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What is thinking? It may seem strange to begin a logic 
textbook with this question. ‘Thinking’ is perhaps 
the most intimate and personal thing that people do. 
Yet the more you ‘think’ about thinking, the more 
mysterious it can appear. It is the sort of thing that one 
intuitively or naturally understands, and yet cannot 
describe to others without great difficulty. Many 
people believe that logic is very abstract, dispassionate, 
complicated, and even cold. But in fact the study of 
logic is nothing more intimidating or obscure than 
this: the study of good thinking.  
Before asking what good thinking is, we might 
want to ask a few questions about thinking as such. 
Let’s say that thinking is the activity of the mind. It 
includes activities like reasoning, perceiving, explain-
ing, inventing, problem solving, learning, teaching, 
contemplating, knowing, and even dreaming. We 
think about everything, all the time. We think about 
ordinary practical matters like what to have for dinner 
tonight, all the way to the most abstract and serious 
matters, like the meaning of life. You are thinking, 
right now, as you read this sentence.  
Some may wish to draw a distinction between 
thinking and feeling, including sense perception, emo-
tional experience, or even religious faith. Some might 
want to argue that computers or animals are capable 
of thinking, even if their way of thinking is somehow 
different from that of humans. And some might say 
that the question is an absurd one: everyone knows 
what thinking is, because everyone ‘thinks’ all the time, 
and everyone can ‘feel’ themselves thinking. We are 
somehow ‘aware’ of thoughts in our minds, aware of 
information and knowledge, aware of memories, and 
aware of likely future probabilities and so on. Thinking 
is a first-order phenomenological insight: it’s a bit like 
knowing what the colour ‘red’ looks like, or knowing 
the taste of an orange. You know what it is, but you 
probably have an awfully hard time describing or 
defining it. 
Thinking, in this way of ‘thinking’ about thinking, 
is an event. It is something done, something that takes 
place, and something that happens. 
There are a lot of serious philosophical (as well as 
scientific) questions about the nature of thinking. For 
instance, we might ask: ‘who is it that knows that he or 
she knows?’ Who is it that is aware of thinking? And is 
not that awareness of thinking itself a kind of think-
ing? This is a line of questioning that may seem as if it 
can go on forever. It’s a little bit beyond the purpose 
of this book to investigate all of them. But if you 
happen to find yourself asking how do you know that 
you know something, or if you find yourself thinking 
about the nature of thinking itself, you may be well on 
your way toward becoming an excellent philosopher!
Why is good thinking important?
A lot of people think of philosophy as something 
rather vague, wishy-washy, or simplistic. You’ll hear 
people quote a line from a popular song or movie, and 
then they’ll say, “That’s my philosophy.” But there’s a lot 
more to it than that; and a person who merely repeats 
a popular saying and calls it philosophy has not been 
doing enough work. Philosophical questions are often 
Introduction
“Thinking … is no more and no less an organ 
of perception than the eye or ear. Just as the 
eye perceives colours and the ear sounds, so 
thinking perceives ideas.” – Rudolph Steiner.
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very difficult questions, and they demand a lot of effort 
and consideration and time. 
Good and bad thinking are very different from 
each other. Yet some people might feel personally 
threatened by this distinction. Your thoughts are prob-
ably the most intimate and the most precious of all 
your possessions. Your mind, indeed, is the only part 
of you that is truly ‘yours’, and cannot be taken away 
from you. Thus if someone tells you that your thinking 
is muddled, confused, unclear, or just plain mistaken, 
then you might feel very hurt or very offended. 
But your thinking certainly can be muddled or 
confused. Normally, bad quality thinking happens 
when your mind has been ‘possessed’, so to speak, by 
other people and made to serve their purposes instead 
of your own. This can happen in various ways. 
In your life so far, you have gathered a lot of beliefs 
about a lot of different topics. You believe things about 
who you are, what the world is like, where you belong 
in the world, and what to do with your life. You have 
beliefs about what is good music and bad music, what 
kind of movies are funny and what kind are boring, 
whether it’s right or wrong to get a tattoo, whether the 
police can be trusted, whether or not there is a god, 
and so on. These beliefs came from somewhere. Most 
of you probably gathered your most important beliefs 
during your childhood. You learned them from your 
family, especially your parents, your teachers at school, 
your piano instructor or your karate instructor, your 
scout group or guide group leader, your priest, your 
medical doctor, your friends, and just about anybody 
who had any kind of influence on your life. There is 
nothing wrong with learning things from other people 
this way; indeed, we probably couldn’t get much of a 
start in life without this kind of influence. But if you 
have accepted your beliefs from these sources, and 
not done your own thinking about them, then they 
are not your beliefs, and you are not truly thinking 
your own thoughts. They are, instead, someone else’s 
thoughts and beliefs, occupying your mind. If you 
believe something only because someone else taught 
it to you, and not because you examined those beliefs 
on your own, then in an important sense, you are not 
having your own thoughts. And if you are not having 
your own thoughts, then you are not living your own 
life, and you are not truly free.
Some people might resist studying logic for 
other reasons. They may prefer to trust their intuition 
or their “gut feelings” as a source of knowledge. I’m 
always very curious about such people. Perhaps they 
think that logic is dispassionate and unemotional, and 
that logical people end up cold-hearted and emotion-
less, like robots. Perhaps they find their intuitive 
beliefs so gratifying that they cannot allow anything to 
interfere with them. Perhaps they worry that they may 
have to re-evaluate their beliefs and their lives, and per-
haps change their lives as a result of that re-evaluation. 
Those things may be true for some people, if not for all 
of them. But when your beliefs are grounded in reason, 
the quality of your inner life will be far, far better, in 
ways like these: 
•	 You will be in greater conscious control of your own 
mind and thoughts. 
•	 It will be harder for advertising, political propaganda, 
peer pressure, scams and confidence tricks, or other 
forms of psychological manipulation to affect you. 
•	 When your actions or motives are questioned, you will 
be much better able to explain yourself effectively and 
persuasively. 
•	 You will be able to understand difficult, complex, and 
challenging ideas a lot easier, and with a lot less anxiety. 
•	 You will be able to understand things in a more 
comprehensive and complete way.
•	 You will be better able to identify the source of your 
problems, whether practical or personal, and better able 
to handle or solve those problems.
•	 You will feel much less frustrated or upset when you 
come across something that you do not understand.
•	 You will be better able to plan for the future, compete 
for better paying or more prestigious jobs, and to gather 
political power.
•	 You will find it easier to stand up to governments, 
employers, and other authorities when they act unjustly.
•	 Tragedies, bad fortune, stress, and other problems in life 
will be easier to deal with.
•	 You will find it easier to understand other people’s 
feelings and other people’s points of view, and you will 
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be better able to help prevent those differences from 
becoming conflicts.
•	 You will get much more pleasure and enjoyment from 
the arts, music, poetry, science, and culture.
•	 You may even enjoy life more than you otherwise 
would.  
Let me add that the use of reason doesn’t shut out 
one’s feelings, or the benefit of the arts or of human re-
lationships, or any of the apparently non-logical things 
that make life enjoyable and fun. Indeed, in classical 
and mediaeval philosophy reason was said to be the 
very presence of God within the human soul. It is by 
means of reason that a human being could get inside 
the mind of God, and obtain an experience of eternity. 
Reason can be a spiritual thing. But, alas, I’ll have to 
discuss that prospect in more detail another time.
There are also social and public benefits to being 
able to reason well. Over the centuries, thoughtful 
individuals and their associates used reason, evidence, 
argument, scientific observation and persuasion 
to work for a more free, peaceful and just society. 
Consider a few examples:
Wang Anshi (11th century):  Chinese economist 
who transformed the civil service examination system 
to prevent nepotism. He instituted various reforms in 
government to protect the rights of the poor, especially 
poor farmers.
Martin Luther (1483-1546):  Christian monk 
from Saxony, who translated the Bible into vulgate 
German so that ordinary people could read it and 
decide for themselves what it meant. His public con-
demnations of corrupt practices in the Roman Church 
(especially including the sale of indulgences) led to 
the creation of Protestantism.
Nellie McClung (1873-1951):  Canadian poli-
tician who, together with four associates (the ‘Famous 
Five’), campaigned to change Canadian law so that 
women would be recognized as persons. This allowed 
women to vote and to be appointed to the Senate.
Edward R. Murrow (1908-1965):  
American journalist and broadcaster. He was one 
of the first reporters to describe to the world the 
crimes against humanity, which took place at the 
Buchenwald Nazi concentration camp. He also 
systematically exposed, and effectively stopped, 
the Communist conspiracy paranoia promoted 
by Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy.
William Wilberforce (1759-1833):  British 
evangelical Christian who was the most influential 
voice in the movement to abolish slavery in the British 
empire in 1807.
Vaclav Havel (1936-2011):  Playwright, 
poet, and political activist who campaigned against 
unjust prosecutions. Eventually becoming President 
of Czechoslovakia, he oversaw the dismantling of 
communism in his country, and of the Warsaw Pact 
military alliance.
Florence Nightingale (1820-1910):  Military 
nurse during the Crimean War, who secularized 
and expanded the profession of nursing, and who 
campaigned for the improvement of public health in 
the British Empire.
Julian Assange (born 1971-):  Australian jour-
nalist and computer programmer who campaigns for 
press freedom, and who founded WikiLeaks, an inter-
national whistleblowing organization which publishes 
leaked secret documents in order to publicize and 
prevent the unjust or criminal actions of corporations 
and governments. 
In their own time, many of these people were 
ridiculed or persecuted. Some of them were, and still 
are, controversial figures, because of other things they 
did (or allegedly did). But all of them changed the 
world for the better, in great or small ways, and at great 
personal risk, through the courageous use of their 
intelligence. I’m going to be bold here and claim that 
every successful social reformer the world has 
ever known has also been a rational and critical 
thinker and speaker. Regardless of their profession, 
every  successful social and political reform was made 
 possible by people who carefully and logically ob-
served, examined and judged the world around them.  
Even great religious prophets and their supporters had 
to show that their teachings could withstand rational 
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scrutiny, and were not simply, nor only, a matter of 
revelation.
By studying logic and critical thinking, you will be 
equipping yourself with the same skills that enabled 
them, and people like them, to become heroes. As an 
exercise, see if you can think of more people to add to 
this list, and give a few reasons to support why they 
belong there.
Is logic difficult?
You might hear people say that they are no good at 
math, or at computer programming, or at some other 
kind of activity that requires a lot of concentration. 
When I was in high school, I used to believe that 
I was very bad at math. I resented going to math 
classes, and so I didn’t study, and (therefore!) scored 
poorly on tests and exams. But one day I found myself 
making my own video games on my Commodore 128 
computer, with no other help besides the dictionary of 
commands. Then a few years later I was coding HTML 
scripts by hand, which I learned to do by reading the 
source codes of other people’s web sites. I eventually 
realized that I was actually rather good at math, or 
rather that I could be really good at it if I really wanted 
to be. 
Thinking rationally and critically is much the 
same thing. It’s actually fairly easy, once you get into 
the habit of doing it. Most people are born with an 
ability to perform complex computational tasks built 
right into their brains. It’s true that we often make 
mistakes when we try to calculate big numbers in our 
heads, or when we try to calculate probabilities with-
out much information to start with. Nonetheless, the 
ability to think deliberately, precisely, and analytically 
is a large part of what it is to be human. Indeed, every 
human language, all 8,000 or so of them, have complex 
computational operators built right into the grammar 
and syntax, which we use to speak and be understood 
about anything we may want to talk about. When we 
study logic, we study (among other things) those very 
operators as they work themselves out, not only in our 
thinking, but also in our speaking to each other, and 
in many of the ways we relate to each other and the 
world. Logic examines not what people ought to think, 
but it examines how we actually do think – when we 
are thinking clearly! 
Here’s a very short exercise which may help to 
show you that you already have within your mind 
everything you need to understand logic and critical 
reasoning. Consider the following two sentences: 
1.  All men are mortal.
2.  Socrates is a man.
As almost anyone can see, these two sentences 
have a relationship to each other. For one thing, there’s 
a topic of discussion that appears in both of them: 
‘men’. Both sentences also follow the same grammati-
cal structure: they name an object and they name at 
least one property that belongs to, or can be attributed 
to, that object. But they also have another, more subtle 
relation to each other. That subtle relation tells you 
what should follow next. Here are three possibilities:
a.  Therefore, we’re having Greek tonight!
b.  Therefore, Socrates is a nerd.
c.  Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
To most people, the answer is so obvious that 
I don’t need to state which one it is. That’s because 
logical and rational thinking, as already mentioned, is 
something we all naturally do, all the time.
That example, it may interest you to know, was 
used by the philosopher Aristotle more than two 
thousand years ago, and it is still a favourite among 
philosophy teachers today: we use it as a way of tip-
ping the hat to our predecessors.
Let’s look at two more examples, which might 
show a little more of how that subtle relation works.
1.  All the houses built in that neighbourhood are post-war 
bungalows.
2.  My house is in that neighbourhood.
3.  Therefore – 
a.  My house is a rotting, decrepit shack.
b.  My house is a grand chateau.
c.  Long John Silver was a rotten businessman.
Introduction
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d.  My house is a post-war bungalow.
1.  Every morning, if it is going to be a sunny day, the 
rooster in the yard crows.
2.  Tomorrow is probably going to be a sunny day, just like 
the last few days.
3.  Therefore – 
a.  That rooster is more reliable as the TV weather-
man.
b.  One of these days, I’m going to kill that horrible 
creature!
c.  My old clock on the wall is a family heirloom.
d.  Tomorrow morning, that rooster will probably 
crow again.
1.  If the surprise birthday present is a Harry Potter book, it 
will be a great gift.
2.  The surprise birthday present is a Harry Potter book.
3.  Therefore – 
a.  I’m going to hide in my bedroom for a few hours.
b.  I really owe the person who gave it to me a big 
thank-you!
c.  I have to fix the leaky roof over the kitchen today.
d.  It’s a great gift.
In each of these examples, the best answer is 
 option D.  So long as the first two statements are true, 
then the third one, option D, must be true.  You also 
know that in both examples, option C doesn’t belong. 
It has nothing to do with the two statements that came 
before it. To claim that option C should come next is 
not logical. Perhaps option C would make sense if it 
was part of a joke, or a very complicated discussion of 
housing development plans for pirates, or inheritance 
laws involving clocks and farm animals, or how author 
J.K. Rowling doesn’t like leaky houses. But in these 
examples, we do not have that extra information. 
Going only with the information that we have been 
given, option C cannot be the correct answer. The best 
answer, in each case, is option D. Of all the four op-
tions offered here, option D has the strongest support 
from the statements that came before it.
But look again at the options A and B in all three 
examples. These options were not as silly as option 
C. They might follow correctly and logically from the 
statements that came before them, if only we had a 
little bit more information. Without your deliberate, 
conscious awareness, your mind probably filled in that 
extra information with statements like these ones:
1.  Maybe all the postwar bungalows in this neighbour-
hood are rotting, decrepit shacks.
2.  Maybe the rooster has never got it wrong so far, unlike 
the TV weatherman, who makes mistakes all the time.
3.  The reason I’ll be hiding in my bedroom is because I 
will want to read the book without anybody disturbing 
me.
4.  People who give great gifts deserve to be thanked.
None of these statements appeared among the 
initial premises of the argument. Nothing in the initial 
premises told you anything about these possibilities. 
They come from outside the argument as presented 
so far. But that subtle relation between statements 
allowed you to add something consistent and plausible 
to the argument in order to move the argument from 
the premises you had, to conclusions A or B. You 
might even fill the space with more than one sentence 
to make the move, as we did in the third possibility 
above. 
Logic is the study of relations among ideas like 
these. If you could handle these three examples here 
with ease, then you can handle everything else in this 
textbook just as easily. 
The Process of Reasoning
The chapters of this book roughly follow a path that I 
shall refer to as ‘The Process of Reasoning’. In the first 
chapter, I will describe the ‘backdrop’ or the ‘setting’ in 
which this process takes place. This backdrop consists 
of problems, intellectual environments, and world 
views. The next chapters follow the stages of the 
‘Process of Reasoning’ itself, which are:
Observe and Question. This first stage requires 
us to gather as much information as we can about 
one’s situation and one’s problems. This stage is studied 
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in chapters 1 and 2, where we discuss questions, and 
various good and bad thinking habits.
Examine Possibilities. This stage teaches a few 
techniques and skills that can help us tell the differ-
ence between good and bad answers to your questions. 
We study these skills in chapters 3 and 4, when we look 
at arguments and fallacies.
Make Your Decision. The process of reasoning 
almost always ends with some kind of judgment or 
choice, or decision to be made, whether it’s a decision 
about what to believe or about what to do. This stage 
is covered in chapters 5 and 6, when we look at reason-
able doubt and moral reasoning.
Observe and Question Again. The last stage 
involves observing and questioning one’s decisions, 
and the consequences that may have followed from 
them, which brings us back to the beginning of the 
process.
This is the Basic edition of “Clear and Present Thinking”. 
An expanded edition is currently in preparation, which will 
offer guidance for examining answers and making decisions 
in specific fields such as science, religion, politics, economics, 
and so on. 
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Before getting into any of the more analytic details of 
logical reasoning, let’s consider the ways in which ideas 
‘play out’ in the world, and the way we arrive at most 
of our beliefs. Most textbooks on modern logic assert 
that the basic unit of logic is the statement – a simple 
sentence which can be either true or false. But it seems 
to me that statements have to come from somewhere, 
and that they do not emerge from nothing. People do 
not come to believe things at random, or by magic. To 
my mind, the most obvious places where statements 
are born are one’s intellectual environments, one’s 
problems, and the questions that you and others in 
your environment tend to ask. Good thinking also 
begins in situations which prompt the mind to think 
differently about what it has taken for granted so far. 
1.1  Intellectual Environments
Where does thinking happen? This may sound as if it’s 
a bit of a silly question. Thinking, obviously, happens 
in your mind. But people do more than just think their 
own thoughts to themselves. People also share their 
thoughts with each other. Thoughts do not remain 
confined within your own brain: they also express them-
selves in your words and your actions. I’d like to go out 
on a bit of a limb here, and say that thinking happens 
not only in your mind, but also any place where two 
or more people gather to talk to one another and 
share their ideas with each other. In short, thinking 
happens wherever two or more people could have a 
dialogue with each other. In that dialogue, at least two 
people (but possibly many more) can express, share, 
trade, move around, examine, criticize, affirm, reject, 
modify, argue about, and generally communicate their 
own and each other’s ideas. 
The importance of dialogue in reasoning is per-
haps most important, and also most obvious, when we 
are reasoning about moral matters. The philosopher 
Charles Taylor said:
Reasoning in moral matters is always reasoning with 
somebody. You have an interlocutor, and you start 
from where that person is, or with the actual difference 
between you; you don’t reason from the ground up, as 
though you were talking to someone who recognized 
no moral demands whatever. 1
What Taylor says about moral reasoning also 
applies to other things we reason about. Whenever 
you have a conversation with someone about whether 
something is right, wrong, true, false, partially both, 
and so on, you do not start the conversation from 
nothing. Rather, you start from your own beliefs about 
such things, and the beliefs held by your partner in 
the conversation, and the extent to which your beliefs 
are the same, or different, as those of the other person. 
It is not by accident that Plato, one of the greatest 
philosophers in history, wrote his books in the form of 
dialogues between Socrates and his friends. Similarly, 
French philosopher Michel Foucault observed 
that especially among Roman writers, philosophy 
was undertaken as a social practice, often within 
institutional structures like schools, but also through 
informal relations like friendships and families. This 
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social aspect of one’s thinking was considered normal 
and even expected:
When, in the practice of the care of the self, one ap-
pealed to another person in whom one recognised an 
aptitude for guidance and counseling, one was exercis-
ing a right. And it was a duty that one was performing 
when one lavished one’s assistance on another... 2
So, to answer the question ‘Where does thinking 
happen?’ we can say: ‘any place where two or more 
people can have a conversation with each other about 
the things that matter to them’. And there are lots of 
such places. Where the Romans might have listed the 
philosophy schools and the political forums among 
those places, we today could add:
•	 Movies, television, pop music, and the entertainment 
industry
•	 Internet-based social networks like Facebook and 
YouTube
•	 Streets, parks, and public squares
•	 Pubs, bars, and concert venues
•	 Schools, colleges, and universities
•	 Mass media
•	 Religious communities and institutions
•	 The arts
•	 The sciences
•	 Courtrooms and legal offices
•	 Political settings, whether on a small or large scale
•	 The marketplace, whether local or global
•	 Your own home, with your family and friends
•	 Can you think of any more places like this?
In each of the places where thinking happens, 
there’s a lot of activity. Questions are asked, answers are 
explored, ideas are described, teachings are presented, 
opinions are argued over, and so on. Some questions 
are treated as more relevant than others, and some 
answers meet with greater approval than others. It 
often happens that in the course of this huge and 
complicated exchange, some ideas become more influ-
ential and more prevalent than others. You find this in 
the way certain words, names, phrases or definitions 
get used more often. And you find it as certain ways 
to describe, define, criticize, praise, or judge things 
are used more often than others. The ideas that are 
expressed and traded around in these ways and in these 
places, and especially the more prevalent ideas, form 
the intellectual environment that we live in. 
Most of the time, your intellectual environment 
will roughly correspond to a social environment: that 
is, it will correspond (at least loosely) to a group of 
people, or a community that you happen to be part of. 
Think about all the groups and communities that you 
belong to, or have belonged to at one time or another:
•	 Families
•	 Sports teams
•	 The student body of your college
•	 The members of any social club you have joined
•	 The people at your workplace
•	 Your religious group (if you are religious)
•	 People who live in the same neighbourhood of your 
town or city
•	 People who speak the same language as you
•	 People who are roughly the same age as you
•	 People who come from the same cultural or ethnic 
background
•	 People who like the same music, movies or books as you
•	 People who play most of the same games as you
•	 Can you think of any more?
An intellectual environment will have a character 
of its own. That is, in one place or among one group 
of people, one idea or group of related ideas may be 
more prevalent than other ideas. In another place 
and among other people, a different set of ideas may 
dominate things. Furthermore, several groups may 
have very similar intellectual environments, or very 
different ones, or overlapping ones. Also note that you 
probably live in more than one social environment, 
and so you are probably hearing ideas from more than 
one intellectual environment too.
An intellectual environment, with its prevalent 
ideas, surrounds everyone almost all the time, and it 
profoundly influences the way people think. It’s where 
we learn most of our basic ideas about life and the 
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world, starting at a very early age. It probably includes 
a handful of stock words and phrases that people can 
use to express themselves and be understood right 
away. This is not to say that people get all of their 
thoughts from their environment. Obviously, people 
can still do their own thinking wherever they are. And 
this is not to say that the contents of your intellectual 
environment will always be the same from one day to 
the next. The philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre observed 
that an intellectual tradition is often a continuity of 
conflict, and not just a continuity of thought. But this 
is to say that wherever you are, and whatever com-
munity you happen to be living in or moving through, 
the prevalent ideas that are expressed and shared by the 
people around you will influence your own thinking 
and your life in profound and often unexpected ways. 
By itself, this fact is not something to be troubled 
about. Indeed, in your early childhood it was probably 
very important for you to learn things from the people 
around you. For instance, it was better for a parent to 
tell you not to touch a hot barbecue with your bare 
hand, than for you to put your hand there yourself and 
find out what it feels like. But as you grow into adult-
hood, it becomes more and more important to know 
what one’s intellectual environment is really like. It is 
very important to know what ideas are prevalent there, 
and to know the extent to which those ideas influence 
you. For if you know the character and content of the 
intellectual environment in which you live, you will be 
much better able to do your own thinking. You might 
end up agreeing with most, or even all of the prevalent 
ideas around you. But you will have agreed with them 
for your own reasons, and not (or not primarily) be-
cause they are the ideas of the people around you. And 
that will make an enormous difference in your life.
Some intellectual environments are actually 
hostile to reason and rationality. Some people become 
angry, feel personally attacked, or will deliberately re-
sist the questioning of certain ideas and beliefs. Indeed, 
some intellectual environments hold that intellectual 
thinking is bad for you! Critical reasoning sometimes 
takes great courage, especially when your thoughts go 
against the prevalent ideas of the time and place where 
you live.
1.2  World Views
Eventually, the ideas that you gathered from your 
intellectual environment, along with a few ideas of 
your own that you developed along the way come 
together in your mind. They form in your mind a kind 
of plan, a picture, or a model of what the world is 
like, and how it acts, and so on. This plan helps you to 
understand things, and also helps you make decisions. 
Philosophers sometimes call this plan a world view.
Think for a moment about some of the biggest, 
deepest and most important questions in human life. 
These questions might include:
•	 What should I do with my life? Where should I go 
from here? Should I get married? What career should I 
pursue? Where is my place in the world? How do I find 
it? How do I create it?
•	 Is there a God? What is God like? Is there one god, or 
many gods? Or no gods at all? And if there is, how do I 
know? And if there’s not, how do I know?
•	 Why are we here? Why are we born? Is there any point 
to it all? 
•	 What is my society really like? Is it just or unjust? And 
what is Justice?
•	 Who am I? What kind of person do I want to be? 
•	 What does it mean to be an individual? What does it 
mean to be a member of society?
•	 What happens to us when we die?
•	 What do I have to do to pass this course?
•	 Just what are the biggest, deepest and most important 
questions anyway?
These are philosophical questions. (Well, all but 
one of them.) Your usual way of thinking about these 
questions, and others like them is your world view. 
Obviously, most people do not think about these 
questions all of the time. We are normally dealing with 
more practical, immediate problems. What will I have 
for dinner tonight? If the traffic is bad, how late might 
I be? Is it time to buy a new computer? What’s the best 
way to train a cat to use the litter-box?
But every once in a while, a limit situation will ap-
pear, and it will prompt us to think about higher and 
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deeper things. And then the way that we think about 
these higher and deeper things ends up influencing 
the way that we live, the way we make choices, the 
ways that we relate to other people, and the way we 
handle almost all of our problems. The sum of your 
answers to those higher and deeper questions is called 
your ‘world view’.
The word ‘world view’ was first coined by German 
philosopher Albert Schweitzer, in a book called “The 
Decay and Restoration of Civilization”, first published 
in 1923. Actually, the word that Schweitzer coined 
here is the German word Weltanshauung. There are 
several possible ways to translate this word. In the text 
quoted above, as you can see, it’s translated as “theory 
of the universe”. It could also be translated as “theory of 
things” or “world conception”. Most English speakers 
use the simpler and more elegant sounding phrase 
“world view”. Here’s how Schweitzer himself defined it:
The greatest of the spirit’s tasks is to produce a theory of 
the universe. What is meant by a theory of the universe? 
It is the content of the thoughts of society and the 
individuals which compose it about the nature and 
object of the world in which they live, and the position 
and the destiny of mankind and of individual men 
within it. What significance has the society in which I 
live and I myself in the world? What do we want to do 
in the world? What do we hope to get from it? What is 
our duty to it? The answer given by the majority to these 
fundamental questions about existence decides what 
the spirit is in which they and their age live. (Schweitzer, 
The Decay and Restoration of Civilization, pg. 80-1)
Schweitzer’s idea here is that a world-view is 
more than a group of beliefs about the nature of the 
world. It is also a bridge between those scientific or 
metaphysical beliefs, and the ethical beliefs about 
what people can and should do in the world. It is 
the intellectual narrative in terms of which the actions, 
choices, and purposes of individuals and groups make 
sense. It therefore has indispensable practical utility: 
it is the justification for a way of life, for individuals 
and for whole societies. In this sense, a world view 
is not just something you ‘have’; it is also something 
that you ‘live with’. And we cannot live without one.  
“For individuals as for the community,” Schweitzer 
said, “life without a theory of things is a pathological 
disturbance of the higher capacity for self-direction.” 
(Schweitzer, ibid, pg. 86)
Let’s define a world view as follows: A world 
view is the sum of a set of related answers to 
the most important questions in life. Your own 
world view, whatever it is, will be the sum of your own 
answers to your philosophical questions, whatever 
you take those questions to be, and whether you have 
thought about them consciously or not. Thus your 
world view is intimately tied to your sense of who you 
are, how you want to live, how you see your place in 
your world and the things that are important to you. 
Not only your answers to the big questions, but also 
your choice of which questions you take to be the 
big questions, will form part of your world view. And 
by the way, that’s a big part of why people don’t like 
hearing criticism. A judgment of a world view is often 
taken to be a judgment of one’s self and identity. But it 
doesn’t have to be that way.
Some world views are so widely accepted by many 
people, perhaps millions of people, and are so histori-
cally influential, perhaps over thousands of years, that 
they have been given names. Here are a few examples:
Modernism: referring to the values associated 
with contemporary western civilization, including 
democracy, capitalism, industrial production, scientific 
reasoning, human rights, individualism, etc.
Heliocentrism: the idea that the sun is at the 
centre of our solar system, and that all the planets (and 
hundreds of asteroids, comets, minor planets, etc.) 
orbit around the sun.
Democracy: the idea that the legitimacy of 
the government comes from the will of the people, 
as expressed in free and fair elections, parliamentary 
debate, etc.
Christianity: The idea that God exists; that hu-
mankind incurred an ‘original sin’ due to the events in 
the Garden of Eden, and that God became Man in the 
person of Jesus to redeem humanity of its original sin.
Islam: The idea that God exists, and that Moham-
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med was the last of God’s prophets, and that we attain 
blessedness when we live by the five pillars of submis-
sion: daily prayer, charity, fasting during Ramadan, 
pilgrimage to Mecca, and personal struggle.
Marxism: The idea that all political and eco-
nomic corruption stems from the private ownership 
of the means of production, and that a more fair and 
just society is one in which working class people col-
lectively own the means of production.
Deep Ecology: The idea that there is an im-
portant metaphysical correlation between the self and 
the earth, or that the earth forms a kind of expanded 
or extended self; and that therefore protecting the 
environment is as much an ethical requirement as is 
protecting oneself.
The Age of Aquarius / The New Age: 
The idea that an era of peace, prosperity, spiritual 
enlightenment, and complete happiness is about to 
dawn upon humankind. The signs of this coming era 
of peace can be found in astrology, psychic visions, 
Tarot cards, spirit communications, and so on.
And some of these world views may have other, 
sub-views bundled inside them. For instance:
Democracy a.  Liberalism
  b.  Conservatism
  c.  Democratic Socialism
Buddhism a.  Mahayana
  b.  Theravada
  c.  Tibetan Bon-Po
  d.  Zen
Clearly, not all world views are the same. Some 
have different beliefs, different assumptions, different 
explanations for things, and different plans for how 
people should live. Not only do they produce different 
answers to these great questions, but they often start 
out with different great questions. Some are so radi-
cally different from each other that the people who 
subscribe to different world views might find it very 
difficult to understand each other. 
In summary, your world view and the intellectual 
environment in which you live, when taken together, 
form the basic background of your thinking. They are 
the source of most of our ideas about nearly every-
thing. If you are like most people, your world view and 
your intellectual environment overlap each other: they 
both support most of the same ideas. Sometimes there 
will be slight differences between them; sometimes 
you may find differences so large that you may feel 
that one of them must be seriously wrong, in whole or 
in part. Differing world views and differing intellectual 
environments often lead to social and personal con-
flict. It can be very important, therefore, to consciously 
and deliberately know what your own world view 
really is, and to know how to peacefully sort out the 
problems that may arise when you encounter people 
who have different world views.
1.3  Framing Language
 
One of the ways that your intellectual environment 
and your world view expresses itself is in the use of 
framing language. These are the words, phrases, 
metaphors, symbols, definitions, grammatical 
structures, questions, and so on which we use to 
think and speak of things in a certain way. We 
frame things by describing or defining them with 
certain interpretations in mind. We also frame things 
by the way we place emphasis on certain words and 
not on others. And we frame things by interpreting 
and responding selectively to things said by others. 
As an example, think of some of the ways that 
people speak about their friendships and relationships. 
We say things like “We connected”, “Let’s hook up”, 
“They’re attached to each other”, and “They separated”. 
We sometimes speak of getting married as “getting 
hitched”. These phrases borrow from the vocabulary of 
machine functions. And to use them is to place human 
relations within the frame of machine functions. Now 
this might be a very useful way to talk about relation-
ships, and if so, then it is not so bad. But if for some 
reason you need to think or speak of a relationship 
differently, then you may need to invent a new framing 
language with which to talk about it. And if this is the 
only framing language you’ve ever used to talk about 
relationships, it might be extremely difficult for you to 
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think about relationships any other way. 
As a thought experiment, see if you can invent a 
framing language for your friendships and relation-
ships based on something else. Try using a framing 
language based on cooking, or travel, or music, or 
house building, as examples.
Here’s another example of the use of framing 
language. Consider the following two statements:
“In the year 1605, Guy Fawkes attempted to start a peo-
ple’s revolution against corruption, inherited privilege, 
and social injustice in the British government.” 
“In the year 1605, Guy Fawkes planned a terrorist attack 
against against a group of Protestant politicians, in an 
attempt to install a Catholic theocracy in Britain.”
Both of these statements, taken as statements of 
fact, are true. But they are both framed very differently. 
In the first statement, Fawkes is portrayed as a coura-
geous political activist. In the second, he is framed (!) 
as a dangerous religious fanatic. And because of the 
different frames, they lead the reader to understand 
and interpret the man’s life and purposes very differ-
ently. This, in turn, leads the reader to draw different 
conclusions.
In other situations, the use of framing language 
can have serious economic or political consequences. 
Consider, as an example, the national debate that took 
place in the United States over the Affordable Health 
Care Act of 2009. The very name of the legislation itself 
framed the discussion in the realm of market econom-
ics: the word ‘affordable’ already suggests that the issue 
has to do with money. And most people who partici-
pated in that national debate, including supporters 
and opponents and everything in between, spoke of 
health care as if it is a kind of market commodity, 
which can be bought or sold for a price. The debate 
thus became primarily a matter of questions like who 
will pay for it (the state? individuals? insurance compa-
nies?), and whether the price is fair. But there are other 
ways to talk about health care besides the language of 
economics. Some people frame heath care as a human 
right. Some frame it as a form of organized human 
compassion, and some as a religious duty. But once 
the debate had been framed in the language of market 
economics, these other ways of thinking about health 
care were mostly excluded from the debate itself.
As noted earlier, it’s probably not possible to speak 
about anything without framing it one way or another. 
But your use of framing language can limit or restrict 
the way things can be thought of and spoken about. 
They can even prevent certain ways of thinking and 
speaking. And when two or more people conversing 
with each other frame their topic differently, some 
unnecessary conflict can result, just as if they were 
starting from different premises or presupposing dif-
ferent world views. So it can be important to monitor 
one’s own words, and know what frame you are using, 
and whether that frame is assisting or limiting your 
ability to think and speak critically about a particular 
issue. It can also be important to listen carefully to 
the framing language used by others, especially if a 
difference between their framing language and yours 
is creating problems.
And speaking of problems: this leads us to the 
point where the process of critical thinking begins.
1.4  Problems
Usually, logic and critical thinking skills are invoked in 
response to a need. And often, this need takes the form 
of a problem which can’t be solved until you gather 
some kind of information. Sometimes the problem is 
practical: that is, it has to do with a specific situation in 
your everyday world. 
For example:
•	 Perhaps you have an unusual illness and you want to 
recover as soon as possible. 
•	 Perhaps you are an engineer and your client wants you 
to build something you’ve never built before. 
•	 Perhaps you just want to keep cool on a very hot day 
and your house doesn’t have an air conditioner. 
The problem could also be theoretical: in that case, 
it has to do with a more general issue which impacts 
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your whole life altogether, but perhaps not any single 
separate part of it in particular. Religious and philo-
sophical questions tend to be theoretical in this sense. 
For example:
•	 You might have a decision to make which will change 
the direction of your life irreversibly. 
•	 You might want to make up your mind about whether 
God exists. 
•	 You might be mourning the death of a beloved friend. 
•	 You might be contemplating whether there is special 
meaning in a recent unusual dream. 
•	 You might be a parent and you are considering the best 
way to raise your children.
 
The philosopher Karl Jaspers described a special 
kind of problem, which he thought was the origin of 
philosophical thinking. He called this kind of problem 
a Grenzsituationen, or a “limit situation”.  
Limit situations are moments, usually accompanied by 
experiences of dread, guilt or acute anxiety, in which the 
human mind confronts the restrictions and pathologi-
cal narrowness of its existing forms, and allows itself to 
abandon the securities of its limitedness, and so to enter 
new realm of self-consciousness. 3
In other words, a limit situation is a situation in 
which you meet something in the world that is unex-
pected and surprising. It is a situation that more or less 
forces you to acknowledge that your way of thinking 
about the world so far has been very limited, and that 
you have to find new ways to think about things in 
order to solve your problems and move forward with 
your life. This acknowledgement, according to Jaspers, 
produces anxiety and dread. But it also opens the way 
to new and (hopefully!) better ways of thinking about 
things. 
In general, a limit situation appears when some-
thing happens to you in your life that you have never 
experienced before, or which you have experienced 
very rarely. It might be a situation in which a long-
standing belief you have held up until now suddenly 
shows itself to have no supporting evidence, or that the 
consequences of acting upon it turn out very differ-
ently than expected. You may encounter a person from 
a faraway culture whose beliefs are very different from 
yours, but whom you must regularly work with at your 
job, or around your neighbourhood. You may experi-
ence a crisis event in which you are at risk of death. A 
limit situation doesn’t have to be the sort of experience 
that provokes a nervous breakdown or a crisis of faith, 
nor does it have to be a matter of life and death. But 
it does tend to be the type of situation in which your 
usual and regular habits of thinking just can’t help 
you. It can also be a situation in which you have to 
make a decision of some kind, which doesn’t necessar-
ily require you to change your beliefs, but which you 
know will change your life in a non-trivial way. 
1.5  Observation
Thus far, we have noted the kinds problems that tend 
to get thinking started, and the background in which 
thinking takes place. Now we can get on to studying 
thinking itself. In the general introduction, I wrote 
that clear critical thinking involves a process. The first 
stage of that process is observation.
When observing your problem, and the situation 
in which it appears, try to be as objective as possible. 
Being objective, here, means being without influ-
ence from personal feelings, interests, biases, or 
expectations, as much as possible. It means observing 
the situation as an uninvolved and disinterested third-
person observer would see it. (By ‘disinterested’ here, 
I mean a person who is curious about the situation 
but who has no personal stake in what is happening; 
someone who is neither benefitted nor harmed as the 
situation develops.) Although it might be impossible 
to be totally, completely, and absolutely objective, 
still it certainly is possible to be objective enough to 
understand a situation as clearly and as completely as 
needed in order to make a good decision.
When you are having a debate with someone 
it is often very easy, and tempting, to simply accuse 
your opponent of being biased, and therefore in no 
position to understand something properly or make 
Chapter One 1.5 Observation
3 Stanford encyclopaedia of philosophy, online edition, entry on Karl Jaspers.
22
decisions. If someone is truly biased about a certain 
topic, it is rational to doubt what someone says about 
that topic. But having grounds for reasonable doubt 
is not the same as having evidence that a proposition 
is false. Moreover, having an opinion, or a critical 
judgment about something, or a world view, is not the 
same as having a bias. Let us define a bias here as the 
holding of a belief or a judgment about something 
even after evidence of the weakness or the faulti-
ness of that judgment has been presented. We will 
see more about this when we discuss Value Programs. 
For now, just consider the various ways in which we 
can eliminate bias from one’s observations as much as 
possible. Here are a few examples:
•	 Take stock of how clearly you can see or hear what is 
going on. Is something obstructing your vision? Is it too 
bright, or too dark? Are there other noises nearby which 
make it hard for you to hear what someone is saying?
•	 Describe your situation in words, and as much as pos-
sible use value-neutral words in your description. Make 
no statement in your description about whether what 
is happening is good or bad, for you or for anyone else. 
Simply state as clearly as possible what is happening. If 
you cannot put your situation into words, then you will 
almost certainly have a much harder time understand-
ing it objectively, and reasoning about it.
•	 Describe, also, how your situation makes you feel. Is the 
circumstance making you feel angry, sad, elated, fearful, 
disgusted, indignant, or worried? Has someone said 
something that challenges your world view? Your own 
emotional responses to the situation is part of what is 
‘happening’. And these too can be described in words so 
that we can reason about them later.
•	 Also, observe your instincts and intuitions. Are you 
feeling a ‘pull’, so to speak, to do something or not do 
something in response to the situation? Are you already 
calculating or predicting what is likely to happen next? 
Put these into words as well.
•	 Using numbers can often help make the judgment more 
objective. Take note of anything in the situation that can 
be counted, or measured mathematically: times, dates, 
distances, heights, shapes, angles, sizes, monetary values, 
computer bytes (kilobytes, megabytes, etc. ), and so on.
•	 Take note of where your attention seems to be going. Is 
anything striking you as especially interesting or un-
usual or unexpected?
•	 If your problem is related to some practical purpose, 
take note of everything you need to know in order to 
fulfill that purpose. For instance, if your purpose is to 
operate some heavy machinery, and your problem is 
that you’ve never used that machine before, take note of 
the condition of the safety equipment, and the signs of 
wear and tear on the machine itself, and who will be 
acting as your “spotter”, and so on.
•	 If other people are also observing the situation with 
you, consult with them. Share your description of the 
situation with them, and ask them to share their de-
scription with you. Find out if you can see what they are 
seeing, and show them what you are seeing. Also, try to 
look for the things that they might be missing. 
Separating your observations from your judg-
ments and opinions can often be difficult. But the 
more serious the problem, the more important it can 
be to observe something non-judgmentally, before 
coming to a decision.  With that in mind, here’s a short 
exercise: which of the following are observations, and 
which are judgments? Or, are some of them a bit of 
both?
•	 That city bus has too many people on it.
•	 The letter was delivered to my door by the postman at 
10:30 am.
•	 The two of them were standing so close to each other 
that they must be lovers.
•	 The clothes she wore suggested she probably came from 
a very rich family.
•	 The kitchen counter looked like it had been recently 
cleaned.
•	 He was swearing like a sailor.
•	 The old television was too heavy for him to carry.
•	 There’s too much noise coming from your room, and it’s 
driving me crazy!
•	 The latest James Bond film was a lot of fun.
•	 The latest James Bond film earned more than $80 mil-
lion in its first week.
•	 I hate computers!
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•	 The guy who delivered the pizza pissed me off because 
he was late.
1.6 Questions
Perhaps more than the problems do, good questions 
get the mind thinking as well. Questions express 
doubts, identify problems, call for solutions and de-
mand answers. Indeed we might not fully understand 
the nature of a given problem until we have asked a 
decent question about it. Moreover, the best answers to 
one’s questions tend to become ideas, beliefs, proposi-
tions, theories, arguments and world views. These, in 
turn, guide our lives and our choices in numerous 
ways. But some kinds of questions are better than oth-
ers, and it can be important to discern the differences 
between them. 
Good questions are:
1. Tenacious. We cannot easily put them away or 
ignore them. 
2. Direct. They address the actual problem that 
you are facing, and not a tangential or unrelated issue.
3. Searching. When you pose a good question, 
you don’t already know the answer. You might have a 
rough or vague idea of what the answer might be, but 
you don’t know for sure yet, and you are committed 
to finding out. Or, you might have several possible 
answers, and you want to find out whether any of 
them are good answers, or which one is the best.
4. Systematic. Although you don’t have a 
clear answer to your question, still your question is 
associated with a method or a plan, even if only a loose 
one, with which you can search for an answer. In other 
words: even when you don’t know the answer, you still 
know what you’re doing, and you’re not scrambling in 
the dark. You have an idea where to look for an answer. 
And you are covering every place where a useful 
answer could be found, leaving nothing out.
5. Useful. The process of answering a good ques-
tion actually helps you solve your problem.
6. Open. There might be more than one possible 
correct answer. (There can also be more than one 
possible wrong answer.) With several good answers 
to your question, you may have to do a lot more 
work to find which of them is the best one, if your 
circumstance requires you to pick just one answer. But 
that work is ultimately very useful, and almost always 
leads us to better quality answers.
7. Fertile. Some of the better answers to the 
question prompt more good questions. In this way, 
good questions can keep the mind active.
8. Controversial. A good question is often 
one which addresses itself to beliefs, ideas, ways of 
living, etc., which people normally take for granted. 
It may even be a question that no one else or very few 
others are asking. This does not necessarily mean that 
the questioner is being aggressive or confrontational. It 
should still be a searching question, and a direct ques-
tion, and so on. But with a controversial question, the 
questioner often places herself at odds, in some way, 
with those who are committed to the beliefs being 
questioned, or who might not want the question asked 
at all. Indeed a controversial question can sometimes 
place the questioner in some danger by the very act 
of asking it. That danger might be social: by asking 
the question, she might risk being cold-shouldered or 
ostracized by her friends. Or it might be physical: by 
asking the question, she might place herself at odds 
against politically or economically powerful people 
and institutions, such as the law or one’s employer.
The more of these qualities that a question has, the 
better a question it is. There are also several kinds of 
bad questions. Here are a few examples:
Rhetorical questions. This is a question 
in which the questioner already knows the answer, 
and is trying to prompt that same answer from his 
or her listeners. Although rhetorical questions can 
be interesting and perfectly appropriate in poems or 
storytelling, in a nonfiction text or in a more ‘straight 
talk’ conversation they are stylistically weak. Rhetorical 
questions are often plain statements of belief or of fact 
merely phrased in the form of a question. So it is gen-
erally better to state the belief or the fact directly as a 
proposition. Also, it’s always possible that someone else 
will answer the rhetorical question in an unexpected 
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way. Rhetorical questions can also be used as forms of 
verbal aggression. They position the questioner as the 
controller of the debate, and they place others on the 
defensive, and make it harder for them to contribute to 
the debate as an equal.
Leading questions. These are questions that 
are designed to manipulate someone into believing 
something that they may or may not otherwise believe. 
Normally, leading questions come in a series, and the 
series is designed to make someone predisposed to 
respond to the last question in the series in a particular 
way. Leading questions are often used in a form of 
political campaigning called ‘push polling’ (to be 
discussed in the chapter on Reasonable Doubt).
Loaded or Complex Questions. A loaded 
question is one that cannot be given a straight answer 
unless the person answering it accepts a proposition 
that he or she might not want to accept. (More discus-
sion of this kind of question appears in the chapter on 
Fallacies.) Like rhetorical questions, loaded questions 
can also be used aggressively, to control a debate and to 
subordinate the other contributors.
Obstructionist questions. This is the kind 
of question that someone asks in order to interrupt 
someone else’s train of thought. Obstructionist ques-
tions often look like good questions, and in a different 
context they may be perfectly reasonable. But the ob-
structionist question is designed distract a discussion 
away from the original topic, and prevent the discus-
sion from reaching a new discovery or a clear decision. 
Typically, the obstructionist question asks about defini-
tions, or pushes the discussion into a very abstract 
realm. It may also involve needlessly hair-splitting the 
meaning of certain words. In this sense an obstruction-
ist question is much like the fallacy of ‘red herring’. 
As an example, someone might obstruct a discussion 
of whether same-sex couples should be allowed to 
marry by saying: “Well, that all depends on what you 
mean by ‘marriage’. What is marriage, anyway?”
Framing Questions. The framing question 
uses specific words, terms, and phrases to limit the way 
a certain topic can be discussed. There’s probably no 
such thing as a question that doesn’t frame the answers 
that flow from it, even if only in a small way. But it is 
possible to ‘cook’ or to ‘rig’ a question such that the 
only direct answers are ones which remain within a 
certain limited field of assumptions, or within a certain 
limited world view. Framing questions may even share 
some of the qualities of good questions: they might 
allow more than one answer, or they might open the 
way to further questions. But they are also like loaded 
questions in that they presuppose a certain way of 
thinking or talking about the topic, and you can’t give 
a straight answer unless you reply within the bounds 
of that way of thinking and talking. 
Empty Questions. A question is empty when 
it has no answer. Sometimes people will declare a 
question to be empty when in fact it is ‘open’: but a 
question with more than one possible good answer 
is not an empty question. So it is important to 
understand the difference between the two. A question 
is empty when all its answers lead to dead ends: when, 
for instance, the best answers are neither true nor false, 
or when different answers are nothing more than dif-
ferent descriptions of the same situation, or when the 
question cannot be given a direct answer at all. Such 
questions might be interesting for artistic or religious 
or similar purposes, and they can be the basis for 
some beautiful poems and meditations, or some very 
enjoyable comedy. But reasoning about such questions 
in a logical or systematic way doesn’t produce any 
new discoveries. An empty question cannot tell you 
anything you don’t already know.
By the way: when you are trying to observe a situa-
tion as objectively as possible before making a decision 
about it, you can also try to observe the way other 
people are talking about it. What kind of questions are 
they asking? What kind of framing language are they 
using in their descriptions? This, too, is part of the first 
stage in the process of reasoning.
And before moving on: there are things you 
should look for in a good answer to a good question. 
One of those things is that a good answer can be 
expressed in the form of a proposition. But we will see 
more about propositions a little later on.
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1.7  Differing World Views
Perhaps the most difficult things to observe and ques-
tion are your own beliefs. So let’s look at how to do 
exactly that. 
Once in a while, you are going to encounter dif-
ferences between your world view and the intellectual 
environment in which you live. And you are also likely 
to encounter differences between your world view 
and other people’s world views, and differences in the 
intellectual environments of different religions, politi-
cal arrangements and cultures. And in some of those 
situations, you will not be able to just stand back and 
‘live and let live’. A judgment may have to be made, for 
instance about which world view you are personally 
prepared to live by, or which one you will support 
with your money or your votes or your actions in your 
community. You are also going to occasionally discover 
places where your world view doesn’t “work”, that is, 
places where it clearly does not help you understand 
the world, nor do what you want it to do.
Remember, you probably subscribe to several 
world views at the same time, some religious, some po-
litical, some cultural, some philosophical or scientific. 
In fact you probably subscribe to two or three world 
views at the same time, without consciously realizing 
it. Again, there’s nothing wrong with that: we probably 
wouldn’t be able to think about anything if we didn’t 
have one.
But not all world views are created the same. Some 
are problematic, whether in great or small ways. Some 
are seriously faulty. If some part of your world view 
is faulty, this can muddle your thinking, and create 
conflict between you and other people. Thus it is very 
important to learn to tell the difference between a 
faulty world view and an acceptable one.
Some world views are faulty because their ideas 
concerning the nature of the world have been 
proven wrong through scientific discovery, such as 
the Ptolemaic model of the solar system, the ‘four ele-
ments’ theory of matter or the ‘four humours’ theory 
of medicine. Others are faulty because their political 
and moral consequences have turned out to be very 
destructive. Mediaeval feudalism, Soviet communism, 
Nazism, racism, sexism, and prejudice, are the best-
known examples of morally faulty world views. Some 
world views that are deeply faulty may have one or 
two features that seem very appealing and plausible. 
The way the sun rises in the east and sets in the west 
certainly makes it look as if the earth is standing still 
and the sun is traveling around it, as the Ptolemaic 
world view suggests. The ‘four humours’ theory of 
medicine seems to correspond elegantly to the ‘four 
elements’ theory of matter. Under Soviet communism, 
from Stalin’s time in the early 1940’s until the fall of 
the Berlin Wall in 1989, nobody was unemployed. 
And in Nazi Germany, productive and high-achieving 
workers could receive a free holiday trip, paid for by 
the government. But these apparent benefits should 
not blind you to the moral and empirical failures of a 
faulty world view.
Schweitzer described three properties that he 
thought an acceptable world view had to have. In 
his view, an acceptable world view had to be: rational, 
ethical, and optimistic. Let’s see how Schweitzer 
explains each of these points in turn.
First, an acceptable world view is rational when 
it is the product of a lot of careful thinking about the 
way things really are.
“Only what has been well turned over in the thought 
of the many, and thus recognised as truth, possesses a 
natural power of conviction which will work on other 
minds and will continue to be effective. Only where 
there is a constant appeal to the need of a reflective view 
of things are all man’s spiritual capacities called into 
activity.”  (Schweitzer, ibid pg. 86-7.)
This is stipulated in order that the world view 
may help people come to an understanding of the 
world and of one another. A world-view derived from 
unreflective instincts and impulses, in his view, cannot 
properly reflect reality, nor will it have sufficient power 
to motivate people to take action when they should.
Now, Schwitzer’s words in that quotation might 
seem very circular. It may look as if he’s saying ‘a world 
view is rational when it’s rational’. But what I suspect 
Schweitzer had in mind is something like this. A 
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world view is rational when lots of people examine it 
carefully and critically, and in so doing, they determine 
whether or not it is actually able to explain things. 
Thus an acceptably rational world view corresponds 
appropriately and usefully to the world as people 
actually experience it. In that sense, a rational world 
view is a highly realistic one.
Second, an acceptable world view is ethical when 
it can tell us something about the difference between 
right and wrong, and when it can help us become 
better human beings.
“Ethics is the activity of man directed to secure the 
inner perfection of his own personality... From the ethi-
cal comes ability to develop the purposive state of mind 
necessary to produce action on the world and society, 
and to cause the co-operation of all our achievements 
to secure the spiritual and moral perfection of the indi-
vidual which is the final end of civilization.”  
(ibid pg. 94-5)
It’s important to note here that when Schweitzer 
speaks of a world view as ‘ethical’, he is not saying that 
an acceptable world view has to include certain spe-
cific moral statements. He is not saying, for example, 
that an ethically acceptable world view must be Chris-
tian, or that it must be Liberal, or whatever. Rather, 
he is saying that it has to have something to say about 
what is right or wrong, and something to say about how 
we can become better human beings, whatever that 
something might be. One world view might say that it is 
always wrong to harm animals, for instance. Another 
might say it can be right to harm animals under 
certain conditions. A third might claim that it is never 
wrong to harm animals. The point is not that one of 
these three possibilities is acceptable and the others 
aren’t. The point is that all three of them are robust 
propositions about morality, regardless of whether you 
agree or disagree with them. Thus all three of those 
examples can be part of an acceptable world view. 
It can often be tempting to say that a world view is 
unacceptable or invalid because it asserts moral claims 
that you find disagreeable. Doing so can make you 
look strong-willed and more certain of your values. But 
it can also create unnecessary conflict with others who 
are just as strongly committed to their own different 
world views. Remember, it is possible to acknowledge 
that a world view is ‘acceptable’ in Schweitzer’s sense, 
while at the same time disagreeing with it.
Schweitzer’s third criteria for an acceptable world 
view is that it must be optimistic. By this he means 
that it must presuppose that life on earth is valuable 
and good.
“That theory of the universe is optimistic which gives 
existence the preference as against non-existence and 
thus affirms life as something possessing value in itself. 
From this attitude to the universe and to life results the 
impulse to raise existence, in so far as our influence can 
affect it, to its highest level of value. Thence originates 
activity directed to the improvement of the living condi-
tions of individuals, of society, of nations and of human-
ity.” (Schweitzer, ibid, pp. 93-4) 
Overall, according to Schweitzer, a world view that 
is not rational, not optimistic, and not ethical, whether 
in whole or in part, is (to that extent) a problematic or 
a faulty world view.
1.8  Value Programs
One important type of faulty world view is the kind 
which Canadian philosopher John McMurtry called 
a “value program”. Value programs are world views 
which have the following two qualities: 
•	 There’s at least one proposition about values that cannot 
be questioned under any circumstances or for any 
reason, even when there is evidence available which 
shows that the proposition is weak, open to reasonable 
doubt, or even clearly false. 
•	 Acting on the unquestionable proposition, and behav-
ing and making choices as if that proposition is true, 
tends to cause a lot of preventable harm to people, or to 
their environments. 
Here are McMurtry’s own words, to describe what 
value programs are like: 
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In the pure-type case, which will be our definition 
of a value program, all people enact its prescriptions 
and functions as presupposed norms of what they all 
ought to do. All assume its value designations and 
value exclusions as givens. They seek only to climb its 
ladder of available positions to achieve their deserved 
reward as their due. Lives are valued, or not valued, in 
terms of the system’s differentials and measurements. 
All fulfill its specified roles without question and 
accept its costs, however widespread, as unavoidable 
manifestations of reality. In the strange incoherence of 
the programmed mind, the commands of the system 
are seen as both freely chosen and as laws of nature, or 
God... Those who are harmed by the value program 
are ignored, or else blamed for falling on its wrong 
side, because its rule is good and right. Its victims 
must, it is believed, be at fault. A value program’s 
ideology is in great part devoted to justifying the 
inevitability of the condition of the oppressed. 4
McMurtry added to his discussion that world 
views become value programs not due to a fault in 
human nature, but rather due to a kind of social 
or psychological conditioning: “...it is not “human 
nature” that is the problem. The problem is not in 
how we are constructed, but in the inert repetition of 
the mind, a condition that does not question socially 
conditioned value programs.”5 
It’s usually easy to identify value programs from 
history: mediaeval feudalism, for instance. But perhaps 
the more important questions are:
•	 What are the value programs of our time?
•	 Are you, or the people around you, unknowingly 
subscribing to a value program?
•	 Are there propositions in your intellectual environ-
ment which cannot be questioned, or which can be 
questioned but only at great personal risk?
•	 Is anyone harmed through the ways you live your life in 
accordance with the teachings of your world view? How 
are those harms explained? And are those explanations 
justifiable? Why or why not?
•	 In what ways, if at all, does your world view meet, or fail 
to meet, Schweitzer’s three criteria for acceptability?
As an exercise, have a look at this short list of 
world views of our time, and think about whether any 
of them are value programs, and why (or why not):
•	 Representative parliamentary democracy.
•	 Free-market capitalism.
•	 Human rights.
•	 The ‘trickle-down’ theory of economics.
•	 The right to bear arms.
•	 The pro-choice movement.
•	 The pro-life movement.
•	 Manifest Destiny.
•	 The ‘fandom’ of any professional sports team.
•	 The official platform of any major political party.
•	 The teachings, doctrines, and creeds of any major 
religion.
1.9  World Views, Civilization, and Conflict
In 1993, American historian and political scientist 
Samuel Huntington published a paper called “A Clash 
of Civilizations?” In that paper he defined ‘civilization’ 
as “the highest cultural grouping of people and the 
broadest level of cultural identity people have short of 
that which distinguishes humans from other species.” 6 
The idea here is like this. Think of the biggest grouping 
of people that you feel part of, such that the only 
grouping of people that is larger than that one is the 
human race as a whole. You will probably find yourself 
thinking about more than just your country or your 
religion, or those who speak the same language as you. 
Rather, you will find yourself thinking of people who 
share a few simple concepts in their world views, even 
while they live in different countries or speak different 
languages. With this definition in mind, Huntington 
thought that there are nine civilizations active in the 
world right now: Western, Latin American, Slavic, 
Middle Eastern, African, Hindu, Chinese, Buddhist, 
and Japanese. Huntington also thought that some 
countries, such as Ethiopia, and Turkey, are ‘torn’ coun-
tries. In a torn country, some forces in that country are 
working to transition the country from one civiliza-
tion to another, while at the same time other forces in 
the same country resist that transition.
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Huntington further argued that differences in 
world view and civilization are going to be the basis 
for all future armed conflict. 
“...the fundamental source of conflict in this new world 
will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. 
The great divisions among humankind and the domi-
nating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states 
will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, 
but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur 
between nations and groups of different civilizations.” 
(Huntington, ibid.) 
Finally, Huntington also gives a particular privi-
lege to religion. In his view, economic globalisation 
has had the effect of reducing the importance of the 
nation-state in shaping and defining personal identity. 
Religion, he says, has taken its place, since religion “...
provides a basis for identity and commitment that 
transcends national boundaries and unites civiliza-
tions.” (ibid.) 
 The important question here, of course, is 
whether or not Huntington’s claim about the inevita-
bility of conflict is correct. 
1.10 Exercise for Chapter One: How Much Variety 
Is In Your World?
I have more than one thousand people on my Face-
book list. So I see lot of “memes” every day. Memes are 
ideas, expressed in pictures and videos and quotations 
and so on, which people share with each other, and 
the more they are shared the more their movements 
seem to take on a life of their own. One day I thought 
it would be fun to save them to a database, and tag 
them according to the kind of messages they express. 
What would I discover? Were there some kinds of 
memes that are more popular than others? What are 
these things really telling me about the thoughts and 
feelings of the people around me? And what are they 
telling me about myself?
The original idea was to take a kind of “snapshot” 
of the content of my (online) intellectual environment 
over four days to see what was in it. My basic rules 
were simple. I would take only the pictures which 
appeared while I happened to be online. That way, I 
wouldn’t have to be online all day. And I also promised 
myself not to deliberately change my web surfing 
habits during those days, so that I wouldn’t get an 
artificial result. I also didn’t track the links to blog 
posts, news articles, videos, or other online media. Just 
to be simple, I only tracked the photos and images. 
And I only tracked the ones that someone on my list 
shared after having seen it elsewhere. That way, each of 
these pictures had passed a kind of natural selection 
test. Someone had created the image and passed it on 
to someone who thought it worthy of being passed on 
to a third person.
After the first few hours, I had about 50 memes 
for my collection. And I already noticed a few general 
trends. So I started tagging the samples into what 
appeared to be the four most obvious categories: Inspi-
rational, Humorous, Political, and Everything Else. The 
Humour category was already by far the largest, with 
more samples than the other categories combined. At 
the end of the first day, there was enough variety in the 
collection that I could create sub-categories. The larg-
est of which was “Humour involving cats or kittens”. 
No surprise there, I suppose.
But at the end of the second day, with about 200 
samples in my collection, I started to notice something 
else, which was much more interesting. A small but 
significant number of these samples had to with 
social, political, or religious causes other than those 
that I personally support. Some promoted causes that 
were reasonably similar to my values, but I have never 
done all that much to support them. For instance, I’ve 
nothing against vegetarianism, but I’m not vegetarian 
myself. So I labeled those ones the “near” values, 
because they are not my values, but they are reasonably 
close, and I felt no sense of being in conflict with 
them. Then I noticed that some of my samples were for 
causes almost directly opposed to the ones I normally 
support. So instead of “un-friending” people with 
different political views than me, I saved and tracked 
their political statements just as I did everybody else’s. 
And I labeled those statements the “far” values, because 
they expressed values fairly distant from my own.
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So now I could look at all these images and put 
them in three broad groups: Common values, Near 
values, and Far values. And in doing so, I had discov-
ered a way to statistically measure the real variety of 
my intellectual environment, and the extent to which 
I am actually exposed to seriously different world 
views. Let’s name this measurement your ‘Intellectual 
Environment Diversity Quotient’. Or, to be short about 
it, your ‘DQ’.
At the end of four days, I had 458 pictures, 
and I had tagged them into six broad categories: 
Inspirational, Humour, Religion, Causes, Political, 
and Foreign Language. Here’s how it all turned out. 
(Note here that if some of these numbers don’t seem 
to add up, that is because some samples were tagged 
more than once, as they fit into two or (rarely) three 
categories.)
Total size of the dataset: 458 (100.0%) 
Inspirational images: 110 (24.0%) Humour: 225 (49.1%) 
Religion: 36 (7.8%) Causes: 148 (32.3%) Political: 47 
(10.2%) Foreign language: 11 (2.4%)
And by the way, only 5 of them asked the recipient 
to “like” or “share” the image.
Now, for the sake of calculating how much real 
difference there is in my intellectual environment, 
we have to look at just the images expressing social, 
political, religious, or philosophical values of some 
kind. This doesn’t necessarily exclude the inspirational 
or comic pictures that had some kind of political or 
moral message, because as mentioned, a lot of the pic-
tures got more than one tag. As it turned out, around 
half of them were making statements about values. 
( That, by the way, was also very interesting. )
Here’s the breakdown of exactly what my friends 
were posting pictures about. And as you can see, there’s 
a lot of variety. But what is interesting is not how 
different they are from each other. What’s interesting is 
how many of them are different from my own point of 
view. You can figure this for yourself by comparing the 
memes in your own timeline to what you say about 
yourself in your own FB profile, or by just deciding 
with each image, one at a time, how far you agree or 
disagree with each one. But in either case you have to 
be really honest with yourself. In this way, calculating 
your DQ is not just about taking a snapshot of your 
intellectual environment. It’s also about knowing 
yourself, and making a few small but serious decisions 
about what you really stand for.
Total Religion, Causes, & Political: 
231 (100.0%)
Total religious: 36 (15.5%)
Buddhism: 4 (1.7%) Christianity: 6 (2.5%) Pagan: 
8 (3.4%) Northern / Asatru: 6 (2.5%) Aboriginal 
/ First Nations: 3 (1.2%) Taoism: 1 (0.4%) Hindu: 
1 (0.4%) Any: 6 (2.5%) Atheism: 1 (0.4%)
Total causes: 148 (64.0%)
Against cruelty to animals: 3 (1.2%) Against religious 
proselytization: 3 (1.2%) Support education, science, criti-
cal thinking: 19 (8.2%) Pro-vegetarian: 1 (0.4%) Organic 
and/or backyard gardening: 3 (1.2%) Feminism / anti-
violence against women: 3 (1.2%) Feminism / sexual power 
relations: 7 (3.0%) Feminism / body image: 5 (2.1%) 
Anti-war: 4 (1.7%) Israel-Iran antiwar solidarity: 3 (1.2%) 
Support for soldiers / war veterans: 8 (3.4%) Support for 
retired military dogs: 2 (0.8%) Support gun ownership: 3 
(1.2%) Race relations, anti racism: 1 (0.4%) Support gay 
marriage / LGBT pride: 10 (4.3%) Support environmental-
ism: 5 (2.1%) Support universal health care in America: 
1 (0.4%) Support the student protest in Quebec: 3 (1.2%) 
Against fascism and Neo-Nazism: 1 (0.4%)
Total party political: 47 (20.3%)
Right wing: 8 (3.4%) Left wing: 36 
(15.5%) Centre: 3 (1.2%)
Now for the sake of figuring your DQ, we need 
to look at the percentage of value-expressing memes 
that are near to my values, and the percentage of those 
which are distant. That’s the measure of how much of 
the intellectual environment you live in could really 
challenge you, if you let it.
Total: 231 / 100.0%
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Common values = 150 / 64.9% 
Near values = 64 / 27.7% 
Far values = 17 / 7.3%
So, my DQ, rounded off, is 28 and 7.
Now, you might be thinking, if I did the experi-
ment on a different day, I’d collect different samples, 
and I’d get a different result. This was especially clear 
in the humorous pictures, because some of them 
depended on the time of year for their effect. For exam-
ple, I got a lot of Douglas Adams references, because 
one of the days I was collecting the images was “Towel 
Day”. I also got a lot of Star Wars images because I was 
collecting my samples on May the 4th. Similar effects 
can also influence the memes that were expressing 
values, for instance if the dataset is collected during 
a religious holiday. Therefore, the figure I just quoted 
above might not be very accurate. Well, to address that 
possibility, I ran the experiment again two weeks later. 
And here’s what I got the second time.
Second set = 470
Total Religion, Causes, Political, Second 
Set: 243 (100.0%)
Common values = 157 (64.6%) 
Near values = 77 (31.6%) 
Far values = 9 (3.7%)
As you can see, it’s a slightly different result. The 
total collection was larger, and there were a lot fewer 
distant values represented. And among the comic 
pictures, there were a lot more references to Doctor 
Who. But overall it wasn’t a big difference. In fact the 
fraction of pictures which expressed some kind of 
value was still about 50%, just as before. So if I add the 
second set to the first, and do the math again, I can get 
a more accurate result, like this:
Both sets combined = 474 (100.0%)
Common values = 307 (64.7%) 
Near values = 141 (29.7%) 
Far values = 26 (5.4%)
New DQ = 30 and 4.
Now, I don’t know whether that figure is high or 
low, because I have no one else’s data to compare it 
to. And I also don’t know whether it would be good 
or bad to have a high DQ, or a low one, because, well, 
that’s a value statement too!
But what I do know is that I can now accurately 
measure the extent to which my intellectual environ-
ment has a real range of different ideas and opinions. I 
can measure how much “otherness”, social or religious 
or political “other-ness”, exists in my world. I can also 
measure how much I prefer the somewhat less stressful 
company of people who think more or less the same 
way I do. Or, I can also measure the extent to which my 
intellectual environment serves only as a kind of echo-
chamber, repeating back to me my own ideas without 
examining them very deeply.
But the really fun part of this experiment is that 
you can do it too! What’s your DQ? 
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We have seen some of the problems that can arise 
when different world views and different intellectual 
environments come into conflict with each other. Now 
let us look at some of the problems that can arise when 
a given world view comes into conflict with itself.  
There are various ways that people think, and various 
ways people pull their world views together, which ac-
tually make it harder for people to find the truth about 
anything, communicate with each other effectively, 
and solve their problems.  And there are other ways 
people think which make it easier to communicate, 
solve problems, and discover truths. I shall call these 
things ‘good and bad thinking habits’.
Note that I call these principles of thinking ‘habits’ 
rather than rules. This is because there are various 
exceptions to each of them. There can occasionally be 
situations in which a good thinking habit might be 
inappropriate, or in which a bad thinking habit might 
be very useful. But such exceptions tend to be very 
rare. You will almost always be thinking rationally and 
clearly when your thinking follows the good habits 
and avoids the bad habits. 
The bad habits tend to arise in two ways. They 
arise because of how we think: these bad habits are 
mostly psychological factors such as fears, motivations, 
and attitudes. Bad habits also arise because of what we 
think: these habits arise when our thinking involves 
problematic beliefs. Again, thinking in terms of such 
bad habits are not signs that one’s thinking is necessar-
ily or inevitably wrong. (In this way, they are different 
from the fallacies, which we will discuss later on.) 
They do, however, tend to make one’s thinking very 
weak, and very vulnerable to criticism and objection. 
They also tend to make one’s views and beliefs easily 
manipulated by other people. When they form a 
prominent part of one’s intellectual environment, they 
tend to introduce faults into one’s world view.
2.1.1  Self-Interest
On its own, self interest need not be a bad thing. Most 
people make decisions at least in part on the basis of 
what they think will benefit them. Self-interest can 
be a problem when you advance some argument or 
defend some world view only because you personally 
stand to benefit if it’s true, and for no other reason. 
The notion of self-interest has an important 
place in some specialized forms of reasoning, such as 
game theory and economics. We find it in sources as 
ancient as Aristotle: his claim that everyone by nature 
desires happiness was the starting place for his theory 
of ethics. We find it in the work of John Stuart Mill, 
who made the pursuit of ‘utility’, meaning pleasure or 
personal benefit, the basis of his theory of ethics, called 
Utilitarianism. Adam Smith, widely regarded as ‘the 
father of modern economics’, also placed self-interest 
at the centre of his work. To Smith, self-interest was a 
normal part of rational human behaviour, and often a 
very self-defeating kind of behaviour. But in a properly 
functioning economy, Smith reasoned, businesspeople 
and investors would direct their self-interest toward 
public goods. 
Self-interest also plays an important part in a 
branch of mathematics called game theory. Without 
Chapter Two 2.1.1 Self-Interest
Chapter Two: Habits of 
Good and Bad Thinking
34
going into a lot of detail about each of these writers 
and others who were like them, let it suffice to say that 
self-interest is a very powerful psychological force in 
people’s minds. All the writers mentioned here are 
very careful to specify the ways in which self-interest 
is rational and useful, and the ways in which it is 
irrational and even damaging. For this reason, some 
logicians prefer to separate ‘intelligent self interest’ 
from ordinary selfishness and egotism. Intelligent self- 
interest looks for the ‘bigger picture’, sees the ways in 
which one’s own interests can align with other people’s 
interests, is willing to sacrifice short-term benefits for 
the sake of longer-term benefits, and recognizes that 
some kinds of benefits or advantages for the self are 
not really worth pursuing. 
Self-interest tends to get in the way of good reason-
ing when people have a strong emotional or economic 
stake in something that looks like it might be under 
threat from others. In such situations, people tend to 
get passionate and emotional, and this almost always 
clouds their judgments. If you secretly want something 
to be true, and you stand to benefit from it being true 
(for instance, if you might make money that way), 
but there’s little or no reason for it to be true, you may 
inadvertently misinterpret the evidence, or discount 
contradictory evidence, or invent rationalizations that 
have little or no logical strength. This can lead you to a 
faulty understanding of your situation, and as a result 
you are more likely to make bad decisions.
2.1.2  Saving Face
Among the various ways that people are self-interested, 
most people are also interested in having a good 
reputation, and being liked or even admired by others 
around them. No one, or almost no one, enjoys having 
their faults, weaknesses, harmful actions, or foolish 
choices pointed out to them by others. Moreover 
nobody, or almost nobody, likes to be proven wrong 
by others. And this, by itself, is not a bad thing. But 
because of this interest, people sometimes cover up 
their mistakes. Or, if it is shown to them that some of 
their ideas or beliefs are unworkable or absurd, they 
might continue to argue in favour of them anyway, in 
order to avoid admitting that the other person might 
be right. When we do this, we are falling into the habit 
of saving face.
The habit of saving face is in some ways related 
to a condition described by psychologists called 
“cognitive dissonance”. This is what happens when 
someone is confronted with, or contemplates, two or 
more beliefs that cannot both be true at the same time. 
(Especially these two contradictory thoughts: “I am 
a good person” and “I caused someone harm”.) Most 
people are strongly psychologically disposed to avoid 
having contradictions like that in their thoughts. And 
most people don’t like to have muddled thoughts like 
that pointed out to them by others: it makes us look 
foolish. And so people tend to invent self-interested 
reasons to reject one or other of the contradicting 
beliefs, with the real purpose of restoring their sense 
of self worth. But this can sometimes blind us to the 
truth, or even prevent people from finding out what 
the truth really is.
Examples: 
“Only six people came to the company picnic. I was on 
the organizing team. But it wasn’t my job to send out 
the invitations.”
“I got an ‘F’ on that essay. But I’m getting an ‘A’ in all my 
other classes. Clearly, the professor doesn’t know what 
he’s doing.”
“Jim has been my best friend for ten years and he’s al-
ways been nice to me. So I just can’t believe he is the one 
who stole the old man’s wallet. You must be mistaken.”
“Sally has been my best friend for ten years. But tonight 
she stole my wallet. I guess she was a bad person all 
along, and she just tricked me into thinking she was a 
good person.”
2.1.3  Peer Pressure
All of us are members of various communities and 
social groups, as we saw in the discussion of world 
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views and intellectual environments. Each of those 
groups tends to have a few prevalent ideas, practices, 
and beliefs, that form part of the group’s identity. Here 
let us add that most of these groups also exert a bit of 
psychological pressure on the members to accept the 
group’s prevalent ideas, practices, and beliefs. Some-
times that pressure can be very subtle, and very limited. 
You might get nothing more than an odd look or a 
cold shoulder if you say something that doesn’t fit with 
the group’s main beliefs. Other times, it might be very 
overt and unambiguous, and perhaps connected to 
threats of punishment for non-conformity. You might 
be shut out of the group’s decision-making process, 
or not invited to the group’s events anymore, or (if 
one’s non-conformity is persistent) even targeted with 
malicious gossip or threats of violence. Thus, people 
tend to keep their dissenting views to themselves, or 
they change their views to better fit the group. Now, 
the ideas shared by the group might be right, or they 
might be wrong, or they might be somewhere in 
between. But the number of people who believe those 
ideas has nothing to do with whether those ideas are 
any good. Problems almost always arise when someone 
accepts an idea or a world view only because it is an 
idea or a world view favoured by the group he or she 
belongs to, and for no other reason.
2.1.4  Stereotyping and Prejudice
Since we are speaking of peer pressure: a community 
or social group might have a few beliefs about people 
who belong to other groups. The group might look up 
to other groups, or down upon them, or attribute some 
quality or behavioral trait to all of them. This becomes 
a bad habit when there is little or no real evidence that 
all members of that other group share that quality. 
We might build stereotypes of people based on how 
they are characterised in entertainment media, or on 
your experiences meeting one or two members of that 
group. But in terms of the actual evidence to support 
the stereotype, the ‘sample size’ is always too small. 
It’s usually based on only a handful of cases, and then 
generalized to a massively larger group. In this way it is 
a case of the fallacy of hasty generalization. In fact, the 
sample size can be as small as zero: some people de-
velop stereotypes without any evidence at all. They’ve 
just been taught to think that way by their intellectual 
environment. Stereotyping almost always treats people 
as tokens of a type, almost never as individuals with 
their own distinct qualities. In this way, it prevents us 
from knowing the truth about individuals, and can 
even prevent us from knowing the truth about the 
various groups that person might belong to.
As stereotyping is the assumption that all mem-
bers of a given social group are somehow basically 
the same; so too is prejudice a hostile or harmful 
judgment about the merit or the worth of people in 
that group, assigned on the basis of a stereotypical 
assumption. One of the ideas that a group might 
pressure its members to believe is the idea that one’s 
own group is better than other groups. This almost 
always leads people to see the ideas and world views 
of rival groups in the very worst possible light. And it 
leads people to treat members of the rival group badly. 
Racism, sexism, religious discrimination, classism, 
poor-bashing, and able-ism, are all examples of this. 
Prejudice is also hurtful when the qualities it assigns 
are qualities that subordinate people or which deny 
them full membership in the human race. There might 
be a spectrum of intensity, which at one end attributes 
only a few relatively minor bad qualities such as 
foolishness or uncleanliness, and which at the other 
might incite strong feelings of hate or fear, such as 
criminality, emotional instability, animalistic physical 
features, disease, or even a secret conspiratorial agenda. 
But in any case, stereotyping and prejudice almost 
always prevents people from seeing things and people 
as they truly are.
Why do prejudiced beliefs persist? The main 
reason is because those beliefs are supported by peer 
pressure. When among prejudiced people, uttering a 
disparaging remark about the target group might be 
actually encouraged and rewarded in various ways: 
smiles, happy laughter, welcoming gestures, and 
approving words. In this way, prejudiced beliefs persist 
when people do not think for themselves, but rather 
when they allow other (prejudiced) people to do their 
thinking for them.
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2.1.5.  Excessive Skepticism
It is usually very healthy to be a little bit skeptical of 
things, and not to take things at face value all the time. 
Some people, however, believe that we cannot truly 
know anything unless we can be absolutely certain of 
it, and that we are beyond any possible doubt about it. 
That level of skepticism is almost always too much.
Excessive skepticism tends to appear when 
people try to estimate the riskiness of some activity. 
The excessively skeptical person tends to make a ‘big 
deal’ of the risks involved, and might be unwilling 
to do anything until he is satisfied that everything is 
absolutely safe and certain. Or he might be unwilling 
to do something because ‘it’s never been tried before’. 
But it’s often the case that we have to act even in situ-
ations where success is very uncertain, and there is no 
way to absolutely guarantee safety. The moon landings 
from 1969-72 are good examples here. No one really 
knew whether the missions would succeed, or fail, or 
even end in total disaster. (At one time, astronomers 
thought that the dark ‘seas’ on the moon were made 
of sand, and they worried that the landing craft would 
sink!) The excessively skeptical person weighs the risks 
too heavily, and often ends up unable to act because 
of that skepticism. He may even try to prevent others 
from acting, because of his own doubts.
Excessive skepticism can also appear in matters 
that are almost purely theoretical. For instance, some 
people might doubt the reality of the world outside 
their own minds. It can be fun to speculate about 
whether or not we are being deceived by Descartes’ 
Evil Genius, or whether we are all living inside a 
computer-generated virtual reality. Sometimes it can 
be fun to ask ‘How do you know?’ in an infinite regress, 
the way small children sometimes do. 
But most of the time, we don’t need to have such 
high standards for certainty. It is enough that one’s 
beliefs are beyond reasonable doubt; they do not have 
to be beyond all possible doubt. As a rule of thumb, 
remember that doubt based on speculation without 
evidence is not reasonable doubt. It’s not enough to 
say that something is doubtful because some alterna-
tive explanation might be possible. It’s also important 
to say something about how probable the alternative 
explanation really is. If an alternative explanation 
is possible but very unlikely, and there isn’t much 
evidence for it, then it isn’t a good basis for skepticism. 
So if you dreamed last night that you ran away to a 
foreign country and married your worst enemy, then 
that ‘might’ be because in some parallel universe 
that’s exactly what you did. But there’s no evidence to 
support that possibility, so it’s best to discount it as a 
reasonable explanation for your dream.
We shall see more about skepticism among the 
good thinking habits, and later on we’ll see it again in 
the discussion of reasonable doubt.
2.1.6  Intellectual Laziness 
This is the habit of “giving up too soon”, or deliberately 
avoiding the big questions. This is the habit we indulge 
when we say things like: “thinking that way is too 
confusing,” or “your questions drive me crazy”, or 
“these questions cannot be answered, you just have 
to accept it”. Laziness also appears when you answer a 
philosophical question with a witty quotation from a 
movie or a popular song, as if that’s all that needs to be 
said about the topic. Some people actually go to great 
efforts to defend their laziness, with complex argu-
ments for why intellectually enquiring or scientifically 
minded people “can’t handle the mystery of things”, or 
why they want to “take away the beauty and the magic 
of the world.” 
A variation of intellectual laziness is willed 
ignorance. This is the habit of deliberately preventing 
oneself from answering hard questions or acknowledg-
ing relevant facts. Some people prefer to live in a kind 
of bubble, where serious challenges to their world 
views never appear. And while it can be a sign of in-
tegrity to preserve the core values of one’s world view, 
it is also the case that deliberately shutting out facts or 
realities that challenge one’s world view can lead one 
to make poor decisions. Your world view might hold 
that some questions are unanswerable, or that some 
questions are not allowed to be asked. Similarly, you 
might prevent yourself from acknowledging facts or 
realities that could serve as evidence of the wrongness 
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of some part of your world view. Willed ignorance 
actually takes some effort, and perhaps isn’t precisely 
the same as laziness. But it has the same basic effect: 
it prevents people from learning things that they may 
need to know, and so makes it more likely that they 
will make bad decisions, or turn their world views into 
value programs.
Some people might even argue that there is no 
such thing as ‘Truth’, with a big capital T, referring 
to statements about the ultimate things like God, or 
justice, or knowledge, or reality. They might believe 
that it is pointless to claim that any given idea or belief 
or explanation of such things is true, no matter how 
well supported it might be by the facts or by logic. 
There might be an appeal to some kind of relativism as 
the reason for why there’s no such thing as an ultimate 
truth. And in that sense, this line of thinking is not 
truly lazy: it goes to some effort to seriously defend 
the claim that no one can make a serious claim about 
such things. But the real function of such assertions is 
to justify a refusal to think deeply and carefully about 
the things that matter. It may be the case that there are, 
or that there are not, ultimate truths about such things. 
But the intellectually lazy or willfully ignorant person 
does none of the work needed to find out. They actu-
ally do not know, and they have made their ignorance 
into a kind of rule for their thinking.
It might not be polite or kind to name this habit 
‘laziness’, but that’s what it really is. Just as one can be 
lazy at practical tasks like cleaning your house, you 
can be lazy in your thinking about pressing problems 
or important questions. And just as laziness in your 
practical affairs can hurt you eventually, there are times 
when lazy thinking can cause you great trouble later 
on, too. Lazy thinking can make it easier for others 
to manipulate and deceive you, for instance. And it 
can also paralyze you into doing nothing in situations 
where decisions must be made.
2.1.7  Relativism
Philosophical arguments are often presented in the 
form of debates. Sometimes there are two positions 
that are opposed to each other, and each side presents 
arguments that support their position while showing 
the problems with the opposing position. Consider, as 
an example, a debate about the moral permissibility of 
the death penalty. The speakers might take these two 
positions:
A: The death penalty is morally permissible (for reasons 
x, y, z). 
B: The death penalty is not morally permissible (for 
reasons a, b, c). 
When assessing the evidence for these claims, 
philosophers are trying to establish whether it is true 
or false that the death penalty is morally permissible. 
In this case the moral permissibility of the death 
penalty is being treated like a fact. Often beginning 
philosophers are not comfortable with treating moral, 
epistemic, or aesthetic claims as being either right or 
wrong. Philosophical claims are not scientific claims 
for which we can provide empirical evidence, and 
often both sides provide very compelling arguments. 
This can make it seem as if both sides are right. 
Sometimes it makes sense to search for a middle 
ground, however, it is not always possible or desirable. 
It is, furthermore, a contradiction to say that the death 
penalty both is and is not morally permissible. When 
is it morally permissible? What makes the death pen-
alty morally permissible in some cases but not others? 
More needs to be said.  
Relativism is the view that a claim is only true or 
false relative to some other condition. There are many 
varieties of relativism: but the two most common 
kinds are:
•	 Subjective relativism, also known as Personal Belief 
relativism, is the claim that the truth about anything 
depends on what someone believes. It is the view that all 
truth is in the ‘eye of the beholder’; or that something is 
true if (and only if ) someone believes it to be true, and then 
it is true for that person, and perhaps only for that person. 
In ethics, subjective relativism is the idea that an action 
is morally right if the person doing that action believes 
it to be morally right. Nothing makes an action right 
or wrong except the judgment of the person doing it.
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•	 Cultural Relativism is the idea that something is true, 
or right, etc., because it is generally believed to be so by 
some culture or society. Further, it is true, or right, etc., 
for that society. 
Here we will examine relativism about truth as 
it pertains to philosophical claims about ethics and 
knowledge that you are likely to encounter in an 
introductory class. As relativism is very appealing to 
beginning philosophers, it is important to look at 
some different kinds of relativistic arguments, the 
problems with them, and some of the typical reasons 
for adopting a relativistic position. 
One reason to adopt relativism is that philosophi-
cal claims, particularly ethical claims, can seem very 
subjective. With so much debate it can seem as if there 
are no correct answers, and that what is right or wrong 
can be different for different individuals. Alice believes 
the death penalty is okay and Barbara believes it is 
wrong, and who are we to tell them what to believe? 
The problem with accepting this kind of relativ-
ism is that it makes a claim true or false relative to 
someone’s beliefs, and takes beliefs to be above any 
justification. While it may seem arrogant to challenge 
other people’s beliefs, examining what we take to 
be true and why is one of the basic components of 
philosophy. It isn’t enough to say “Alice believes that 
X is okay, so X is right for her,” perhaps Alice has never 
examined her beliefs, or came to hold them because 
she was given false information. Investigating what we 
believe and why can help us to have consistent beliefs, 
and also to be confident and conscientious in our 
ethical choices. 
While it is respectful to consider others’ points 
of view, differences in perspective does not entail that 
philosophical questions are entirely subjective. Learn-
ing how to carefully consider and assess reasons and 
justifications is part of studying philosophy.  In some 
arguments disagreement between conclusions can 
mask similarities in underlying beliefs. For instance, 
two people can agree that murder is unjustified killing 
and disagree about what deaths count as murder. Alice 
might believe that the death penalty is state sanctioned 
murder, and so oppose it. Barbara might believe that a 
death that is sanctioned by the state is always justified. 
Their disagreement over the death penalty is then 
not only about whether it is right or wrong, but over 
acceptable justifications for taking someone’s life. 
Someone else might note that some cultures 
accept action X while some do not, and argue that X is 
morally permissible relative to culture. This is known 
as cultural relativism. Often students accept cultural 
relativism because they want to be sensitive to cultural 
differences. Different cultures have different practices, 
but can we say that a culture allowing the death 
penalty means it is sometimes morally permissible? 
There are two problems with this approach. One is that 
it does not allow people within a culture to disagree 
with the practice. If someone from culture A wants 
to argue against the death penalty they could not do 
so on moral grounds—their culture permitting it 
makes it a morally acceptable act. Another problem 
is changes in cultural practices. We want to say that 
slavery was abolished because people realized that 
it was wrong to treat people as property, not that it 
became immoral once the practice stopped. 
There is a difference between issues that are moral 
and those that are social norms or matters of etiquette. 
In some cases it makes sense to accept cultural relativ-
ism about social practices, but in others it might seem 
as if some other factor, such as human rights, trumps 
concerns for cultural variation. It can be difficult to 
determine when we should and when we should not 
challenge the practices or beliefs of other cultures, 
but it requires rational inquiry and a sensitive analysis 
of the arguments that demands more than knee-jerk 
relativism. 
The problems with relativism do not mean that 
we have to accept the view that ethical or epistemic 
truths are universal and absolute. There is a great deal 
of conceptual space between individual relativism and 
accepting a general moral principle. Likewise, there 
are ways to be culturally sensitive while challenging 
the practices of our own and other cultures. Some con-
cepts that seem natural or objectively true to us may 
turn out to be contingent—if a culture has three rather 
than two concepts of gender we might reconsider why 
we think about gender as we do.  Being open to other 
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cultures’ beliefs and attitudes can be very important 
to learning to see things in a different light, but it does 
not mean that we have to accept them without good 
reasons. 
2.1.8  The Consequences of Bad Habits
The consequences of living with and falling into these 
bad thinking habits can be very serious. For instance, 
they can:
•	 Make you more vulnerable to being intimidated, bul-
lied, or manipulated by others;
•	 Make you less able to stand up for yourself, or for others 
in need;
•	 Make it harder to tell the difference between truth and 
lies;
•	 Make you more dogmatic and closed-minded;
•	 Make you less flexible, less creative, and less ready to 
handle unpredictable changes in your situation.
•	 Lead you to justify moral decisions that needlessly harm 
people, including yourself;
•	 Lead you to suppress or ignore evidence that goes 
contrary to your beliefs, even if that evidence is very 
reliable;
•	 Provoke confusion or anger when presented with rea-
sons why one’s beliefs might be problematic or faulty;
•	 Prevent serious philosophical thinking about the most 
important problems in our lives;
•	 Prevent personal growth, maturity, and self-awareness.
With these observations in mind, let’s look at some 
good habits.
2.2.1  Curiosity
As an intellectual habit, curiosity is the desire for 
knowledge. To be an intellectually curious person, you 
have to be the sort of person for whom the usual ex-
planations of things are not enough to satisfy you. The 
curious person wants to find out more about whatever 
is new, strange, or interesting in the world. When 
something different, unusual, unexpected, or even 
weird and scary appear, the curious person doesn’t 
hide from them or pretend they are other than what 
they are. She faces them directly, and makes an honest 
attempt to investigate them. And she does not settle 
for things to remain mysterious. Indeed part of the 
task of the philosopher, as it is with the scientist, is to 
render things un-mysterious: it is to understand things 
as completely as possible. Good rational thinkers love 
mysteries and puzzles: but they don’t just stand back 
and “appreciate” them. They also try to figure them out.
It is precisely by being intellectually curious that 
good reasoning helps prevent closed minded dogma-
tism. Curiosity leads to discovery, invention, expanded 
awareness of the world, and of the self. Sometimes it 
leads to beauty; sometimes it leads to power. Most of 
all, it leads to, just as it depends on, a sense of wonder. 
Those who think that rationality is a set of rules for 
thinking which limit or constrain your experiences, or 
who think that rationality kills the sense of creativity 
and imagination, are simply wrong – and there’s 
no polite way to say it. And it’s probable that such 
people have actually limited their own experiences by 
excluding from their minds the most powerful, most 
inquisitive, and most successful way of knowing the 
world ever devised.
2.2.2  Self-Awareness
Above the entrance to the famous Oracle of Delphi, 
the religious centre of the classical Greek world, 
was written the phrase γνϖθι σεατον. In English, 
this means ‘know yourself’. The idea was that people 
who wanted to enter the temple should have done a 
sustained exercise in personal soul-searching, to be 
fully honest about their own individual character and 
habits, and also to be honest about human nature 
(especially human mortality).
Self-awareness involves knowing your own 
presuppositions, desires, biases, world views, and so on. 
It involves knowing your habits, faults, desires, powers, 
and talents. And it involves knowing something about 
what it means to be a thinking human being. This is 
a more difficult prospect than it appears to be. Some 
people do not find out what their own world view 
is until someone else says or does something which 
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challenges it. But it is an essential quality: those who 
do not know themselves tend to make poor decisions, 
and are easily manipulated by others.
2.2.3  Health
As unrelated as it may seem, taking care of your physi-
cal health is actually a good thinking habit. If you are 
feeling unwell, or sleep-deprived, or under stress, or 
for whatever reason physically uncomfortable, then it 
will be harder for you to observe and understand your 
situation, and harder to reason about it clearly. Good 
health, as a thinking habit, involves getting enough 
exercise, eating healthy real food and avoiding junk 
food, bathing regularly, and getting enough sleep. It 
also involves taking care of your mental health: and 
one of the simplest ways to do that is to take time every 
day for leisure activities that are restful. 
A study conducted by psychologists in Japan 
found that people who gazed on forest scenery for 
twenty minutes produced 13.4% less salivary cortisol, a 
stress hormone. Walking in forests and natural settings 
also helped reduce high blood pressure, and reduce 
heart rate fluctuations. As these effects became more 
known, some municipalities in Japan created “forest 
therapy” programs for stressed-out factory workers. 7 
High-stimulation activities like video games, action 
films, intensely athletic sports, and anything that gets 
your adrenaline rushing, can be a lot of fun, but they’re 
not restful. I’m not saying you should avoid such 
things altogether. But good critical thinking requires 
calm, and peace, and quiet. To be better able to calm 
yourself when you need to think, give around twenty 
minutes or more, every day, to something genuinely 
relaxing, such as walking in a forest, or meditating, or 
reading, or cooking and eating a proper meal. Don’t be 
multitasking at the same time. If you are experiencing 
a lot of frustration dealing with a certain problem, you 
will probably have an easier time of it after a shower, a 
healthy dinner, a walk in the park with a friend and a 
dog, and a good night’s sleep.
2.2.4  Courage
Sometimes, your process of thinking about things will 
lead you to possibilities or conclusions that you won’t 
like, or which your friends or associates won’t like. 
Sometimes, you might reach a conclusion about some-
thing that might land you in trouble with your boss 
at work, or your teacher, your priest, your government, 
or anyone who has some kind of power, authority, 
or influence in your life. Expressing that conclusion 
or that thought might land you in some amount of 
danger: you might risk being fired from your job, or 
ostracized from your community. Depending on the 
situation, and the idea you are expressing, you might 
find yourself excluded, angrily criticized, ignored, 
arrested, imprisoned, or even killed. Even in countries 
where the freedom of speech and of expression and of 
the press is guaranteed by constitutional law, people 
can still run great risks by speaking their minds, even 
when their words are true. 
Courageous thinking means thinking and express-
ing the dangerous thought anyway. It means thinking 
and speaking without fear. It means committing 
yourself to what you rationally judge to be the best 
conclusion, whether you like it or not, and whether 
your friends or your ‘betters’ like it or not. And this is 
a lot harder to do than it sounds. Strong social forces 
like the desire to be welcomed and included and loved, 
or strong institutional forces like laws or corporate 
policies, can lead people to keep quiet about ideas that 
might be controversial. 
Questions and arguments can require personal 
courage when they challenge a very important part of 
one’s world view. Consider the following examples: 
•	 What if there is no god? 
•	 What if there is no objective moral right or wrong? 
•	 What if a very popular or charismatic person is telling 
half-truths or lies?
•	 At my workplace, am I participating in or benefitting 
from something unjust, or evil? 
•	 What if life has no purpose or meaning?
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People who take such questions seriously, and who 
consider answers that are radically different from the 
answers provided by their world views, may experience 
a lot of self-doubt or even despair. They may find that 
they have to change their lives. Even the mere act of 
posing the questions, aside from the attempt to answer 
them, can land people in trouble with their friends 
and families. Strong social forces might pressure the 
questioner to not ask certain questions, or to answer 
them only in acceptable ways. In such situations, it 
can take great courage to ask such questions, and to do 
one’s own thinking in search of a decent answer. 
Questions and arguments can require public or 
political courage when they challenge some arrange-
ment in your social world. It could something as 
simple as choosing to support a different professional 
sports team other than the one based in your home 
city, or the one supported by all your friends and 
family. Or, it could be something as complex and 
dangerous as opposing a policy of a large corporation 
that you work for, or which has a significant presence 
in the area where you live. It can take a lot of courage 
to criticize the actions of some entity with political 
power, especially when that entity can threaten people 
who disagree with it. If you criticize your employer, 
you might lose your job. If you criticize your govern-
ment, you might be arrested. If you criticize your 
church leaders, you might be shamed, denounced, or 
dismissed from the church. As the philosopher Voltaire 
wrote, “It is dangerous to be right in matters on which 
the established authority is wrong.”
The classical Greek language gives us a word for 
statements that require this kind of courage: par-
rhesia, which roughly translates as ‘bold speech’. The 
person who makes such a bold statement is called a 
parrhesiastes. Two qualities are necessary for a proposi-
tion to count as parrhesia. One is that the speaker 
incurs some personal risk from various social or politi-
cal forces. The second is that the speaker’s words must 
be true. (Thus, a person who creates controversy for 
the sake of creating controversy is not a parrhesiates.) 
Today we might call such people ‘whistle-blowers’: 
individuals who act like referees in a game who stops 
some player who breaks the rules. Whistle-blowers 
are people who draw public attention to some act or 
policy of moral wrongdoing in their workplaces, their 
governments, or in any other social group to which 
they belong. Whistleblowers often face all kinds of 
problems: harassment, defamation of their reputations, 
job losses, lawsuits, vandalism of their homes and 
vehicles, and in some cases death threats. But no public 
cause has ever succeeded “by itself”, without coura-
geous people willing to speak out in favour of it. To be 
a courageous thinker means to care more for the truth 
than for one’s personal interests (and sometimes, more 
than for one’s safety). But it also means to be an agent 
for necessary changes.
2.2.5  Healthy Skepticism
Earlier, we characterized ‘excessive skepticism’ as a bad 
habit. But there is another side of skepticism that is 
very healthy. Healthy skepticism is the general unwill-
ingness to accept that things are always what they 
appear to be. It is the unwillingness to take things for 
granted, or to accept that things are as you have been 
told they are by anyone else, no matter who they are, 
or what their relation is to you.
This does not mean we have to doubt absolutely 
everything, nor does it mean we cannot trust anyone. 
It does, however, mean that we do not jump to 
conclusions. Healthy skepticism is to be slow to 
accept the popular explanations for things. It prefers 
to investigate many possibilities before settling on the 
best available explanation.
Healthy skepticism is also known as ‘reasonable 
doubt’. We’ll see more of that in a later chapter.
2.2.6.  Autonomy
To think with autonomy simply means to think for 
yourself, and not to let other people do your thinking 
for you. Autonomous thinking is thinking that does 
not blindly accept what you have been told by parents, 
friends, role models of every kind, governments, 
newspaper columnists, or anyone who could have an 
influence on your thinking. 
No one else can do your thinking for you. And 
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you are under no obligation to follow anybody’s party 
line. Your only obligation for thinking, if it is an ‘obli-
gation’ at all, is to think clearly, consistently, rationally, 
and (where necessary) courageously.
At the end of some curious, courageous, and skep-
tical soul-searching, you might decide that your world 
view should be more or less the same as that which 
is held by your family, friends, role models, and other 
influences. That is okay – the point is that the world 
view is now yours, and not handed to you by others.
2.2.7  Simplicity
Sometimes you may find that things are more complex 
or more elaborate than they appear to be at first. 
And it is often the job of reason to uncover layers 
of complexity behind appearances. Still, if you have 
two or more explanations for something, all of which 
are about as good as each other, the explanation you 
should prefer is the simplest one.
This principle of simplicity in good reasoning 
is sometimes called Ockham’s Razor. It was first 
articulated by a Franciscan monk named Brother 
William of Ockham, who lived from 1288 to 1348. His 
actual words were “Entia non sunt multiplicanda sine 
necessitate.”8  In English, this means ‘No unnecessary 
repetition of identicals’. This is a fancy way of saying, 
‘Well it’s possible that there are twenty-three absolutely 
identical tables occupying exactly the same position in 
space and time, but it’s much simpler to believe that 
there’s just one table here. So let’s go with the simpler 
explanation.’ Ockham’s original point was theological: 
he wanted to explain why monotheism is better than 
polytheism. It’s simpler to assume there’s one infinite 
God, than it is to assume there are a dozen or more. 
Ockham’s idea has also been applied to numerous 
other matters, from devising scientific theories to 
interpreting poetry, film, and literature. Other ways to 
express this idea go like this: “All other things being 
equal, the simplest explanation tends to be the truth”, 
and “The best explanation is the one which makes the 
fewest assumptions.”
2.2.8  Precision
There are a lot of words in every language that have 
more than one meaning. This is a good thing: it allows 
us more flexibility of expression; it is part of what 
makes poetry possible; and so on. But for the purpose 
of reasoning as clearly and as systematically as possible, 
it is important to use our words very carefully. This 
usually means avoiding metaphors, symbols, rhetorical 
questions, weasel words, euphemisms, tangents, 
equivocations, and ‘double speak’. When building a 
case for why something is true, or something else is 
not true, and so on, it is important to say exactly what 
one means, and to eliminate ambiguities as much as 
possible.
The simplest way to do this is to craft good defini-
tions. A definition can be imprecise in several ways; 
here are some of them.
•	 Too broad: it covers more things than it should.
•	 Too narrow: it covers too few things.
•	 Circular: the word being defined, or one of its closest 
synonyms, appears in the definition itself.
•	 Too vague: The definition doesn’t really say much at all 
about what is being defined, even though it looks like 
it does. 
Example of a broad definition: “All dogs are four-
legged animals.”  (Does that mean that all four-legged 
animals are dogs?)
Example of a narrow definition: “All tables are 
furniture pieces placed in the dining rooms of houses 
and used for serving meals.” (Does that mean that 
tables in other rooms used for other purposes are not 
‘true’ tables?’)
Example of a Circular definition: “Beauty is that 
which a given individual finds beautiful.” (This actu-
ally tells us nothing about what beauty is.)
Example of a vague definition: “Yellowism is not 
art or anti-art. Examples of Yellowism can look like 
works of art but are not works of art. We believe that 
the context for works of art is already art.”9  (And I 
don’t know what this means at all.)
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2.2.9  Patience
Good philosophical thinking takes time. Progress in 
good critical thinking is often very slow. The process 
of critical thinking can’t be called successful if it 
efficiently maximizes its inputs and outputs in the 
shortest measure of time: we do not produce thoughts 
in the mind like widgets in a factory. 
The reason for this is because good critical think-
ing often needs to uncover that which subtle, hard to 
discern at first, and easy to overlook. I define subtlety 
as ‘a small difference or a delicate detail which takes on 
greater importance the more it is contemplated.’ As a 
demonstration, think of how many ways you can utter 
the word ‘Yes’, and mean something different every 
time. This also underlines the importance of precision, 
as a good thinking habit. As another example: think of 
how the colour planes in a painting by Piet Mondrian, 
such as his ‘Composition with Yellow, Blue, and Red’ 
have squares of white framed by black lines, but none 
of the white squares are exactly the same shade of 
white. You won’t notice this if you look at the painting 
for only a few seconds, or if you view a photo of the 
painting on your computer screen, and your monitor’s 
resolution isn’t precise enough to render the subtle 
differences. But it is the job of reason to uncover those 
subtleties and lay them out to be examined directly. 
And the search for those subtleties cannot be rushed. 
2.2.10  Consistency
When we looked at what a world view is, we defined 
it as ‘the sum of a set of related answers to the most 
important questions in life’. It’s important that one’s 
world view be consistent: that your answers to the big 
questions generally cohere well together, and do not 
obviously contradict each other. Inconsistent think-
ing usually leads to mistakes, and can produce the 
uncomfortable feeling of cognitive dissonance. And it 
can be embarrassing, too. If you are more consistent, 
you might still make mistakes in your thinking. But it 
will be a lot easier for you to identify those mistakes, 
and fix them.
Consistency also means staying on topic, sticking 
to the facts, and following an argument to its conclu-
sion. Obviously it can be fun to explore ideas in a 
random, wandering fashion. But as one’s problems 
grow more serious, it becomes more important to stay 
the course. Moreover, digressing too far from the topic 
can also lead you to commit logical fallacies such as 
Straw Man, and Red Herring.
2.2.11  Open-ness and open-mindedness
Being open-minded means listening to others, taking 
their views seriously, and treating their ideas with 
respect even while critically examining them (a dif-
ficult thing to do, but not impossible). It also means 
not resorting to fear and force when promoting one’s 
own views, but rather presenting them in a way that 
leaves them open to the critical scrutiny of others. In 
philosophy this is sometimes called “the principle of 
charity”. The Principle of Charity requires speakers 
and listeners to interpret and understand each other’s 
ideas in the very best possible light. Listeners must 
assume that other speakers are rational (unless you 
have good reasons to assume otherwise), and that what 
they say is rational, even if that rationality is not im-
mediately obvious. Philosophers do this partially as a 
kind of professional courtesy to each other. Open-ness 
and open-mindedness does not, however, mean that 
we have to accept everyone’s ideas as equally valid. 
Open mindedness is not the same as assuming that 
all things are true; it is also not the same as relativism. 
Rather, the open-minded person looks for the best 
explanation for things, whether he or she personally 
likes that explanation or not, and whether it fits with 
his or her world view or not. She is open to the idea 
that she might be wrong about something, or that 
her world view might be partially faulty, or that her 
thinking about something that matters to her may 
have to change. But she does not change her thinking 
at random: she is interested in the truth, whatever it 
might be.
An open-minded person may still find that 
some ideas, arguments, and explanations are better 
than others. But if we are open-minded, then we can 
be more confident that we have understood other 
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people’s views properly: we will not fall into the logical 
trap of the straw man (see the chapter on Fallacies). 
It is also much easier to find common ground with 
others, which is an essential step in quelling conflict. 
And if we reject some idea, we will have rejected it for 
the right reasons. Open-mindedness also helps prevent 
intellectual or ideological differences from descending 
into personal grudges.
Open-mindedness is also helpful in other ways. 
Suppose that some friends of mine and I went on a 
picnic in the park, but soon after we got to our picnic 
site it started to rain. One member of the party might 
say the rain was caused by ghosts or supernatural 
creatures who live in the park and who don’t want 
us to picnic there. Another might say that the rain 
was caused by air pressure changes in the upper 
atmosphere. Now the open-minded person is not 
necessarily the one who accepts that both explana-
tions are equally possible, and leaves it at that. The 
open- minded person is the one who goes looking for 
the evidence for each explanation. If he doesn’t find 
the evidence for one of those explanations, he rejects 
it and goes in search of the evidence for another one. 
The closed-minded person, by contrast, is the one who 
picks the explanation he likes best, whether or not 
there’s any evidence for it, and then refuses to consider 
any alternative explanation. Closed-mindedness is 
one of the signs that someone’s mind is occupied by a 
value program. As a rule of thumb, the closed-minded 
person is usually the one who is quickest to accuse 
other people of being closed-minded, especially when 
his own ideas are criticized. 
The point of that example is to show how open-
mindedness helps people arrive at good explanations 
for things that happen. It does not mean that all 
explanations for things are equally ‘valid’. We do not 
have to put unlikely or weird explanations on the 
same footing as those with verifiable evidence or a 
consistent logical structure. But it can mean that every 
explanation or idea which appears to be sound, at least 
at first glance, is given a fair examination, no matter 
where that explanation came from, or who thought of 
it first.
2.2.12 Asking for help
So far, I have been stressing good thinking habits that 
one can practice on one’s own. Good thinking tends to 
require independence and autonomy. And problems 
often arise when we allow other people to have too 
much influence over one’s own thinking, such as 
when we allow ourselves to be influenced by peer 
pressure. However, it can also be helpful to ask others 
who you respect and admire, or who you believe may 
have relevant knowledge, to help you. And while it 
is important to make your own decisions about your 
own life, there’s nothing wrong with asking others 
who you trust to offer you advice and guidance. And 
even if you do not ask anyone to offer suggestions, it 
can sometimes be helpful to hear a different point of 
view, or just to talk things over with someone who can 
be both critical and appreciative. The shared wisdom 
and experience of one’s friends, elders, and associates 
can often lead to different perspectives and better deci-
sions. Others people, for instance, can offer possibilities 
that you might not have thought of. Or they might 
know things that you didn’t know, and thus point you 
in new directions. Or they might have faced a similar 
problem or situation in the past, and their description 
of their experience might help clarify something about 
your own situation. As an example, here’s the Roman 
philosopher Seneca describing how some kind of 
social interaction is important for one’s personal intel-
lectual growth: “Skilled wrestlers are kept up to the 
mark by practice; a musician is stirred to action by one 
of equal proficiency. The wise man also needs to have 
his virtues kept in action; and as he prompts himself to 
do things, so he is prompted by another wise man.” 10 
A lot may depend on who you choose to ask for 
advice, how much you trust them, and how often you 
go to them. But the overall point here is that knotty 
and complicated problems need not always be handled 
alone. A habit of asking one’s elders, peers, colleagues, 
and friends for help can often help clarify one’s think-
ing, and lead to better solutions.
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2.3  A few summary remarks for Chapter Two
None of the bad habits of thinking necessarily or 
inevitably lead to unsound arguments, false beliefs, or 
faulty world views. They are not the same as fallacies 
(to be discussed in chapter 5.) An argument can be 
strong and sound even if its conclusion coincides with 
the speaker’s personal interests, or even if it coincides 
with the presuppositions of the speaker’s culture, etc. 
The bad habits are, however, signs that one’s thinking 
is probably not fully clear, critical, and rational. It 
may even mean that one has given up the search for 
the truth of the matter too soon.
Similarly, the good habits, by themselves, do not 
guarantee that one’s thinking will always be perfectly 
rational, but they do make one’s thinking very much 
more likely to be rational.
2.4 Exercises for Chapter Two.
Consider the following situations, and ask yourself 
which of the good thinking habits should be applied 
here, and what might happen if some of the bad habits 
are applied instead.
•	 You come home at the end of the day and someone sit-
ting on the ground near your door appears to be crying. 
Perhaps he is injured, or emotionally distraught. Other 
people passing by seem to be taking no notice, and may 
even be crossing the street to avoid him. 
•	 Someone who you are fairly close to, such as a member 
of your family, or a colleague at your workplace, or 
someone you count as a good friend, unexpectedly ut-
ters a nasty racist or sexist or politically prejudiced joke. 
By his tone of voice and body language, you can tell that 
he expects you to agree with him or to go along with it. 
•	 Someone you are fairly close to tells you that he has just 
been diagnosed with a medical condition that carries a 
strong social stigma, such as cancer, or AIDS. Or, he says 
he is coming “out of the closet” about his sexual prefer-
ences, or that he is changing his religion. He tells you 
that most of his other friends have stopped associating 
with him because of this situation.
•	 Someone who you counted on to do something for you, 
for instance someone with whom you have a contract, 
fails to uphold his promises. This person has failed 
you numerous times before, but you’re fairly sure that 
confronting this person might have bad consequences 
for you. For instance, it might result in a lost friendship, 
or a malicious gossip campaign against you, a loss of 
money spent on the arrangement, etc. 
•	 A friend of yours at your school, your workplace, or a 
social club you belong to, has been accused of a crime. 
The police haven’t been called because all the evidence 
against that person is circumstantial, and it’s mostly 
a matter of one person’s word against another’s. But 
around half of your friends are gossiping about that 
person as if he’s obviously guilty, and the other half of 
your friends are certain he’s innocent.
•	 Have you ever been in a similar situation? What were 
your thoughts about it? And what did you do?
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Let’s define argumentation as the process of seriously 
debating the worth and the merits of some proposi-
tion. The word ‘argument’ here does not refer to an 
angry shouting match. Rather, it refers to any two (or 
more) statements in which one is the reason for 
the other; one is supported by the other(s), or one 
follows from the other(s). We ‘build’ arguments by 
assembling together basic statements into particular 
structures, and having assembled them together that 
way, we can more easily test to see whether the ideas 
being discussed are worth your time.
3.1. Propositions
Arguments have various parts. And the part that’s 
easiest to identify is called the proposition: also 
sometimes called the statement, or the claim. (For 
the purpose of understanding argumentation, these 
terms mean the same thing, and are often used inter-
changeably.) A proposition is a simple sentence that 
has just one meaning, for it expresses one thought 
according to the rules of grammar in one’s language. 
Also, a proposition asserts that something is the 
case, or is not the case. When a proposition asserts 
that something is the case, it is also called an affirma-
tion; when a proposition asserts that something is not 
the case, it is also called a negation or denial.
Not all sentences are propositions. Some 
sentences are questions, some are commands, some are 
emotional exclamations, and some are poetic devices 
like metaphors. One way to recognize a statement is 
to look for sentences that could be given as a direct 
answer to a straightforward question. Another is to 
look for sentences that could be either true or false; a 
sentence that one could agree with, or disagree with. 
With that in mind, which of the following 
sentences are propositions?
•	 The lamp on my table is switched on. 
•	 Good morning everyone!
•	 My sweater is green.
•	 How many cars are parked outside right now?
•	 Smoking is bad for your health.
•	 Smoking is good for your health.
•	 Stop driving on the wrong side of the road.
•	 The revolution will not be televised. 
•	 My love is like a red, red rose.
•	 WTF?
Also, it is possible for a single sentence to contain 
within it more than one proposition. 
•	 It’s raining today, and I’m feeling blue.  (Two proposi-
tions)
•	 The book on my table is well-read, but boring. (Two 
propositions.)
•	 This new kitchen gadget can slice any vegetable, as well 
as any fruit, but it can’t handle meat. (Three proposi-
tions.)
And, it’s also possible to have a paragraph of 
dialogue in which only one or two sentences are 
propositions, and the rest of the paragraph is made of 
expressions that, while they might help communicate 
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the speaker’s feelings, are not expressions that can be 
used to build an argument. Consider this example:
“The other day, I was really pissed off. I ordered this new 
computer from the Internet. And it took three weeks to 
get here, which was bad enough. Then when it arrived I 
got so mad again! Because the one I ordered was silver, 
but the one they sent me was black! Somebody in that 
company is asleep at the wheel.”
Clearly, the speaker here is angry about this 
situation. But if the speaker wanted to draw any logical 
conclusions from this discussion, for instance about 
what to do, or about whether to trust the company 
again, the only relevant sentences here are the ones 
which stick to the facts. Here’s the same discussion 
again, with the irrelevant expressions crossed out:
“The other day, I was really pissed off. I ordered this new 
computer from the Internet. And it took three weeks to 
get here, which was bad enough. Then when it arrived I 
got so mad again! Because the one I ordered was silver, 
but the one they sent me was black! Somebody in that 
company is really asleep at the wheel.”
As you can see (I hope!), it’s really easy to tell the 
difference between a sentence that is a decent and 
useful proposition, and another that isn’t. Logic starts 
to look complicated when there are lots of proposi-
tions with lots of relations to each other. But even 
the argument with thousands of lines is still made of 
simple, straightforward true-or-false sentences like 
these. The other parts of the argument have to do with 
the way that propositions are used, or the way they 
are positioned in relation to other propositions in the 
general structure of the argument. If you can figure out 
this part of the textbook, you can figure out everything 
else! 
Once we have sorted out which sentences are 
propositions and which sentences are not, we are 
almost ready to put them together into arguments. 
It’s possible to have a sentence which is a proposition, 
but which you can’t use in an argument because of 
vagueness or an ambiguity in its words or grammar. 
For example:
“Women are stronger than men.”
This looks like a perfectly ordinary proposition: 
it could be either true or false. We could stage arm-
wrestling or weight lifting competitions to test it. But 
is that what the word ‘stronger’ means here? Or, does 
it mean that women have more willpower than men? 
Does it mean that women have thicker and tougher 
bones than men? Does this statement generalize about 
the ‘average man’ or the ‘average woman’? If we do not 
have the context or the meaning of the word ‘stronger’ 
here, then this proposition is probably too vague to 
be used in an argument. The various uses of the word 
“stronger” are homonyms, and the sentence is vague 
because we don’t know which sense it is that the 
speaker or writer means. That is an issue separate from 
the issue of whether the proposition, once properly 
understood, is true or false. 
“People who get good marks in school are very intel-
ligent.”
Again, this looks like a decent proposition, but 
one might want to clarify the meaning of the word 
‘intelligent’ before using it in an argument. The prob-
lem here isn’t just that someone could counter-propose 
that some intelligent people get bad marks in school, 
or that some stupid people get good marks. Those 
kinds of issues can come up when the argumentation 
is underway. But before we get that far, we have to 
know what the speaker means by the word ‘intelligent’. 
Is it just a matter of the ability to perform well on 
school tests? Is it the ability to speak clearly and sound 
like you know what you’re talking about? Is it the abil-
ity to solve problems quickly? Is it something else?
“Beer is better than wine.”
A judgment of value can act as a decent proposi-
tion. But in an example like this one, we would need to 
know what measure of value is being used here. Is beer 
considered better because it is cheaper? Or because 
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it has less alcohol content? Or because it’s easier for 
people to make their own beer at home? Or, is this 
person merely expressing a personal taste preference? 
Also, given that there are thousands of recipes for beer, 
and thousands of recipes for wine, it might not be 
clear what kind of beer and what kind of wine is being 
compared.
It is often the case that propositions like these 
are clarified by introducing the argument with a few 
handy definitions. The definitions might not form part 
of the argument, but they can provide the context or 
the background information that will allow debaters 
to understand each other and then decide whether 
they agree or disagree. 
Propositions can also be clarified by their position 
in the argument, and their relationship to other 
propositions. 
3.2 Parts of Arguments
Once we have figured out what a proposition is we 
can build arguments by arranging propositions into 
particular relationships with other propositions. Re-
member, an argument needs at least two propositions, 
not just one. 
The first type of proposition that an argument 
needs is a premise. This is a statement given in sup-
port of another statement; it is the reason why another 
statement should be accepted as true. Propositions 
can come from your world view, or your personal 
experience, or some other trustworthy source. Most 
arguments have more than one premise and most 
arguments state the premises first.
The other type of proposition that an argument 
needs is a conclusion. This is the ‘point’ of an argu-
ment; it is that which is supported by the premises; it 
is that which the speaker is trying to persuade another 
person to believe is the case. Rather than coming from 
your experience or your world view or some other 
source, the conclusion follows from the premises of 
the argument. 
The difference between the premises of an argu-
ment and its conclusion are not differences in the 
statements themselves. Rather, to identify which are 
the premises and which is the conclusion, you have 
to rely on context. What is being used as a reason, 
and what is supposed to follow from those reasons? 
Sometimes a conclusion that follows from a number 
of premises is then used as a premise for another 
conclusion. Consider the following argument:
“I don’t believe he’s telling the truth. You see how his 
eyebrow twitches, and he’s sweating a little more than 
normal. If he is lying, you shouldn’t give him your 
money.”
In this example there are two arguments. The 
speaker intends to support the conclusion that “he 
is not telling the truth/he is lying” with the premises 
that “his eyebrow twitches” and “he’s sweating more 
than normal”. The conclusion that “he is lying” is used 
again as a premise, to support the conclusion that “you 
shouldn’t give him your money”, which is the overall 
conclusion of the argument.
Stories, poems, explanations, speeches, and so on, 
can sometimes look like arguments. They might even 
be made up of statements. But if they do not have 
premises giving you reasons for accepting conclusions, 
then they are not arguments. This, in case I haven’t 
mentioned it yet, is why thinking logically about 
something is often called ‘reasoning’ about it.
The other parts of arguments have to do with the 
way premises and conclusions are put together. 
An inference is the name for the relationship 
between statements in an argument. It is a line of logic 
between propositions that lead you from the premises 
to the conclusion. Inferences are often embodied in 
certain indicator words, which show you which way 
the direction of the argument is flowing. Here are a 
few examples of indicator words:
•	 Because
•	 Since
•	 Given that...
•	 Which means that...
•	 We can conclude that...
•	 Hence
•	 It follows that...
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•	 Therefore
•	 Consequently...
•	 This implies...
...and so on. I’ve mentioned that an argument 
needs at least two propositions. But two propositions 
placed side by side do not make an argument. There 
must be a relationship between them, showing that 
one leads you to the other, one supports the other, and 
one follows from the other. That relationship is called 
an inference; and between its propositions an argu-
ment must have inferences too, or else it is not an argu-
ment. The indicator words “Because”, “Since”, “Given 
that” (and many others) indicate that what follows the 
indicator word is being used as a premise or reason to 
support a conclusion. Indicator words that indicate the 
conclusion are “Which means that”, “We can conclude 
that”, “Hence”, “Therefore”, “Consequently”, etc.
3.3  Truth and Validity
Truth, in this way of understanding logic, is a property 
of propositions. As we’ve already seen, arguments 
must be made of sentences that could be either true or 
false, and not from other kinds of sentences. And there 
are various ways we could find out whether a given 
proposition is true. For example:
•	 The proposition corresponds to the facts, as you are able 
to observe them or somehow prove them (this is called 
the Correspondence theory of truth). 
•	 The proposition is acceptably consistent, or ‘coheres 
well’, with other statements that form part of your world 
view (the Coherence theory). 
•	 When put to some kind of test, the proposition turns 
out to be a very useful and practical thing to believe 
(the Pragmatic theory).
As truth is a property of sentences, so validity is 
a property of inferences. We say that an argument is 
valid if its inferences lead you properly from premises 
to conclusions. Validity is determined by looking at 
the form, or the structure of the argument, and not the 
content – those are two separate issues.
And finally, soundness is a property of argu-
ments as a whole. An argument is sound if it has true 
premises and valid inferences. Both of these conditions 
must be met 
Arguments themselves also come in two main 
types: deduction and induction. A deduction, or a 
deductive argument, is a type of argument that, if it 
begins with true premises, logically guarantees that the 
conclusion is also true. Deduction works because in a 
deductive argument, nothing appears in the conclu-
sion that was not already present in at least one of the 
premises. You can think of a deductive argument as a 
kind of ‘unpacking’ or ‘synthesizing’ of the premises.
An induction, or an inductive argument, is a 
type of argument that asserts the likelihood of the 
conclusion. In an inductive argument, if the premises 
are true, then the conclusion is probably true. Unlike 
a deduction, an induction can go beyond what is 
asserted in the premises. Its conclusion can say more 
than what the premises say. For example, you can use 
an induction to make a prediction about the future. 
But an induction cannot guarantee the truth of a 
conclusion, as a deduction can do.
3.4 Types of Statements (Modern Logic)
As we said earlier, an argument is a set of statements 
from which we can infer another statement, that is, 
the argument’s conclusion. In formal logic there are 
several common forms of statements that will be use-
ful to know when we discuss argument forms. 
3.4.1. Negative Statements
A negative statement is true when the corresponding 
positive statement is false. For instance, if we were to 
take the positive statement, “I can clone this pig”, the 
negation of that statement could be expressed by any 
of the following examples:
•	 I can not clone this pig.
•	 It is not the case that I can clone this pig.
•	 It is false that I can clone this pig.
•	 It is untrue that I can clone this pig.
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If we symbolize “I can clone this pig” with the 
letter “A”, and its negation as “~A”, then we can represent 
the truth values for “A” and “~A” in a table. Row one 
of this table says that if A is true, then ~A is false. Row 
two of the table says that if A is false, ~A is true.
A ~A
T F
F T
3.4.2 Conjunctions
When a statement affirms or denies more than one 
thing, that statement is a conjunction. In essence, a 
conjunction claims that all of the statements of which 
it is composed are true. The individual statements of 
a conjunction are its conjuncts. These statements 
could be negative or positive. But when any one of 
the statements of which a conjunction is composed is 
false, the whole conjunction is false. For instance, the 
conjunction “My house is red, and I like to eat buttons,” 
is only true if both of the individual statements are 
true; that is, if my house is red and I like to eat buttons. 
If I don’t like to eat buttons, then the conjunction, 
“My house is red, and I like to eat buttons” is false. But 
conjunctions don’t necessarily use the word “and”, and 
so it is useful to recognize some other indicator words 
that tell us we’re dealing with a conjunction. Consider 
the following examples, all of which could be reduced 
to the conjunction, “I childproofed the house, and 
children get in the house”:
•	 I’ve childproofed the house, and they still get in.
•	 I’ve childproofed the house, but they still get in.
•	 I’ve childproofed the house, yet they still get in.
•	 Although I’ve childproofed the house, they still get in.
•	 Even though I’ve childproofed the house, they still get in.
•	 I’ve childproofed the house; however, they still get in.
If we symbolize “I’ve childproofed the house” 
as “A” and “Children get in the house” as “B”, and the 
conjunction as “A&B”, then the truth table for the 
conjunction is as follows:
A B A&B
T T T
T F F
F T F
F F F
From this we can see that the only case where 
the conjunction “A&B” is true is when both of the 
individual statements are true.
Conjunctions are used when we need to put two 
or more statements together and treat them all as if 
they are one single statement. This can make it easier 
to analyze an argument as a whole.
3.4.3 Disjunctions
Disjunctions, like conjunctions, are composed of 
two or more statements, which could be positive 
or negative. It is another way to put two statements 
together and treat them as if they are one statement; 
but we do this when we know only one of them is 
true, but we are not sure which one. The statements 
disjoined in a disjunction are called its disjuncts. In 
the case of disjunctions, only one of those statements 
needs to be true to make the disjunction as a whole 
true. For instance, the statement, “Either I’ll save this 
money, or I’ll spend it on candy” is true in either of the 
cases where I save the money or spend it on candy. The 
statement would be false, however, if instead I bought 
a motorcycle with the money. All of the following 
examples are cases of a disjunction:
•	 The hoarder will clean the house, or be evicted.
•	 Either the hoarder will clean the house, or he’ll be 
evicted.
•	 The hoarder will either clean or be evicted.
•	 Unless the hoarder cleans the house, he will be evicted.
If we symbolize “The hoarder will clean the house” 
as “A”, and “The hoarder will be evicted” as “B”, then the 
disjunction as a whole would be represented as “A∨B”. 
We can summarize the truth of the disjunction in a 
table. From this we can see that a disjunction is true 
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in all of the cases where A is true, B is true, and where 
both A and B are true. The only case where the disjunc-
tion is false is if both of the statements are false.
A B A∨B
T T T
T F T
F T T
F F F
3.4.4 Conditional Statements
Conditional statements are intended to express a 
one-way relation between the statements of which it 
is composed, such that the truth of one implies the 
truth of the other. In general, a conditional statement 
takes the form, “If P, then Q”. For instance, a conditional 
statement “If Stacey is going to the party, then I’m not 
going” implies that my decision about whether to go 
to the party is dependent on whether Stacey is going 
(because I hate Stacey). 
When we have a conditional statement composed 
of two statements, we call one the antecedent, and the 
other the consequent. In the statement, “If P, then, Q”, 
“P” is the antecedent (what goes before), and “Q” is the 
consequent (what follows).
Conditional statements can also be used to express 
sufficient and necessary conditions. A sufficient 
condition is something that is enough to bring about 
an expected result, for instance, “If I get 85% of the 
questions right, then I will get an A on the exam.” A 
necessary condition is something that might not be 
enough, but is necessary, for instance “If I’m going to 
write the exam at all, then I’ll need to bring a pencil.”
Conditional statements can be symbolized with 
an arrow telling us which way the relation goes. For 
instance, if “P” symbolizes “You will give me that pony” 
and “C” symbolizes, “I will cry”, all of the following 
statements would be symbolized “~P→C”. Note that 
“~P” is the negation of “P”.
•	 If you don’t give me that pony, then I’ll cry.
•	 If you don’t give me that pony, I’ll cry.
•	 I’ll cry only if you don’t give me that pony.
•	 Your not giving me that pony is a sufficient condition to 
make me cry.
•	 My crying is necessary, given that I haven’t gotten my 
pony.
•	 Unless you give me that pony, I’ll cry.
•	 When I don’t get my pony, I cry.
•	 I cry only when I don’t get my pony.
A conditional statement is true if both of the 
statements of which it is composed are true, or if the 
consequent is true. It is only false if the antecedent is 
true and the consequent is false. This is the only case 
where we can be sure that the relationship does not 
hold. For instance, if Stacey goes to the party and I go 
too, then the statement “If Stacey is going to the party, 
then I’m not going” is false, because in fact we have 
shown that my hatred of Stacey is not strong enough 
to prevent me from having a good time. However, 
if I don’t go to the party, it might be because Stacey 
is going, or it might be for another reason. Thus in 
any case where I don’t go to the party, we say that the 
conditional statement is true.
The truth of the conditional statement A→B can 
be summarized in the following table:
A B A→B
T T T
T F F
F T T
F F T
3.4.5 Biconditional Statements
A biconditional statement describes a two-way rela-
tionship between two statements, such that either one 
implies the other. For instance, if my decision to go to 
the party depends on my being able to bring my cat, 
and if I don’t get to bring my cat, then I won’t go, then 
there are two possible results: Either I get to bring my 
cat, and so I go to the party, or they won’t let me bring 
my cat, so I won’t go. This means that the two-way 
relation holds if the truth of the statements is the same. 
Either both are true, or both are false.
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All of the following statements describe a bicon-
ditional relation, for the case in which if you eat your 
vegetables you will get dessert, and if you don’t eat 
your vegetables, you won’t. 
•	 You can have dessert if and only if you eat your 
vegetables.
•	 You can have dessert exactly if you eat your vegetables.
•	 You can have dessert precisely if you eat your vegetables.
•	 Your eating your vegetables is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for your getting dessert.
•	 You can have your dessert, if you eat your vegetables, but 
only if you eat them.
•	 You can have your dessert just in case you eat your 
vegetables.
We can summarize the truth of a biconditional 
statement in a table:
A B A↔B
T T T
T F F
F T F
F F T
3.5 Categorical Logic
Categorical logic is a type of deductive logic intro-
duced by Aristotle in the 4th century BC, according 
to which we can infer true statements from other 
true statements that state that some or all things of a 
category belong to another category. For instance, the 
statement that “All cats are blue” tells us that there is a 
category of cats, and a category of blue things, and that 
everything that is a cat is also blue. In categorical logic, 
we can divide a statement into parts, each part describ-
ing a category. This is something we cannot do if we 
are only evaluating statements as a whole. For instance, 
if I claim that “All cats are blue” and that “Benny is 
a cat”, then the logical inference we can make is that 
“Benny is blue”. But if we’re looking at the propositions 
as a whole, then we can’t see the relation between the 
two statements. That is, if we symbolized “All cats are 
blue” as “A”, and “Benny is a cat” as “B”, then we have lost 
the relation between the two claims that allows us to 
infer that “Benny is blue”. 
There are four main types of categorical state-
ments. We will use “S” to indicate the subject of the 
proposition, and “P” to indicate the predicate we are 
attributing to the subject.
Universal Affirmative: All S are P.  
Example: “All cats are fuzzy.”  (S: cats.  P: fuzzy things.)
Universal Negative: No S are P  
Example: “No dogs are ten feet tall.”  
(S: dogs.  P: things that are ten feet tall.)
Particular Affirmative: Some S are P  
Example: “Some skyscrapers are beautiful.”  
(S: skyscrapers.  P: beautiful things.)
Particular Negative: Some S are not P 
Example: “Some books are not meant for children.”  
(S: books.  P: things meant for children.)
Modern logic has a similar “predicate logic”, which 
extends beyond the realm of this text. In fact, attempts 
to symbolize Aristotle’s logic have resulted in horrible 
difficulties and frustrated logicians all over the world 
for millennia. One particular difference between 
Aristotle’s logic and modern predicate logic we should 
note is that while modern logic would symbolize Aris-
totle’s universal statements as conditional statements, 
Aristotle did not use conditionals in his logic, as he 
believed a conditional statement did not properly 
express the relation between the antecedent and the 
consequent. The proper relation is that of belonging 
to a category. This is why you might see “All S are P” 
reinterpreted by modern logicians as something like, 
“If X is an S, then X is a P” (where X is some random 
individual). Modern logic also assumes that when 
we make a statement about a particular thing, that 
particular thing exists, but when we make a universal 
statement, the subject of that statement doesn’t neces-
sarily exist. Thus particular statements are said to have 
“existential import” that universal statements do not.  
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Contradictories
In Categorical Logic, two statements are said to be 
contradictories if it is impossible for both of them to 
be true, and also impossible that both of them should 
be false. For instance, “I’m wearing white shoes” and 
“I’m not wearing white shoes” are contradictory state-
ments. 
Of the kinds of statements given above, the 
Universal Affirmative is contradictory to the Particular 
Negative, and the Universal Negative is contradictory 
to the Particular Affirmative. This is best illustrated 
by example. Let’s say that “S” stands for “cats” and “P” 
stands for “fuzzy”. Then the statements look like this:
•	 Universal Affirmative: All cats are fuzzy
•	 Universal Negative: No cats are fuzzy
•	 Particular Affirmative: Some cat is fuzzy
•	 Particular Negative: Some cat is not fuzzy
The Universal Affirmative and Particular Negative 
statements are contradictory because it is impossible 
that all cats are fuzzy and that at the same time some 
cat is not fuzzy. It is also impossible that both state-
ments are false. That would mean that “All cats are 
not fuzzy” and “Some cat is fuzzy” would both have 
to be true.
Likewise, the Universal Negative and the Particu-
lar Affirmative statements are contradictory. Again, this 
is because it is impossible that “No cats are fuzzy” and 
“Some cat is fuzzy” are both true statements. Likewise, 
they cannot both be false. This would mean that “No 
cat is not fuzzy” and “Some cat is not fuzzy” would 
both have to be true.
Contraries
Two statements are said to be contraries if it is impos-
sible for them both to be true, but possible for them 
both to be false. Carrying on with our fuzzy cats, the 
Universal Affirmative and Universal Negative state-
ments are contraries. “All cats are fuzzy” and “No cats 
are fuzzy” cannot be true at the same time. However, 
they could both be false. When they are both false is 
when both of their contradictory statements are true: 
when some cats are fuzzy and some are not.
Subcontraries
Two statements are said to be subcontraries if it is 
possible for them both to be true, but impossible for 
them both to be false. The Particular Affirmative and 
Particular Negative statements are subcontraries, as it 
is possible for “Some cats are fuzzy” and “Some cats 
are not fuzzy” to be true at the same time. But both 
statements cannot be false at the same time. Then 
both of their contradictories would have to be true: 
“All cats are fuzzy” and “No cats are fuzzy”. (But this is 
impossible.)
Subalterns
Since categorical logic did not distinguish between 
statements having existential import and those that 
did not, it is also possible to make inferences from 
Universal Statements to Particular Statements. That 
is, categorical logic assumes that if “All cats are fuzzy” 
then “Some cat is fuzzy”. Similarly, if “No cats are fuzzy”, 
then “Some cat is not fuzzy”.
The Square of Opposition
The above conclusions can be (and often are) sum-
marized in a diagram11 :
 
3.6 Some Common Deductive Argument Forms
Earlier we stated that the definition of an argument is 
“any two (or more) statements in which one is 
the reason for the other”. This section will introduce 
some valid deductive argument forms. In deductive 
Chapter Three 3.6 Some Common Deductive Argument Forms
11 Diagram taken from Parsons, Terence, “The Traditional Square of Opposition”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2012 Edition), Edward     
     N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/square/
Every S is P
A
I
E
O
contraries
subcontraries
subalternssubalterns
Some S is P
No S is P
Some S is not P
subcontraries
55
argumentation, we take some number of premises 
as given, and from these we are able to make other 
claims according to certain logical rules of inference. 
If the conclusion that results comes out of the given 
premises as a result of applying the accepted rules of 
inference, then we say that the conclusion follows 
necessarily from the premises, or that the argument is 
“valid”.
The validity of an argument is determined not 
by what it says, but by its form. That means that when 
we assess the validity of an argument, we assume that 
the premises are true. If, on the other hand, we want 
to question the truth of the premises, we would be 
evaluating not its validity, but its soundness. Consider 
the following argument:
All pigs can fly.
Babe is a pig.
Therefore, Babe can fly.
This argument is valid. That is, assuming that the 
premises are true, the conclusion necessarily follows. 
Of course, we can question the soundness of the argu-
ment. If we can disprove the premise that “All pigs can 
fly”, then the argument would be unsound. We might 
also question whether we want to consider Babe a pig, 
rather than a fictional character resembling a pig. In 
either case, if either one of the premises is not true, 
then the argument is not sound. But that does not 
mean it is not valid. An argument can be valid without 
being sound. Let’s look at an example of the same form:
All humans are mortal.
Brendan is a human.
Therefore, Brendan is mortal.
This argument is both valid and sound. In fact, 
both arguments are examples of a categorical syllogism 
of the form AII (Modus Darii), which is a shorthand 
for Universal Affirmative-Particular Affirmative-
Particular Affirmative. But we’ll get to that.
3.6.1 Modus Ponens or Affirming the Antecedent
Modus Ponens is a valid argument form taking a 
conditional statement as one premise, and the affirma-
tion of its antecedent as another premise. So, if I claim 
“If something, then another thing” and then affirm 
“something”, I can logically deduce that “another thing”. 
If the conditional statement and the affirmation of its 
antecedent are both true, the truth of the conclusion is 
guaranteed. 
Let’s take an example.
(P1) If the dog is barking, then there’s an intruder 
in the house.
(P2) The dog is barking!
(C) Therefore, there’s an intruder in the house!
Of course, there might be other reasons why the 
dog might bark. But according to Premise 1, the fact 
that the dog is barking implies that there is definitely 
an intruder in the house. And we are assuming that P1 
is true. 
This argument takes the general form:
(P1) If P, then Q
(P2) P
(C) Q
Rendered symbolically:
(P1) P→Q
(P2) P
(C) Q
The validity of this form is pretty intuitive. But if 
ever in doubt, we can refer back to our truth table for 
conditionals and prove it beyond a doubt. 
P Q P→Q
T T T
T F F
F T T
F F T
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Premise 1 gives us a conditional statement. Con-
sidered alone, we can see that there are three possible 
cases where it could be true: where the antecedent (P) 
is true and the consequent (Q) is true; where the an-
tecedent (P) is false and the consequent (Q) true; and 
where the antecedent (P) and consequent (Q) are both 
false. We can therefore eliminate the fourth possibility 
that the antecedent (P) is true and the consequent (Q) 
false, because this would make Premise 1 false (and we 
are assuming that it’s true). So let’s cross it off.
P Q P→Q
T T T
T F F
F T T
F F T
Now, taking into account Premise 2, which tells 
us that our antecedent is true, we can eliminate the 
possibilities in the table where P is false.
P Q P→Q
T T T
T F F
F T T
F F T
So it seems that the truth of the consequent is 
guaranteed, for based on what we know from Premise 
1 and Premise 2, there is no other possible conclusion.
Let’s look at another example:
(P1) If it is raining, then I will need my umbrella.
(P2) It is raining.
(C) Therefore, I will need my umbrella.
There might be other reasons why you might need 
your umbrella. Perhaps it’s to be used as a prop in a 
theatrical performance. But nothing in this argument 
tells you that. And besides, whether or not that’s the 
case, the first premise still tells you that you need it 
when it rains.
Affirming the Consequent: Modus 
Ponens’ Invalid Half Brother
There’s a sneaky invalid argument out there that 
looks a lot like Modus Ponens. What would happen 
if instead we affirmed the consequent, instead of the 
antecedent? We would have an argument like this:
(P1) If it is raining, then I will need my umbrella.
(P2) I will need my umbrella.
(P3) Therefore, it is raining.
We tend to make this logical leap and equate the 
fact that we need our umbrella with the fact that it’s 
raining. But though it is not equally likely that we 
might need the umbrella for a theatrical performance, 
it is still a possibility. That is, the fact that I need my 
umbrella does not absolutely guarantee that it’s raining. 
This argument form is therefore invalid.
Practical Uses of Modus Ponens:
Every circuit in your computer uses this pattern of ar-
gument to make calculations. In effect, the diodes and 
transistors in your computer CPU are like ‘switches’, 
which operate as if they are reasoning like this:
If a signal comes in from direction X, then send it out 
again in direction Y.
A signal just came in from direction X.
Therefore, the thing to do is send it out in direction Y.
3.6.2 Modus Tollens or Denying the Consequent
Modus Tollens is a valid argument form taking a 
conditional statement as one premise, and the denial 
of its consequent as another premise. So, if I claim 
“If something, then another thing” and then deny 
“another thing”, I can logically deduce that “not 
something”. Here I’m recognizing that if the relation 
between “something” and “another thing” holds, 
and if “another thing” failed to happen, or is false 
(depending on what that thing is), then “something” 
must not have happened, or must not be true. 
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Let’s take an example.
(P1) If you gave me a diamond tiara, I’d be the happiest 
girl in the world!
(P2) I am not the happiest girl in the world.
(C) Therefore, you did not give me a diamond tiara.
This argument takes the general form:
(P1) If P, then Q.
(P2) Not Q.
(C) Not P.
Rendered symbolically:
(P1) P→Q
(P2) ~Q
(C) ~P
Again, the validity of this form is rather intuitive. 
But, we can still go through the truth table proof, just 
for fun. 
Again, Premise 1 tells us that the conditional 
statement is true. Therefore, we can again eliminate the 
possibility that it is false from our table.
P Q P→Q
T T T
T F F
F T T
F F T
Then, Premise 2 tells us that the consequent (Q) 
is false. We can therefore also eliminate all of the pos-
sibilities where Q is true from our table.
P Q P→Q
T T T
T F F
F T T
F F T
Now we’re left with just what we expect. If P→Q is 
true, and Q is false, then P must also be false.
Like Modus Ponens’s evil half brother, there’s 
another bad argument out there attempting at every 
turn to pass itself off as valid. 
Denying the Antecedent: Fallacy!
Again, when we see a conditional statement and a 
negation, we’re immediately tempted to think ‘Modus 
Tollens’.  But what happens if we deny the antecedent 
instead of the consequent? We get an argument like 
this:
(P1) If you gave me a diamond tiara, I’d be the happiest 
girl in the world!
(P2) You did not give me a diamond tiara.
(C) Therefore, I am not the happiest girl in the world.
Again, the truth of these premises does not 
absolutely guarantee the truth of the conclusion. Even 
if you did not give me a diamond tiara, I might still be 
the happiest girl in the world for some other reason. 
I might have been the happiest girl in the world all 
along, and there’s quite possibly nothing you could do 
to change that. This argument form is invalid.
3.6.3 Categorical Syllogisms
The four standard statements in categorical logic can 
be combined into 24 possible valid logical argument 
forms. But we can just look at a few of them; once 
you get the idea behind how categorical syllogisms 
are judged as valid or invalid, it’s easy to discern the 
difference.
One valid categorical syllogism was already given 
in the introduction to this section. That was:
All humans are mortal.
Brendan is a human.
Therefore, Brendan is mortal.
This argument is valid. We can, in general, con-
clude that if an entire class of things has some quality, 
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and if something is a member of that class, it has that 
quality.
But we can also generalize further. If an entire 
class of things has some quality, and all of the things 
that have that quality have some other quality, then we 
can make a valid inference that the entire class also has 
that other quality. 
For example:
All farm animals are cannibalistic.
All cows are farm animals.
Therefore all cows are cannibalistic.
If you accept the validity of the first argument, 
then you must also accept the validity of this argu-
ment. This makes sense, because if every individual 
cow is a farm animal and therefore cannibalistic, then 
the whole cow species is cannibalistic.
Now let’s try some negative statements.
 
No human is immortal.
Brendan is a human.
Therefore Brendan is not immortal.
What this argument says is that if none of the 
members of the class of humans is immortal, then 
neither is a specific individual of that class. Again, 
we can generalize. If no specific member of the class 
is immortal, then the whole class is excluded from 
immortality. 
No human is immortal.
All philosophy professors are humans.
Therefore no philosophy professor is immortal.
These are only some of the possible combinations 
of categorical statements that result in valid syllogisms. 
If you can keep track of what thing or what kind of 
thing belongs to what class, then you’re in pretty 
good shape for evaluating the validity of categorical 
syllogisms.
3.6.4 Enthymemes
An enthymeme is a categorical syllogism in which 
one of the premises is missing. People use them all the 
time, often without realizing it, when they want to get 
a certain point across quickly, or when they can assume 
the listeners know what the they are talking about. It’s 
really easy to commit a fallacy called ‘undistributed 
middle’ when making an enthymeme, because we 
aren’t always keeping close track of where the premises 
are. So to analyze an enthymeme, one has to lay out all 
the propositions in the place where they would stand 
in a categorical syllogism, fill in the missing proposi-
tion, and then determine whether the inferences are 
valid or invalid. 
“Many songs by Justin Timberlake are popular. So this 
new song will be popular too.”
P1.  Some Justin Timberlake songs are popular.
P2.  This new song is composed by Justin Timberlake.  
C.  Therefore, this new song will be popular.
“He is a leprous man, for he is unclean.” (Leviticus 13)
P1. Leprous men are unclean.
P2.  He is unclean.
C.  Therefore, he is a leprous man.
“Yond Cassius has a lean and hungry look. He thinks 
too much. Such men are dangerous.” (Shakespeare, 
Julius Caesar, III.2)
P1. Cassius has a lean and hungry look and thinks too 
much.
P2. Men who have lean and hungry looks and who 
think too much are dangerous.
C. Therefore, Cassius is dangerous.
By the way: which of these enthymemes are sound, 
and which are not?
3.6.5 Hypothetical Syllogism
A hypothetical syllogism is a valid argument form 
that takes as premises two conditional statements and 
concludes a third, where the consequent of the first 
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premise is identical to the antecedent of the second. 
For instance, if I make the claim, 
 (P1) If it gets below freezing outside, I can make ice 
out there. 
And I also make the claim that,
(P2) If I can make ice, my soft drinks will be 
deliciously refreshing.
Then I can conclude that,
(C) If it gets below freezing outside, my soft drinks 
will be deliciously refreshing.
Essentially, we are demonstrating the transitive 
property of conditional statements. That is, if we have 
two conditional statements where the consequent of 
one is identical to the antecedent of another, we can 
eliminate them and mash the rest of the two premises 
together to get a conclusion that is definitely true.
This argument takes the general form
(P1) If P, then Q
(P2) If Q, then R
(C) If P, then R
Rendered symbolically:
(P1) P→Q
(P2) Q→R
(C) P→R
The truth table proof of this argument now has 
to take into account three terms. Therefore when we 
make the table, we must account for all of the possible 
truth values of P, Q, and R, for a total of 8 combina-
tions. Then we can fill in the truth values for the 
conditional statements acting as our premises:
P Q R P→Q Q→R
T T T T T
T T F T F
T F T F T
T F F F T
F T T T T
F T F T F
F F T T T
F F F T T
If we assume that both P→Q and Q→R are true, 
we can eliminate all of the possibilities where either 
one of them is false.
P Q R P→Q Q→R
T T T T T
T T F T F
T F T F T
T F F F T
F T T T T
F T F T F
F F T T T
F F F T T
Now let’s take the values for P and R that are left 
over, and see what the values for P→R looks like. There 
are four possible combinations of P and R left, after we 
have taken into account the truth of our premises:
P R P→R
T T T
F T T
F T T
F F T
Now it looks like no matter what leftover values of 
P and R we might choose, if P→Q and Q→R are true, 
P→R is definitely going to be true.
But this could all be made clearer by taking a few 
examples. We can apply the hypothetical syllogism to 
categorical thinking:
(P1) If Socrates is a man, Socrates is an animal.
(P2) If Socrates is an animal, Socrates is a substance.
(C) If Socrates is a man, Socrates is a substance.
We could also apply the hypothetical syllogism to 
causal relations:
(P1) If I set the house on fire, it will burn down.
(P2) If the house burns down, I’ll collect insurance 
money.
(C) If I set the house on fire, I’ll collect insurance money.
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In any case, the transitive property of the implica-
tion relation that constitutes a conditional statement 
guarantees that the hypothetical syllogism is valid. 
That is, the hypothetical syllogism can be proven valid 
just by the definition of conditional statements.
3.6.6 Disjunctive Syllogism
This argument establishes the truth of some proposi-
tion by ruling out all other possibilities until there’s 
just one left still standing. 
Form:
Either P is true, or Q is true.
P is false.
Therefore, Q is true.
Either P is true, or Q is true.
Q is false.
Therefore, P is true.
Examples:
(P1) This tree is either coniferous or it is deciduous.
(P2) I see by its flat leaves that it is not coniferous.
(C) Therefore, this tree is deciduous.
(P1) One of us is going to die here, Mister Bond. It’s 
either you or me.
(P2) And it isn’t going to be me.
(C) So it will have to be you!
This is a valid argument form:
(P1) P∨Q
(P2) ~P
(C) Q
Truth table proof:
If we take our truth table for disjunction and assume 
Premise 1 is true, then we have three possible interpre-
tations left: both P and Q are true, P is true and Q is 
false, or P is false and Q is true:
P Q P∨Q
T T T
T F T
F T T
F F F
But Premise 2 tells us that P is false. Therefore we 
can eliminate some more possibilities and guarantee 
that Q is true:
P Q P∨Q
T T T
T F T
F T T
F F F
Actually, you can have as many propositions as you 
like in the first premise, and rule them out one by one 
in the middle premises until you arrive at the last one 
standing. So the argument could also look like this:
Either P, or Q, or R, or S, or T.
P is false.
Q is false.
R is false.
S is false.
Therefore, T is true.
This is basically what I mean when I make the 
argument:
(P1) You talkin’ to me?
(P2-?) I’m the only one here. (That is, nobody else is 
here—John isn’t here, Mary isn’t here, Neil isn’t here, 
Bob isn’t here, Sheila isn’t here—and you must be talk-
ing to someone here.)
(C) I guess you’re talkin’ to me.
Practical Uses:
The game of “Clue” ( first published as “Cluedo” in 
England in 1949) operates entirely on the basis of the 
disjunctive syllogism. In this game players try to figure 
out who killed “Mr. Body”, by locating suspects, murder 
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weapons, and crime scenes on a list of possibilities. 
When a player figures out which suspect, weapon, and 
location cannot be accounted for, she can make an 
accusation, and perhaps win the game.
3.6.7 Adjunction
The rule of adjunction allows us to form a conjunction 
from any two true statements. It is also known as 
“conjunction introduction”. This is one of the most 
intuitively obvious rules of inference in the world of 
logic. It simply states that if two statements are true 
independently, then their conjunction is also true. 
For example, from the premises:
(P1) I’m a little man
(P2) I’m also evil
(P3) I’m also into cats
I can conclude:
(C) I’m a little man, and I’m also evil, also into cats.
Generally this is done by adding one premise to 
another individually, such that a logical proof would 
look like this:
(P1) P
(P2) Q
(P3) R
(C1) P&Q
(C2) (P&Q)&R
The result is the same.
“Why would we do this?” you might ask. It seems 
so obvious. Well, there are some cases where you might 
need a conjunction and don’t have one. For instance, 
say you know that everything that looks like a duck 
and quacks like a duck is a duck, and you want to 
prove that your mystery pet Billy is a duck. Then we 
would have an argument like this:
(P1) Everything that looks like a duck and quacks like 
a duck is a duck.
(P2) Billy looks like a duck.
(P3) Billy quacks like a duck.
(C1) Therefore Billy looks like a duck and quacks like a duck.
(C2) Therefore Billy is a duck.
This rule is valid by the definition of conjunction, 
whereby we stated that a conjunction is true if and 
only if all of its conjuncts are true. 
3.6.8 Dilemmas
A dilemma, stemming from the Greek “δίλημμα” re-
fers to an “ambiguous proposition”. In logic, a dilemma 
occurs when we have two possibilities somewhere in 
the argument. Often a dilemma is associated with an 
undesirable consequence. Consider, for instance, this 
simple dilemma:
“You’re damned if you do, and damned if you don’t.”
We can separate this dilemma into two condi-
tional statements.
(P1) If you do, then you’re damned.
(P2) If you don’t, then you’re damned.
Then we can take these premises together with the 
logical truth that either you do or you don’t:
(P3) You do or you don’t.
And then make the obvious conclusion:
(C) You’re damned.
But sometimes our dilemmas are not simple. This 
section will introduce two complex dilemmas, where 
our conclusions turn out to be ambiguous statements. 
That is, while we can infer that either this one or that 
one of our possible conclusions is true, we don’t know 
which one. We can, however, confidently state the 
conclusion that either this or that.
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Constructive Dilemma
The constructive dilemma gives us two conditional 
statements and a disjunctive statement. For example:
(P1) If I go to the movies tonight, I’ll have to stand in 
line.
(P2) If I go to that party tonight, I’ll have to do laundry.
(P3) I’m either going to the movies, or going to the 
party.
From these statements we can validly conclude:
(C) I’m either going to have to stand in line, or I’ll have 
to do laundry.
We don’t know which one. But one of them is 
going to happen.
 Notice how similar this argument is to modus 
ponens. Where in modus ponens we had a conditional 
statement and a true antecedent, now we have two 
conditional statements, and another one saying that 
one of the antecedents is going to be true. If we knew 
which one, we could make a valid modus ponens argu-
ment. But we don’t. Still, though, we can conclude that 
depending on my choice of what to do this evening, 
I’ll have to do something unpleasant. 
The argument form looks like this:
(P1) If P, then Q
(P2) If R, then S
(P3) P or R
(C) Q or S
Rendered symbolically:
(P1) P→Q
(P2) R→S
(P3) P∨R
(C) Q∨S
Let’s look at another example.
(P1) If your mother loved you, she would pack you a 
bagged lunch.
(P2) If  your father loved you, he would knit you some 
mittens.
(P3) One of your father or mother loves you.
Our conclusion is:
(C) Your mother will pack you a bagged lunch or your 
father will knit you some mittens.
Note that in this example, it is completely possible 
that you’ll end up with both a bagged lunch and some 
mittens. This is as a result of the inclusive nature of 
disjunction. That is, while it is safe to say that either 
one of your father or mother loves you, it’s possible 
that both do.
Destructive Dilemma
While the constructive dilemma allows us to infer 
a disjunction using the same kind of reasoning that 
makes modus ponens valid, a destructive dilemma mir-
rors closely the same kind of reasoning as modus tol-
lens. In a destructive dilemma, we are again provided 
with two conditional statements and told that one of 
their consequents is false. We do not know which one 
it is, however. The only thing we can say for sure is that 
if at least one of their consequents is false, at least one of 
their antecedents will be as well.
(P1) If the people value free puppies for all, Jim will win 
the election.
(P2) If the people value extended library hours, George 
will win the election.
(P3) Either Jim will not win the election, or George will 
not win the election.
(C) Either the people don’t value free puppies for all, or 
the people don’t value extended library hours.
While we might be able to guess at which one 
of these possibilities is true, neither one of them is 
assured by the rules of deductive logic. All we know 
is that at least one of the disjuncts in our conclusion 
will be true.
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The argument form looks like this:
(P1) If P, then Q
(P2) If R, then S
(P3) Not Q or Not S
(C) Not P or Not R
Rendered symbolically:
(P1) P→Q
(P2) R→S
(P3) ~Q∨~S
(C) ~P∨~R
Let’s take a look at another example.
(P1) If your mother loved you, she would pack you a 
bagged lunch.
(P2) If your father loved you, he would knit you 
some mittens.
(P3) Since your care package looks rather small, you 
infer that it either does not contain a bagged lunch, or it 
does not contain mittens.
(C) Either your mother doesn’t love you, or your father 
doesn’t love you.
Again, it’s possible that neither of your parents 
love you, and that they sent an empty box just to taunt 
you. It’s cruel, but logically valid.
3.7 Induction
All of the argument forms we have looked at so far 
have been deductively valid. That meant, we said, that 
the conclusion follows from necessity if the premises 
are true. But to what extent can we ever be sure of 
the truth of those premises? Inductive argumentation 
is a less certain, more realistic, more familiar way of 
reasoning that we all do, all the time. Inductive argu-
mentation recognizes, for instance, that a premise like 
“All horses have four legs” comes from our previous 
experience of horses. If one day we were to encounter 
a three-legged horse, deductive logic would tell us that 
“All horses have four legs” is false, at which point the 
premise becomes rather useless for a deducer. In fact, 
deductive logic tells us that if the premise “All horses 
have four legs” is false, even if we know there are many, 
many four-legged horses in the world, when we go 
to the track and see hordes of four-legged horses, all 
we can really be certain of is that “There is at least one 
four-legged horse.” 
Inductive logic allows for the more realistic 
premise, “The vast majority of horses have four legs”. 
And inductive logic can use this premise to infer other 
useful information, like “If I’m going to get Chestnut 
booties for Christmas, I should probably get four of 
them.” The trick is to recognize a certain amount of 
uncertainty in the truth of the conclusion, something 
for which deductive logic does not allow. In real life, 
however, inductive logic is used much more frequently 
and (hopefully) with some success. Let’s take a look at 
some of the uses of inductive reasoning.
Predicting the Future
We constantly use inductive reasoning to predict the 
future. We do this by compiling evidence based on 
past observations, and by assuming that the future will 
resemble the past. For instance, I make the observation 
that every other time I have gone to sleep at night, 
I have woken up in the morning. There is actually 
no certainty that this will happen, but I make the 
inference because of the fact that this is what has hap-
pened every other time. In fact, it is not the case that 
“All people who go to sleep at night wake up in the 
morning”. But I’m not going to lose any sleep over that. 
And we do the same thing when our experience has 
been less consistent. For instance, I might make the as-
sumption that, if there’s someone at the door, the dog 
will bark. But it’s not outside the realm of possibility 
that the dog is asleep, has gone out for a walk, or has 
been persuaded not to bark by a clever intruder with 
sedative-laced bacon. I make the assumption that if 
there’s someone at the door, the dog will bark, because 
that is what usually happens. 
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Explaining Common Occurrences
We also use inductive reasoning to explain things 
that commonly happen. For instance, if I’m about to 
start an exam and notice that Bill is not here, I might 
explain this to myself with the reason that Bill is stuck 
in traffic. I might base this on the reasoning that being 
stuck in traffic is a common excuse for being late, or 
because I know that Bill never accounts for traffic 
when he’s estimating how long it will take him to get 
somewhere. Again, that Bill is actually stuck in traffic 
is not certain, but I have some good reasons to think 
it’s probable. We use this kind of reasoning to explain 
past events as well. For instance, if I read somewhere 
that 1986 was a particularly good year for tomatoes, 
I assume that 1986 also had some ideal combination 
of rainfall, sun, and consistently warm temperatures. 
Although it’s possible that a scientific madman circled 
the globe planting tomatoes wherever he could in 
1986, inductive reasoning would tell me that the 
former, environmental explanation is more likely. (But 
I could be wrong. )
Generalizing
Often we would like to make general claims, but in 
fact it would be very difficult to prove any general 
claim with any certainty. The only way to do so would 
be to observe every single case of something about 
which we wanted to make an observation. This would 
be, in fact, the only way to prove such assertions as, 
“All swans are white”. Without being able to observe 
every single swan in the universe, I can never make 
that claim with certainty. Inductive logic, on the other 
hand, allows us to make the claim, with a certain 
amount of modesty. 
3.7.1 Inductive Generalization
Inductive generalization allows us to make general 
claims, despite being unable to actually observe every 
single member of a class in order to make a certainly 
true general statement. We see this in scientific studies, 
population surveys, and in our own everyday reason-
ing. Take for example a drug study. Some doctor or 
other wants to know how many people will go blind 
if they take a certain amount of some drug for so 
many years. If they determine that 5% of people in the 
study go blind, they then assume that 5% of all people 
who take the drug for that many years will go blind. 
Likewise, if I survey a random group of people and ask 
them what their favourite colour is, and 75% of them 
say “purple”, then I assume that purple is the favourite 
colour of 75% of people. But we have to be careful 
when we make an inductive generalization. When you 
tell me that 75% of people really like purple, I’m going 
to want to know whether you took that survey outside 
a Justin Bieber concert.
Let’s take an example. Let’s say I asked a class of 
400 students whether or not they think logic is a valu-
able course, and 90% of them said yes. I can make an 
inductive argument like this:
(P1) 90% of 400 students believe that logic is a valuable 
course.
(C) Therefore 90% of students believe that logic is a 
valuable course.
There are certain things I need to take into 
account in judging the quality of this argument. 
For instance, did I ask this in a logic course? Did the 
respondents have to raise their hands so that the 
professor could see them, or was the survey taken 
anonymously? Are there enough students in the course 
to justify using them as a representative group for 
students in general?
If I did, in fact, make a class of 400 logic students 
raise their hands in response to the question of 
whether logic is valuable course, then we can identify 
a couple of problems with this argument. The first is 
bias. We can assume that anyone enrolled in a logic 
course is more likely to see it as valuable than any 
random student. I have therefore skewed the argument 
in favour of logic courses. I can also question whether 
the students were answering the question honestly. Per-
haps if they are trying to save the professor’s feelings, 
they are more likely to raise their hands and assure her 
that the logic course is a valuable one. 
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Now let’s say I’ve avoided those problems. I have 
assured that the 400 students I have asked are ran-
domly selected, say, by soliciting email responses from 
randomly selected students from the university’s entire 
student population. Then the argument looks stronger.
Another problem we might have with the 
argument is whether I have asked enough students so 
that the whole population is well-represented. If the 
student body as a whole consists of 400 students, my 
argument is very strong. If the student body numbers 
in the tens of thousands, I might want to ask a few 
more before assuming that the opinions of a few mir-
ror those of the many. This would be a problem with 
my sample size. 
Let’s take another example. Now I’m going to run 
a scientific study, in which I will pay someone $50 to 
take a drug with unknown effects and see if it makes 
them blind. In order to control for other variables, I 
open the study only to white males between the ages 
of 18 and 25.
A bad inductive argument would say:
(P1) 40% of 1000 people who took the drug went blind.
(C) Therefore 40% of people who take the drug will go 
blind.
A better inductive argument would make a more 
modest claim:
(P1) 40% of the 1000 people who took the drug went 
blind.
(C) Therefore 40% of white males between the ages of 
18 and 25 who take the drug will go blind.
The point behind this example is to show how in-
ductive reasoning imposes an important limitation on 
the possible conclusions a study or a survey can make. 
In order to make good generalizations, we need to 
ensure that our sample is representative, non-biased, 
and sufficiently sized.
3.7.2 Statistical Syllogism
Where in an inductive generalization we saw state-
ment expressing a statistic applied to a more general 
group, we can also use statistics to go from the general 
to the particular. For instance, if I know that most com-
puter science majors are male, and that some random 
individual with the androgynous name “Cameron” is 
an computer science major, then we can be reasonably 
certain that Cameron is a male. We tend to represent 
the uncertainty by qualifying the conclusion with the 
word “probably”. If, on the other hand, we wanted to 
say that something is unlikely, like that Cameron 
were a female, we could use “probably not”. It is also 
possible to temper our conclusion with other similar 
qualifying words.
Let’s take an example.
(P1) Of the 133 people found guilty of homicide last 
year in Canada, 79% were jailed.
(P2) Socrates was found guilty of homicide last year 
in Canada.
(C) Therefore, Socrates was probably jailed.
In this case we can be reasonably sure that 
Socrates is currently rotting in prison. Now the 
certainty of our conclusion seems to be dependent on 
the statistics we’re dealing with. There are definitely 
more certain and more uncertain cases.
(P1) In the last election, 50% of voting Americans voted 
for Obama, while 48% voted for Romney.
(P2) Jim is a voting American.
(C) Therefore, Jim probably voted for Obama.
Clearly, this argument is not as strong as the first. 
It is only slightly more likely than not that Jim voted 
for Obama. In this case we might want to revise our 
conclusion to say:
(C) Therefore, it is slightly more likely than not that Jim 
voted for Obama.
In other cases, the likelihood that something is or 
is not the case approaches certainty. For example:
(P1) There is a 0.00000059% chance you will die on any 
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single flight, assuming you use one of the most poorly 
rated airlines.
(P2) I’m flying to Paris next week.
(C) There’s more than a million to one chance that I will 
die on my flight.
Note that in all of these examples, nothing is ever 
stated with absolute certainty. It is possible to improve 
the chances that our conclusions will be accurate by 
being more specific, or finding out more information. 
We would know more about Jim’s voting strategy, 
for instance, if we knew where he lived, his previous 
voting habits, or if we simply asked him for whom he 
voted ( in which case, we might also want to know how 
often Jim lies).
3.7.3 Induction by Shared Properties
Induction by shared properties involves noting the 
similarity between two things with respect to their 
properties, and inferring from this that they may share 
other properties. 
A familiar example of this is how a company 
might recommend products to you based on other 
customers’ purchases. Amazon.com tells me, for 
instance, that customers who bought the complete Sex 
and the City DVD series also bought Lipstick Jungle 
and Twilight.
Assuming that people buy things because they like 
them, we can rephrase this as:
(P1) There are a large number of people 
who, if they like Sex and the City and Twi-
light, will also like Lipstick Jungle.
I could also make the following observation:
(P2) I like Sex and the City and Twilight.
And then infer from there two premises that:
(C) I would also like Lipstick Jungle.
And I did. In general, induction by shared properties 
assumes that if something has properties w, x, y, and z, 
and if something else has properties w, x, and y, then 
it’s reasonable to assume that that something else also 
has property z. Note that in the above example all of 
the properties were actually preferences with regard to 
entertainment. The kinds of properties involved in the 
comparison can and will make an argument better or 
worse. Let’s consider a worse induction.
(P1) Lisa is tall, has blonde hair, has blue eyes, and rocks 
out to Nirvana on weekends.
(P2) Gina is tall, has blonde hair, and has blue eyes.
(C) Therefore Gina probably rocks out to Nirvana on 
weekends.
In this case the properties don’t seem to be related 
in the same way as in the first example. While the first 
three are physical characteristics, the last property in-
stead indicates to us that Lisa is stuck in a 90’s grunge 
phase. Gina, though she shares several properties with 
Lisa, might not share the same undying love for Kurt 
Cobain. Let’s try a stronger argument.
(P1) Bob and Dick both wear plaid shirts all the time, 
wear large plastic-rimmed glasses, and listen to bands 
you’ve never heard of.
(P2) Bob drinks PBR.
(C) Dick probably also drinks PBR.
Here we can identify the qualities that Bob and 
Dick have in common as symptoms of hipsterism. The 
fact that Bob drinks PBR is another symptom of this 
affectation. Given that Dick is exhibiting most of the 
same symptoms, the idea that Dick would also drink 
PBR is a reasonable assumption to make. 
Practical Uses
A procedure very much like Induction by Shared 
Properties is performed by nurses and doctors when 
they diagnose a patient’s condition. Their thinking 
goes like this:
(P1) Patients who have elephantitus display an increased 
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heart rate, elevated blood pressure, a rash on their skin, 
and a strong desire to visit the elephant pen at the zoo. 
(P2) The patient here in front of me has an increased 
heart rate, elevated blood pressure, and a strong desire 
to visit the elephant pen at the zoo.
(C) It is probable, therefore, that the patient here in 
front of me has elephantitus.
The more that a patient’s symptoms match the 
‘textbook definition’ of a given disease, then the more 
likely it is that the patient has that disease. Caregivers 
then treat the patient for the disease that they think 
the patient probably has. If the disease doesn’t respond 
to the treatment, or the patient starts to present dif-
ferent symptoms, then they consider other conditions 
with similar symptoms that the patient is likely to 
have.
3.7.4 Induction by Shared Relations 
Induction by shared relations is much like induction 
by shared properties, except insofar that what is shared 
are not properties, but relations. A simple example 
is the causal relation, from which we might make an 
inductive argument like this:
(P1) Percocet, Oxycontin and Morphine reduce pain, 
cause drowsiness, and may be habit forming.
(P2) Heroin also reduces pain and causes drowsiness.
(C) Heroin is probably also habit forming.
In this case the effects of reducing pain, drowsi-
ness, and addiction are all assumed to be caused by 
the drugs listed. We can use an induction by shared 
relation to make the probable conclusion that if 
heroin, like the other drugs, reduces pain and causes 
drowsiness, it is probably also habit forming. 
Another interesting example are the relations we 
have with other people. For instance, Facebook knows 
everything about you. But let’s focus on the “friends 
with” relation. They compare who your friends are 
with the friends of your friends in order to determine 
who else you might actually know. The induction goes 
a little like this:
(P1) Donna is friends with Brandon, Kelly, Steve, and 
Brenda.
(P2) David is friends with Brandon, Kelly, and Steve.
(C) David probably also knows Brenda.
We could strengthen that argument if we knew 
that Brandon, Kelly, Steve, and Brenda were all friends 
with each other as well. We could also make an alter-
nate conclusion based on the same argument above:
(C) David probably also knows Donna.
They do, after all, know at least three of the same 
people. They’ve probably run into each other at some 
point.
3.8 Scientific Method
The procedure that scientists use is also a standard 
form of argument. Part of it is inductive, and so like 
other inductions, its conclusions only give you the 
likelihood or the probability that something is true, 
and not the certainty that it’s true. But when it is 
done correctly, the conclusions it reaches are very well 
grounded in experimental evidence. Another part of 
it is deductive; and like other deductions, it gives you 
certain knowledge - but it gives you certainty about 
what’s false, not what’s true! These two parts have to be 
put together in a particular way. Here’s a rough outline 
of how the procedure works.
Observation: Something is observed in the world 
which invokes your curiosity.
Theory: An idea is proposed which could explain why 
the thing which you observed happened, or why it is 
what it is. This is the part of the procedure where scien-
tists can get quite creative and imaginative.
Prediction: A test is planned which could prove or 
disprove the theory. As part of the plan, the scientist will 
offer a proposition in this form: “If my theory is true, 
then the experiment will have [whatever] result.”
Experiment: The test is performed, and the results are 
recorded. 
5(a) . Successful Result: If the prediction you 
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made at stage 3 came true, then the theory devised at 
step 2 is strengthened. This part of scientific method is 
inductive, and not deductive. And then we go back to 
step 3 to make more predictions and do more and more 
tests, to see if the theory can get stronger yet.
5(b) . Failed Result: If the prediction did not come 
true, then the theory is falsified. This part of scientific 
method is deductive: scientists can’t always be certain 
about what’s true but they can be absolutely certain 
about what’s false. When our predictions fail, we go 
back to step 2 and devise a new theory to put to the test, 
and a new prediction to go with it. 
Actually, a failed experimental result is really a 
kind of success, because falsification rules out the 
impossible. And that frees up the scientist to pursue 
other, more promising theories. 
Scientists often test more than one theory at the 
same time, so that they can eventually arrive at the “last 
theory standing.” In this way, scientists can use a form 
of disjunctive syllogism (see 3.6.6 above) to arrive at 
definitive conclusions about what theory is the best 
explanation for the observation. Here’s how that part 
of the procedure works.
(P1) Either Theory 1 is true, or Theory 2 is true, or 
Theory 3 is true, or Theory 4 is true. (And so on, for 
however many theories are being tested.)
(P2) By experimental observation, Theories 1 and 2 and 
3 were falsified.
(C) Therefore, Theory 4 is true. 
Or, at least, Theory 4 is strengthened to the point 
where it would be quite absurd to believe anything 
else. After all, there might be other theories that we 
haven’t thought of, or tested yet. But until we think of 
them, and test them, we’re going to go with the best 
theory we’ve got.
There’s a bit more to scientific method than this. 
There are paradigms and paradigm shifts, epistemic 
values, experimental controls and variables, and the 
various ways that scientists negotiate with each other 
as they interpret experimental results. There are also 
a few differences between the experimental methods 
used by physical scientists (such as chemists), and 
social scientists (such as anthropologists). But these 
things will be discussed in the expanded edition of this 
textbook. 
Scientific method is the most powerful and suc-
cessful form of knowing ever devised. Every advance in 
engineering, medicine, and technology has been made 
possible by people applying science to their problems. 
It is adventurous, curious, rigorously logical, and 
inspirational – it is even possible to be artistic about 
scientific discoveries. And the best part about science 
is that anyone can do it. Science can look difficult 
because there’s a lot of jargon involved, and a lot of 
math. But even the most complicated quantum physics 
and the most far-reaching astronomy follows the same 
method, in principle, as that primary school project 
in which you played with magnets or built a model 
volcano. 
3.9 Exercises for Chapter Three
1. Identify which of the following statements are 
propositions:
(a) Tea time is at 2pm.
(b) Why don’t you love me anymore?
(c) Please keep off the grass.
(d) There’s something wrong with kids today.
(e) Thou shalt not kill.
(f ) Those 6 swans are looking at me funny.
(g) Some people have trouble with propositions.
(h) Can you pass the salt?
(i) There’s a hole in my bucket.
(j) Could you be any more ridiculous?
(k) 67% of statistics are made up on the spot.
(l) Don’t you dare kick that puppy.
(m) Puppy kickers are evil.
(n) This cat is my white whale.
(o) My feet hurt.
(p) There will be a sea battle tomorrow.
(q) Parades are stupid.
(r) You should probably not kidnap children.
(s) Kidnapping is illegal.
(t) Don’t go into that barn.
(u) Fa la la la la, la la la la.
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2. Identify the following statements as a simple state-
ment, negation, conjunction, disjunction, conditional, or 
biconditional.
(a) Lois is awesome.
(b) If you don’t eat your meat, you can’t have any pud-
ding.
(c) You can go to the party if and only if your home-
work is done.
(d) You said you would give me a pony, but you didn’t.
(e) Either you’re going to the dentist, or I’ll rip that 
tooth out myself.
(f) I’m a wussy little girl.
(g) “Hoser” is not an acceptable Scrabble word.
(h) Your professor is dreamy, and also so smart.
(i) If he kisses the puppy, he’ll get the votes; and if he 
doesn’t, he won’t.
(j) Having a computer is necessary if you want to Skype 
with your grandmother.
(k) Happy faces are so 90’s.
(l) Either you’re going to eat this candy, or I will.
(m) I keyed your car, and I boil bunnies.
(n) You’re not special.
(o) He didn’t know what he was doing.
(p) If you hear sirens, you’re supposed to pull over.
(q) You’re going to work today, or you’re not getting 
paid.
(r) I have a test tomorrow, and my paper is due.
3. Identify the form of the following deductive 
arguments. (Modus Ponens, Modus Tollens, Hypo-
thetical Syllogism, Categorical Syllogism, Disjunctive 
Syllogism, Adjunction, Constructive Dilemma, or 
Destructive Dilemma)
(a) If you don’t have a pencil, you can’t write the exam. 
You don’t have a pencil. So you can’t write the exam.
(b) If you buy the farm, you can get kittens. If you buy 
a boat, you can go sailing. You’re either going to buy 
the farm, or buy a boat. Therefore you can either have 
kittens or go sailing.
(c) If Lois has a bicycle, she also has a bicycle helmet. If 
Lois has a bicycle helmet, her hair will be flat. Therefore, 
if Lois has a bicycle, her hair will be flat.
(d) If you robbed that store, you would be found guilty. 
You were not found guilty. Therefore, you didn’t rob that 
store.
(e) Kittens are either cute, or kittens are ugly. Kittens are 
not ugly. Therefore kittens are cute.
(f) I have two buttons missing. I have a tail. Therefore I 
have two buttons missing and I have a tail. 
(g) All good muffins have chocolate chips. This is a good 
muffin. Therefore this muffin has chocolate chips.
4. Supply the conclusion that results from the follow-
ing premises:
(a)  P1: All monkeys like bananas.
 P2: George is a monkey.
(b) P1: If this cupcake is less than a week old, George  
        will eat it.
 P2: George will not eat that cupcake.
(c)  P1: Either you’re lying to me, or I’m stupid.
 P2: I’m not stupid.
(d)  P1: If there’s a monkey in the room, you can smell      
        bananas.
 P2: If there’s a cake in the room, you can smell cake.
 P3: There’s either a monkey in the room, or some  
        cake.
(e)  P1: If you want to get ahead in life, you have to       
        know your argument forms.
 P2: You want to get ahead in life.
(f)  P1: If you have a boat, people call you “Captain”. 
 P2: If people call you “Captain”, you get a lot of       
         street cred.
5. Identify a problem with the following inductive 
arguments.
(a) P1: 79% of men who take drugs prefer cocaine.
 P2: Princess Peach takes drugs.
 C: Therefore Princess Peach prefers cocaine.
(b) P1: 60% of people who shop at Mountain Equip   
        ment Co-Op like mountain climbing.
 C: Therefore 60% of people like mountain 
         climbing.
(c) P1: 100% of the people I asked said their name was    
         Joe Brown.
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C: Therefore 100% of people are named Joe Brown.
6. Identify these arguments as either:  inductive general-
ization, statistical syllogism, induction by shared properties, 
or induction by shared relations.
(a) P1: Of the 10% of the population surveyed, most   
        said they support the “kittens for all” movement.
 C: Therefore most people support the “kittens for  
        all” movement.
(b)  P1: Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is a heavy book,    
        densely worded, has a boring cover and if you read    
        it in a coffee shop, people think you’re cool.
  P2: Heidegger’s Being and Time is a heavy book,           
 densely worded, and has a boring cover.
 C: Reading Heidegger’s Being and Time in a coffee  
  shop will make people think you’re cool.
(c)  P1: 67% of people who attend university never have  
 the opportunity to commit armed robbery.
 P2: Bob went to university.
 C: Therefore, Bob has probably never committed  
 an armed robbery.
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What is a fallacy? Simply put, a fallacy is an error in 
reasoning. A fallacy can arise for two reasons: (1) when 
we mistakenly assume that we have proven our conclu-
sion when we have not, and (2) when we assume we 
have stronger evidence for the conclusion than we re-
ally do. Hence, when you commit a fallacy it typically 
means that you lack in some way the proper evidence 
necessary to support your conclusion. A fallacy does 
not mean that the conclusion is necessary false, just 
that the premises provided are not strong enough to 
show that the conclusion is in fact true.  There are also 
fallacies that have faulty inferences at their base.
Why should we study fallacies? First and most 
importantly, so that you don’t commit them. You 
want your reasoning to be sound and valid, and the 
surest way to meet these goals is to avoid fallacies at 
all costs. Second, learning about fallacies is a great 
way to correct biases in your own reasoning that 
are maybe too deep to spot on your own. You’d be 
amazed how much bad reasoning you learn from 
parents, family, and friends, your culture, or the city 
you’ve been raised in. This brings me to the third 
point, you want to learn fallacies so you can see the 
errors in reasoning others commit: Politicians, lawyers, 
newspaper reporters, bloggers, Wikipedia, etc. are 
just some of the list. Many times, fallacies don’t just 
happen on accident; they are often committed with 
some kind of intent or reaction in mind. Spotting 
them enables you to make clear and educated choices 
about who and what to believe, to prevent falling 
prey to schemes or false opinions, and will enable 
you to communicate more effectively with others.
4.1 Appeal to Authority 
(Latin: argumentum ad verecundiam) An attempt to 
prove a conclusion by an improper appealing to an 
authority, and this appeal is considered improper 
when the authority is irrelevant and/or unrecognized.
Example: My mom says if I eat watermelon 
seeds, a plant will grow in my belly and I’ll turn green. 
Because my mom said it, it is true.
It should be noted here that not all appeals to 
authority are faulty. When you are sick, you do visit 
your doctor and take their advice, and when you get 
into legal trouble you follow what a lawyer tells you. 
So, an appeal to authority can be relevant and proper 
when the authority you appeal to is: (1) recognized 
as having authoritative expertise in that area, and (2) 
if we ourselves lack the information, the experience, 
or cannot firsthand acquire the information required 
ourselves for the argument. To appeal to statements 
made by Buzz Aldrin when speaking about the moon’s 
surface is a proper application of authority. 
4.2 Appeal to Force
(Latin: argumentum ad baculum) Any attempt to make 
someone accept a proposition or argument by using 
some type of force or threat, possibly including the 
threat of violence. After all, threats do not establish 
truth whatsoever. 
Example: Company policy concerning customer 
feedback is “it’s either perfect (100%) or we failed (99% 
or less)”. Anyone who doesn’t support this will be fired. 
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4.3 Appeal to Pity
(Latin: argumentum ad misericordiam) Any attempt to 
make someone accept a proposition or argument by 
arousing their emotions. A strong emotional appeal 
is meant to subvert someone’s rational thinking. 
Remember: Pity alone does not establish truth. 
Example: The defendant should not be found 
guilty of this crime. Her life has been filled with 
endless abuse, a lack of love and respect, and so many 
hardships.
4.4 Appeal to Tradition
(Latin: argumentum ad antiquitatem)  This fallacy 
happens when someone cites the historical preferences 
and practices of a culture or even a particular person, 
as evidence for a proposition or argument being cor-
rect. Traditions are often passed down from generation 
to generation, with the explanation for continuity 
being “this is the way it has been done before”, which is 
of course not a valid reason. The age of something does 
not entail its truth or falsity.
Example: We have turkey for Thanksgiving din-
ner and duck for Christmas dinner every year, because 
that is how my parents and grandparents did it. 
4.5 Appeal to Novelty
(Latin: argumentum ad novitatem) This fallacy is the 
opposite of appeal to tradition, in that it is the attempt 
to claim that the newness or modernity of something 
is evidence of its truth and superiority.  The novelty 
of the idea or proposition does not entail its truth or 
falsity. 
Example: String Theory is a new and rising 
research area in particle physics, and therefore it must 
be true. 
4.6 Appeal to Ignorance
(Latin: argumentum ad Ignorantiam) The attempt to 
argue for or against a proposition or position because 
there is a lack of evidence against or for it: I argue X 
because there is no evidence showing not-X. 
Example: There is intelligent life on Neptune, 
for sure. Science has not found any evidence that there 
isn’t life there. 
4.7 Appeal to Popularity
(Latin: argumentum ad numeram) The attempt to use 
the popularity of a position or premise as evidence for 
its truthfulness.  This is a fallacy because the popularity 
of something is irrelevant to its being true or false.  It is 
one that sometimes is difficult to spot or prevent doing 
because common sense often dictates that if something 
is popular it must be true and/or valid.
Example: Eating quinoa daily is a healthy thing 
everyone is doing, so it must be the right choice.
4.8 Accident Fallacy
(Latin: a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid) 
Also known as the fallacy of sweeping generalization. 
It is an attempt to apply a general rule to a situation 
with disregard for relevant exceptions to that rule.  In 
other words, it is taking a general rule and attempting 
to apply it like a universal one (something that has 
no exceptions). Often what is being applied is what 
we would call ‘rules of thumb’, which are considered 
to be scientifically vague bits of reasoning that have a 
cultural and temporal context.
Example: All birds can fly.
But there are flightless birds - like kiwi, penguin, 
emu, ostrich, and rhea.
If you were raised in a large city like Toronto, you 
may only see flight capable birds in the park or in 
your yard, and thus your rule of thumb would most 
likely be like that above – ‘all birds fly’.  So, what we are 
familiar with often determines the rule of thumb and 
what is ‘normal’. We can discuss possible exceptions to 
the rule of thumb, where birds that are flight capable 
cannot fly, such as when the bird is a hatchling, or if it 
breaks a wing. One committing this fallacy would take 
instances like these and categorize them as ‘abnormal’ 
and still continue to argue that all ‘normal’ or ‘quintes-
sential’ birds fly. 
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4.9 Amphiboly
A fallacy of ambiguity, where the ambiguity in 
question arises directly from the poor grammatical 
structure in a sentence. The fallacy occurs when a bad 
argument relies on the grammatical ambiguity to 
sound strong and logical. 
Example: I’m going to return this car to the 
dealer I bought this car from. Their ad said “Used 1995 
Ford Taurus with air conditioning, cruise, leather, new 
exhaust and chrome rims.” But the chrome rims aren’t 
new at all. 
There are other kinds of amphiboly fallacies, like 
those of ambiguous pronoun reference: “I took some 
pictures of the dogs at the park playing, but they were 
not good.” Does ‘they’ mean the dogs or the pictures 
“were not good”? And there is amphiboly when modi-
fiers are misplaced, such as in a famous Groucho Marx 
joke: “One morning I shot an elephant in my pajamas. 
How he got into my pajamas I’ll never know.” 
4.10 Fallacy of Composition
(Also known as exception fallacy) The fallacy of as-
suming that when a property applies to all members of 
a class, it must also apply to the class as a whole. 
Example: Every player in the NHL is wealthy; 
therefore, the NHL must be a wealthy organization. 
4.11 Fallacy of Division
(Also known as false division, or faulty division) 
The fallacy of assuming that when a property applies 
to the class as a whole, it must also apply to every 
member of that class as well.
Example: The US Republican Party platform 
states that abortion is wrong and should be illegal. 
Therefore, every republican must believe a woman 
doesn’t have the right or freedom to choose. 
4.12 Red Herring
(Latin: Ignoratio elenchi) This fallacy involves the rais-
ing of an irrelevant issue in the middle of an argument, 
derailing the original discussion, and causing the argu-
ment to contain two totally different and unrelated 
issues. A red herring has happened when you begin 
your argument about one thing and end up arguing 
about something else entirely different. This fallacy 
renders any premises used logically unrelated to the 
conclusion. A red herring is a distraction tactic, and is 
often used to avoid addressing criticism or attack by 
an opponent. This device is most commonly seen in 
political debates. 
Example:  The ‘Occupy Wall Street’ protesters 
complain that corporations and their money control 
Washington. But how can we take them seriously 
when their camps are messy, disorganized, with home-
less people and drug addicts now living with them, 
and they are making life hell for the shop owners in 
their area?
4.13 Straw Man Fallacy
Like the red herring, a straw man tends to happen 
when one person is criticizing or attacking another’s 
position or argument. It occurs when a person misrep-
resents or purposely distorts the position or argument 
of their opponent in order to weaken it, thus defeating 
it more easily.  The name vividly depicts the action: 
imagine two fighters in a ring, one of them builds 
a man made of straw (like a scarecrow), beats it up 
horribly, and then declares victory. While doing this, 
his or her real opponent stands in the ring, completely 
untouched.  The straw man is considered to be one 
of the commonest fallacies; in particular we see it in 
widely used in political, religious, and ethical debates.
Example: The Leader of the Opposition 
is against the purchase of new submarines and 
helicopters. Clearly he is okay with our country being 
defenseless and open to invasion by our enemies. He 
also obviously hates our country. So, be ready to learn a 
new language and give up all our freedoms! 
4.14 Abusing The Man
(Latin: argumentum ad hominem) Any attempt to 
disprove a proposition or argument by launching a 
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personal attack on the author of it. A person’s charac-
ter does not necessarily predict the truth or falsity of a 
proposition or argument. 
Example: All of Marx’s economic doctrines are 
hogwash. But this was to be expected given he studied 
only philosophy in university, not business, and he 
never even held down a regular job.
4.15 False Cause
(Latin: Post hoc ergo propter hoc) This fallacy hap-
pens when one argues that because X happened 
immediately after Y, that Y was the cause of X. Or, 
when concerning event types: event type X happened 
immediately after event type Y, therefore event type 
Y caused event type X. In a sense, it is jumping to a 
conclusion based upon coincidence, rather than on 
sufficient testing, repeated occurrence, or evidence. 
Example: The sun always rises a few minutes 
after the rooster crows. So, the rooster crowing causes 
the sun to rise. 
Example: Once the government passed the new 
gun laws, gun violence dropped by 10%, therefore the 
new gun laws are working and caused the occurrence 
of gun violence to drop. 
4.16 Non Sequitur Fallacy
(From Latin, means ‘does not follow’) A logical fallacy 
that is most often absurd, where the premises have no 
logical connection with or relevance to the conclusion. 
Example: The police have not been able to crack 
this homicide cold case, so they’ve called a psychic in 
to help out. They have tried all the traditional police 
investigation methods and the case still isn’t solved. 
Therefore, the psychic (the non-traditional method) 
is needed.
4.17 Fallacy of the Undistributed Middle
(Also known as undistributed middle term) A formal 
fallacy that occurs in a categorical syllogism, when the 
middle term is undistributed is not distributed at least 
in one premise. According to the rules of categorical 
syllogism, the middle term must be distributed at least 
once for it to be valid. 
Example of the form: All X’s are Y’s; All Z’s 
are Y’s; Therefore, All X’s are Z’s. 
Example in words: All ghosts are spooky; all 
zombies are spooky; therefore all ghosts are zombies.
4.18 Naturalistic Fallacy
(Latin: argumentum ad Naturam) A fallacy that 
occurs when a person bases their argument of position 
on the notion that what is natural is better or what 
‘ought to be’.  In other words, the foundation for the 
argument or position is a value judgment; the fallacy 
happens when the argument shifts from a statement of 
fact to one of value.  The word ‘natural’ is loaded with 
positive evaluation, like the word ‘normal’, so implied 
in the use of it is praise.  One commonly sees this 
fallacy in moral arguments.
Example: It is only natural to feel angry some-
times; therefore there is nothing wrong with feeling 
angry. 
4.19 Loaded Question Fallacy
(Also known as complex question, fallacy of presup-
position, trick question) The fallacy of asking a 
question that has a presupposition built in, which 
implies something (often questionable) but protects 
the person asking the question from accusations of 
false claims or even slander. 
Example:  Have you stopped 
beating your wife yet?
This question is a real ‘catch 22’ since to answer 
‘yes’ implies that you used to beat your wife but have 
now stopped, and to answer ‘no’ means you are still 
beating her. The question rests on the assumption that 
you beat your wife, and so either answer to it seems to 
endorse that idea. 
4.20 Equivocation
(Also known as doublespeak) A fallacy that occurs 
when one uses an ambiguous term or phrase in 
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more than one sense, thus rendering the argument 
misleading. The ambiguity in this fallacy is lexical and 
not grammatical, meaning the term or phrase that is 
ambiguous has two distinct meanings.  One can often 
see equivocation in jokes. 
Example: If you don’t pay your exorcist you can 
get repossessed.
Example: A feather is light; whatever is light 
cannot be dark; therefore, a feather cannot be dark. 
4.21 Begging the Question
(Latin: Petitio Principii) The fallacy of attempting to 
prove something by assuming the very thing you are 
trying to prove. In its form, the conclusion occurs as 
one of the premises, or concerning a chain of argu-
ments the final conclusion is a premise in an earlier 
argument. This is a fallacy that rests on a circular 
argument. 
Example: All of the statements in Smith’s book 
Crab People Walk Among Us are true. Why, he even says 
in the preface that his book only contains true state-
ments and firsthand stories. 
4.22 False Dilemma
(Also known as false dichotomy, black-and-white fal-
lacy) A fallacy that happens when only two choices are 
offered in an argument or proposition, when in fact a 
greater number of possible choices exist between the 
two extremes. False dilemmas typically contain ‘either, 
or’ in their structure. 
Example: Either you help us kill the zombies, or 
you love them.
4.23 Hasty Generalization
(Also known as argument from small numbers, 
unrepresentative sample) This fallacy occurs in the 
realm of statistics. It happens when a conclusion or 
generalization is drawn about a population and it is 
based on a sample that is too small to properly repre-
sent it.  The problem with a sample that is too small is 
that the variability in a population is not captured, so 
the conclusion is inaccurate. 
Example: My Grandfather drank a bottle of 
whiskey and smoked three cigars a day, and he lived to 
be 95 years old. Therefore, daily smoking and drinking 
cannot be that bad for you. 
4.24 Weak Analogy
(Also known as faulty analogy, questionable analogy) 
When someone uses an analogy to prove or disprove 
an argument or position by using an analogy that is 
too dissimilar to be effective.  Two important things 
to remember about analogies: No analogy is perfect, 
and even the most dissimilar objects can share some 
commonality or similarity. Analogies are neither true 
nor false, but come in degrees from identical or similar 
to extremely dissimilar or different. 
Example: Not believing in the monster under 
the bed because you have yet to see it is like not 
believing the Titanic sank because no one saw it hit 
the bottom. 
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4.25 Exercises for Chapter Four
Have a look at the following arguments. All of them 
contain a fallacy; some contain two or more fallacies. 
Which fallacy best describes each of them?
If you break the law then you should go to jail. Anyone 
committing adultery violates God’s law. Therefore, 
anyone committing adultery should go to jail.
The sports section of the Globe and Mail is terrible. 
Those reporters don’t know what they’re talking about. 
The statistics are out of date and they don’t even cover 
major events. That newspaper sucks!
The notion of global warming is ridiculous. In the last 
three or four years, winters have gotten colder and 
colder.
“If today you can take a thing like evolution and make 
it a crime to teach it in the public school, tomorrow 
you can make it a crime to teach it in the private 
schools, and the next year you can make it a crime to 
teach it to the hustings or in the church. At the next 
session you may ban books and the newspapers. Soon 
you may set Catholic against Protestant and Protestant 
against Protestant, and try to foist your own religion 
upon the minds of men. If you can do one you can do 
the other.” (Clarence Darrow, The Scopes Trial (1925), 
Day 2.)
“Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” - 
U.S. President George W. Bush.
“The Jewish community worldwide is a powerful, 
wealthy, and influential group. So, all Jews must be 
powerful, wealthy, influential people.”
“The animal rights people should not protest against 
the zoo. They should come out and see how much fun 
all the little kids are having. Everyone loves going to 
the zoo.”
“It is immoral to eat meat, because raising animals to 
adulthood only to slaughter them for food is contrary 
to the ethical principles of a truly civilized society.”
“Turmeric is a natural healer. In India, where the heal-
ing properties of turmeric have been long understood 
and accepted, you can buy Band aids saturated with 
the spice!”
[Senator Joe McCarthy] announced that he had 
penetrated ‘Truman’s iron curtain of secrecy’ and that 
he proposed forthwith to present 81 cases... Cases of 
exactly what? ‘I am only giving the Senate,’ he said, 
‘cases in which it is clear there is a definite Communist 
connection...persons whom I consider to be Commu-
nists in the State Department.’... Of Case 40, he said, 
‘I do not have much information on this except the 
general statement of the agency...that there is nothing 
in the files to disprove his Communist connections.’
You can train a dog to fetch a stick; therefore, you can 
train a potato to dance. 
On the basis of my observations, it is evident that 
wearing huge pants low on your waist, with your 
underwear showing, makes you fat.
I don’t listen to country music. Therefore, country 
music is not very popular.
Some Canadians are animal rights activists. Some 
Canadians like to wear fur coats and leather boots. 
Therefore, Canadians are hypocrites.
He’s not a criminal. He just does things that are against 
the law.
I’m a compulsive liar. That’s why I can’t trust anything 
that other people say.
This toaster costs $100. But that’s a pretty good price, 
considering that a Ferrari costs $225,000.
“Everything comes to he who waits.” Therefore, I’m not 
going to go looking for a job.
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“Seeing that the eye and hand and foot and every one 
of our members has an obvious function, must we 
not believe that in like manner a human being has a 
function over and above these particular functions?” - 
Aristotle.
The “Occupy Wall Street” protesters are angry about 
economic injustice and the excessive power of corpora-
tions. But they are getting their message out using 
cellphones, cameras, computers, and the Internet -- all 
of which are provided by corporations. Clearly, they’re 
all hypocrites. 
Geraldo says that students who cheat on exams should 
not automatically be expelled from school. But it’s 
ridiculous to insist that students should never be 
punished for cheating.
My sweater is blue. Therefore, the atoms that make up 
my sweater are blue.
I’m right because I’m smarter than you. And I must be 
smarter than you because I’m right.
Your theory of gravity doesn’t explain why the sky is 
blue. So it must be wrong.
My uncle Homer says that eating fish makes you 
smarter. That’s good enough reason for me.
Sure, the experts all say that it’s dangerous to ride a 
bicycle into the eye of a hurricane. But I have my own 
theory.
If today we allow voluntary, physician-assisted 
suicide, then tomorrow we will allow non-voluntary 
physician-assisted suicide for unconscious or mentally 
incapacitated patients. Then we’ll have involuntary 
physician-assisted suicide on unwilling patients. Soon 
no hospital patient will be safe from these ‘helpful’ 
physicians!
Either we fire this guy, or else we send a message to all 
the other employees that it’s okay to show up late for 
work. So we better fire him!
Bill is an investment banker, drives a Lexus, is 
overweight, and votes conservative. John is also an in-
vestment banker, drives a Lexus, and is also overweight. 
John probably votes Conservative too.
Speaking as a professional chemist, alcohol is a solu-
tion.
The Mayor is a racist! At a City Council meeting last 
night, he said that he won’t support our proposal to 
name a street after Nelson Mandela. How can we toler-
ate elected officials who say that minorities shouldn’t 
have rights?
That is a lousy book. It didn’t sell well at all.
I’ve never seen you get drunk. So you must be one of 
those Amish people.
In the city, you can always hear the sounds of car 
engines and aircraft, humming in the background. 
Therefore, you can always hear true silence in the 
countryside.
 
Chapter Four 4.25 Exercises for Chapter Four
80
81
Most people are familiar with the term ‘reasonable 
doubt’ from watching courtroom dramas on television 
or in film. It is an important legal concept which 
judges and juries use to help them decide whether an 
accused person is innocent or guilty. But reasonable 
doubt is something that can be applied to many kinds 
of situations. You might be asked to spend money on 
something. You might be invited to join a club, orga-
nization, or association of some kind. You might be 
asked to endorse a certain religious, political, or moral 
belief, for instance by signing a petition, or attending 
a rally, or voting, or making some kind of public 
statement. You might be asked to do something that 
you have never done before. In such situations, and 
others like them, it can be very useful to think of such 
requests as propositions, and then decide whether they 
are believable. There are lots of fairly straightforward 
ways to do this. And if you find that the argument 
is weak, or incomplete, or objectionable, or for any 
reason fishy, then it is probably wise to invoke your 
reasonable doubt.
5.1  What is reasonable doubt?
As we saw in the discussion of good thinking habits, 
reasonable doubt is related to healthy skepticism. We 
defined healthy skepticism as “a general unwillingness 
to accept that things are (always) as they appear to be”. 
Reasonable Doubt is like a refinement or a specializa-
tion of the habit of healthy skepticism. Let’s define it 
here as the suspension of one’s acceptance of some 
statement or proposition, due to an absence of 
sufficient support for that statement. Here are some 
questions you can ask yourself, to decide whether some 
reasonable doubt is warranted:
•	 Is there decent and readily available evidence which 
proves that the proposition is true?
•	 Can you see that evidence for yourself?
•	 Can the proposition be put to some kind of test, 
especially a scientific test which could definitively prove 
that it is false? 
•	 Does the argument in support of the proposition pass 
the test of Ockham’s Razor? In other words, is it simple?
•	 Is the person who asserted the idea someone you have 
good reason to trust?
•	 Is it consistent with other propositions that you are 
already reasonably sure are true?
•	 Is it consistent with your world view?
The more of these questions you answer with ‘no’, 
then the more grounds you have for reasonable doubt. 
You can also ask critical questions about a few alterna-
tive propositions. For instance:
•	 Is there decent evidence that supports some other 
proposition, and/or which contradicts the one you are 
considering?
•	 Are there other, perhaps simpler ways to interpret the 
evidence that supports the proposition?
•	 What additional implications or conclusions can be 
drawn from the proposition, and are they:
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1. Morally unacceptable, or
2. Inconsistent with the speaker’s original intentions or 
world view, or
3. Inconsistent with some other part of the argument, or
4. Questionable for some other reason?
Again, if you can answer these questions with a 
‘yes’, then you probably have good grounds for reason-
able doubt.
A proposition is not automatically disproven just 
because someone could reasonably doubt it. You might 
have all the reasons listed above for why you should 
reject the proposition, and then later discover that it 
was true after all. But in such a situation, you have not 
made a logical mistake. The point of having reasonable 
doubt is that you should not be too quick to believe 
anything and everything. Rather, you should accept 
only those propositions which are supported by the 
best information and the strongest argument available 
to you at the time. If that information changes in the 
future, the good critical thinker also changes his or 
her beliefs accordingly. In general, Reasonable Doubt 
means withholding one’s acceptance of the unsup-
ported statement until some acceptable source of 
support can be found. So, having Reasonable Doubt 
is like having a “wait and see” attitude. It is open to the 
idea that the support for the statement may exist, but 
until that support appears, it assumes that the state-
ment is false. Depending on your level of interest, you 
may choose to go looking for that support. But if there 
are decisions to be made or problems to be solved, 
and good grounds for reasonable doubt in your mind, 
then you will almost always be better off basing your 
decision, or the solution to your problem, on the best 
quality information that you already possess. 
Here are a few examples of such situations where 
you should engage your reasonable doubt:
•	 A salesman offers you an amazing deal, but it seems ‘too 
good to be true’.
•	 Your employer asks you to do something which falls 
outside your usual (or even contractual) range of 
responsibilities.
•	 An advertiser makes an improbable or bold claim about 
the capabilities of a product that he’s selling.
•	 A politician makes a bold claim about an opponent’s 
character, history, or true intentions.
•	 Someone invents an unlikely new technology: super-fast 
computers, ‘miracle’ medicines or weight-loss pills, 
disease-immune genetically modified food, cold-fusion 
nuclear power, clean fossil fuels, perpetual motion 
machines, transparent aluminum, etc.
•	 A charity or a humanitarian aid organization asks 
you to donate to a worthy cause, but the critics say the 
organization might be a front for a private, for-profit 
corporation, or a missionary recruitment effort for a 
religious group.
•	 A film, video game, music album, or book suddenly 
becomes popular, and you want to decide whether it 
really is as good as it seems everyone around you says it 
is (and therefore, whether you should buy it too).
•	 A new friend tells you an unusual story about his family 
background, for instance that he is descended from roy-
alty, or is secretly very rich, or was personally involved in 
an important historical event.
•	 You think you might have had a paranormal experience: 
seeing a ghost, or a UFO, or an angel, or the like; or 
someone you know might be describing such an experi-
ence.
•	 A health problem you might be experiencing feels like 
it might be worse than what your doctor tells you it is.
By the way: scientists have identified what they 
believe to be the area of the brain responsible for belief 
and doubt. It’s the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. 
This area of the brain deteriorates in old age a little 
faster than other areas, which explains why elderly 
people tend to fall for scams a little more readily than 
younger people. Here are the summary remarks from 
the researchers who discovered this, as published in 
Frontiers in Neuroscience (an academic psychology 
journal).
“Belief is first, easy, inexorable with comprehension of 
any cognition, and substantiated by representations in 
the post-rolandic cortex. Disbelief is retroactive, difficult, 
vulnerable to disruption, and mediated by the vmPFC. 
This asymmetry in the process of belief and doubt 
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suggests that false doctrines in the “marketplace of 
ideas” may not be as benign as is often assumed. Indeed, 
normal individuals are prone to misleading informa-
tion, propaganda, fraud, and deception, especially in 
situations where their cognitive resources are depleted. 
In our theory, the more effortful process of disbelief 
(to items initially believed) is mediated by the vmPFC; 
which, in old age, tends to disproportionally lose 
structural integrity and associated functionality. Thus, 
we suggest that vulnerability to misleading information, 
outright deception, and fraud in older persons is the 
specific result of a deficit in the doubt process which is 
mediated by the vmPFC.”  12
And with that observation in mind, let’s get 
underway.
5.2 Contradictory Claims
Suppose, for example, you log into your favourite In-
ternet social network, and you get a ‘friend’ invitation 
from someone famous. Just pulling a name out of the 
blue, let’s say it’s from Matt Smith, the actor who cur-
rently stars in the BBC sci-fi television series ‘Doctor 
Who’. The ‘proposition’ you are asked to believe, in this 
situation, is that the person asking to be added to your 
list really is the actor he says he is. But you probably 
have another proposition in your mind which states 
that famous people do not send requests like that 
to people they do not know. These two propositions 
cannot both be true at the same time. They contradict 
each other. So what you have to do is decide which one 
you have greater reason to believe, and which one you 
have greater reason to doubt. In this example, you have 
much greater reason to believe the second proposition. 
It’s much more consistent with other things that are 
well known about celebrities. And you have some 
excellent alternative ways to explain who might really 
be trying to ‘add’ you: a friend of yours who wants to 
play a practical joke on you, for instance. Or it might 
be a salesman, or a con artist.
 Contradictory claims are two (or more) 
propositions which cannot both (or all) be true at 
the same time. It might be the case that one of them is 
true; it may also be the case that they are all false. But 
if the claims contradict, then it cannot be the case that 
they are all true at the same time. This is perhaps the 
easiest and most obvious situation in which you have 
good grounds for reasonable doubt. Here are a few 
more examples:
“The stars in the night sky are actually pinpoints of light 
shining through little chinks in a cinder-block wall 
which surrounds our solar system.”
You probably should not accept this claim because 
it conflicts with just about everything scientists around 
the world have discovered about the stars. 
“There are sharks and piranha fish living in the Ottawa 
river.”
This claim conflicts with a few basic facts about 
sharks and piranha, and about geography, which are 
easy to find out. 
Sometimes you might be given two statements 
that don’t contradict any practical knowledge you have 
about the world, and that don’t contradict your world 
view, but they do contradict each other. For example, 
consider these two statements: 
“Next summer, Heritage College will receive a multi-
million dollar extension. When the work is done, our 
building will be twice as big!”
“Next summer, the Heritage College building will be de-
molished and replaced with another, brand new, much 
bigger building.”
Either one of these statements might be true, and 
they are both fairly consistent with other things that 
you might know about the building, such as that it 
is slightly over-crowded, etc. But they clearly cannot 
both be true at the same time. So, in this situation, you 
should doubt both of them, and then ask a few teach-
ers or administrators what they might know about the 
situation.
Contradictory claims are one of the ways you can 
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spot a scam or a confidence trick. We’ll see more about 
such things later on.
5.3 Common Sense
How trustworthy is ‘common sense’? Most of the time, 
it is about as trustworthy as anything you may have 
learned from your intellectual environment and your 
world view. But it is equally as open to criticism as 
anything else you might believe. For example: many 
people believe, on the basis of common sense, that 
shark attacks are common, that flying in an airplane 
is the most dangerous way to travel, and that having 
a shower will help you sober up more quickly after 
a night of heavy drinking. But all of these common 
sense beliefs are actually false. Only around ten people 
per year are attacked by sharks, out of the many mil-
lions of people who, at this moment, are swimming 
or boating in the world’s oceans. Statistically, in terms 
of the number of deaths per year, it is much more 
dangerous to drive a car than to fly in a commercial 
aircraft. And when you shower after drinking, your 
liver processes the same amount of alcohol in your 
bloodstream as it would have done if you sat in your 
living room and watched television instead.
One of the reasons that common sense is not 
always reliable is because it changes all the time, and it 
can be very different from one community to another. 
For example, about a century or so in the past, com-
mon sense used to lead people to believe that animals 
don’t feel pain, that Kings rule their countries by 
divine right, and that no one would ever walk on the 
moon. But today, common sense tells us that all three 
of those beliefs are false. So the next time that someone 
tells you that something is common sense, then ask 
yourself whether that thing is common, or whether it 
is really sensible. There’s a good chance that it’s neither. 
Another reason you may need to occasionally 
doubt your common sense is because people often 
appeal to common sense to disguise the habits of 
self-interest and face saving. In this way, common sense 
is not a body of knowledge, but a kind of device for 
self-deception. 
As a general rule, think of this: whether a proposi-
tion is true or false has nothing to do with whether it 
is part of your common sense. It might be true, or it 
might be false: but that will depend on whether it is 
supported by good reasons, arguments, and evidence, 
and not on whether it happens to be common, or seem 
sensical.
Of course, this is not the only way people use the 
phrase ‘common sense’. Sometimes, people will refer 
to common sense when they are criticizing someone’s 
choices, or holding them responsible for their actions. 
In this way, common sense means having a proper 
understanding of the likely consequences of one’s 
actions and choices. And ‘having no common sense’ 
means having not enough foresight to predict the con-
sequences of one’s actions. This is a somewhat different 
use of the term. In that case, when someone tells you 
to “use your common sense”, try to think of everything 
that applies to the situation that she is talking about, 
and what should be done about it. Making careful 
observations, and asking the right questions (skills 
discussed back in chapter one) are helpful here.
5.4  Emotions, Instincts, and Intuitions
Your emotions, gut feelings, and instincts should 
also be doubted once in a while. That is not the same 
as suppressing or denying them, of course. One’s 
emotions can sometimes play a very useful role in the 
process of reasoning. And contemporary culture places 
a lot of emphasis and importance upon emotional 
knowledge. The lyrics of pop songs, and the dialogue 
in well-loved films and television shows, encourage 
us to “do what your heart tells you”, and “if it makes 
you happy, it can’t be bad.” Pop psychologists, self-help 
books, and motivational speakers might also encour-
age you to “follow your bliss”, “visualize success”, and 
“believe in yourself”. They might claim that we should 
always maintain a positive, optimistic attitude, and 
avoid excessive self-criticism or self-doubt, because they 
say such “negative energies” will attract bad fortune, 
sabotage our endeavours, and turn us into failures. But 
just like everything else, it is important to examine 
and evaluate what your heart tells you, just as you 
examine your common sense, and your world view, 
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and anything that anyone else tells you.
Most emotions are triggered responses to some 
event, situation, or perception, happening either in 
the world or in your own mind and body. Sometimes 
the emotions are responding to things we may be only 
barely consciously aware of: subtle details, mnemonic 
associations, subliminal symbols, and the like. In 
this way, your instincts and emotions can be very 
helpful. They can warn of danger, or guide you toward 
beneficial ends, or (at the very least) inform you that 
there is more going on in the situation than is obvious 
at first glance. Many emotions are also triggered by our 
psychological desires and attachments, for instance 
the attachment to one’s home, or workplace, or friends 
and loved ones, or future goals. We might experience 
irrational fear, anger, or even depression, when one of 
those attachments is threatened. And this can be an in-
dicator of how deeply attached to such things you are. 
In this way, your instincts and emotions can provide 
you with useful knowledge, especially self-knowledge.
At other times, however, your emotions can get in 
the way of clear thinking. Stereotypes, prejudices, ob-
sessive or criminal behaviour, and even self-destructive 
behaviour, are often supported by strong emotions. 
Someone who is excessively optimistic about his or 
her success in a business venture, for instance, might 
not fully understand the risks involved, or the true 
influence of factors beyond her control. Therefore he 
is more likely to make bad decisions. Someone who 
lives in fear of dangers that don’t exist (someone afraid 
of being abducted by aliens, perhaps?) is not being 
benefitted by his emotions. 
Furthermore, an emotional state is almost never 
a good enough reason, by itself, to explain or justify 
someone’s actions. You might accept the explanation 
of a man who said that he ran from the burning house 
because he was afraid of dying there. But you would 
probably reject the explanation of a man who said he 
set fire to someone’s house because doing so gave him 
pleasure. It can also happen that you are emotionally 
attached to something that you shouldn’t be. Someone 
who, for instance, is absolutely convinced that he will 
get the job, or win the bicycle race, or get a very high 
mark on his essay, because he “just knows” that’s what 
will happen, and he is convinced of this for no other 
reason than because he “feels it in his heart”, is almost 
certainly setting himself up for a colossal failure. And 
finally, it is possible to be mistaken about one’s own 
feelings and mistaken about the right way to act upon 
them. A man who visits the home of a woman he 
loves two or three times a day, and who peers into her 
windows, and leaves notes under her door, and follows 
everything she does on her computer social networks, 
is not really loving her. Rather, it would be more 
accurate to say he is stalking her.
In cases where your emotions and instincts seem 
to be pulling you one way or another, or making you 
feel something and you are not at first sure why, then 
observe and question them just as you would any 
other aspect of your situation. 
•	 Do you know exactly what you are feeling? Can you put 
a name on it? 
•	 Can you identify what event, situation, attachment, or 
perception is stimulating the feeling?
•	 Is the feeling interfering with your ability to do 
something? 
•	 Is the feeling interfering with your objectivity?
•	 Is a physical state in your own body contributing to the 
feeling? For instance, are you sleep deprived, or hungry, 
or ill, or have you had too much coffee lately?
•	 What are other people in the situation feeling?
•	 Are you feeling nothing at all? (This can be as much an 
indicator of things as an overwhelming emotion.)
•	 Has the feeling been invoked by something that some-
one has said? And if so, can the statement be examined 
on its own merits, like any other argument?
Diagnostic questions like these can be hard to ask. 
Caught up in the moment, it might not occur to you 
to slow down, calm yourself, and observe and question 
your own feelings. But if you can cultivate the habit of 
casting reasonable doubt upon your own instincts and 
intuitions, you are more likely to make better, more 
intelligent decisions.
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5.5  Looking at the evidence
Probably the most important occasion when you 
should exercise reasonable doubt is when you are told 
something is true, but there’s no evidence that you 
can see which supports it. Or, there might be evidence 
which favours the statement, but that evidence is very 
slim and unreliable. Or perhaps the evidence can be 
interpreted differently, to support of much simpler 
conclusions. Here are some examples:
“Whenever American presidents visit Canada, their 
hidden purpose is to invite Canada to join the U.S.A. as 
its 51st state.”
“The C.N. Tower in Toronto has a secret deck, just 
above the topmost viewing platform, which has spe-
cial quantum-radio broadcast machines that control 
people’s minds.”
It is also reasonable to doubt a proposition when 
it’s impossible for you to find out the evidence for 
yourself. The claim might be one which no one could 
verify. Or, there might be someone stopping you from 
verifying the claim for yourself. For example:
“I have invented a machine that uses cold fusion to 
produce cheap and abundant electrical power. It will fit 
under your kitchen counter - soon every household in 
the world will have one! But for proprietary reasons I 
will not allow outside investigators to open the box and 
see how it works.”
In cases like these, a lot depends on how much 
you are willing to trust the speaker. In this example the 
speaker might not want to open the box because he is 
afraid that someone might steal his patent. A profes-
sional third-party investigator, such as an engineer or 
scientist, could be bound by a legal contract to not 
infringe his copyright. If you happen to know that the 
person is a competent entrepreneur with a graduate 
degree in nuclear physics, you might be willing to 
trust him, at least for a little while. But if you happen 
to know that he has a degree in theatre, not physics, 
then you should probably keep walking. The overall 
point is that automatically believing what people you 
tell you should not be your usual and regular habit. 
And if someone asks you to believe something without 
showing you what’s behind the curtain, you are almost 
always better off doubting it.
Suppose that there actually is decent evidence 
available that supports whatever it is you are asked 
to believe. Even then, there are several ways in which 
people ‘skew’ or ‘bias’ their handling or their inter-
pretation of that evidence, to allow them to continue 
believing whatever they may want to believe, whether 
it is rational to believe it or not. The name for this kind 
of faulty reasoning is confirmation bias. The term 
was coined in Peter Watson, an English psychologist, 
in 1960, and refers to the way people tend to favour 
evidence which supports beliefs they already have, and 
tend to ignore evidence which doesn’t support those 
beliefs. But when we downplay or ignore evidence that 
goes against our beliefs, we can end up making bad 
decisions. For instance, we might judge the riskiness 
of some action poorly. We might not fully understand 
new information which comes available. People put 
money into bad investments, vote for corrupt politi-
cians, reinforce stereotypes, ignore health problems 
in their own bodies, and sometimes even reinforce 
feelings of depression and fear, because of the way they 
suppress evidence which goes against what they be-
lieve about themselves, other people, or their situation. 
Three of the most common ways that people com-
mit confirmation bias is by resisting contrary evidence, 
looking for confirming evidence, and preferring 
available evidence.
Resisting Contrary Evidence means avoiding, 
ignoring, re-interpreting, or downplaying evidence 
that goes against what you believe. Political 
activists, scientists, investors, religious believers, and 
people from all kinds of different professions will do 
this, when they feel their most cherished ideas are 
threatened. But if you want to test some statement to 
find out if it’s true, you need to look at more than just 
the evidence that confirms it. You need to look for the 
evidence which refutes it as well, and in both cases you 
should assess how relevant or strong the evidence is. 
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Another part of confirmation bias is the habit of 
preferring confirming evidence. This means favour-
ing evidence that supports or agrees with whatever 
you already believe. When we are particularly 
committed or attached to a certain idea, we often 
trick ourselves into seeking out and using only the 
confirming evidence. This can lead us to miss out on 
other kinds of evidence which are equally relevant. As 
a result, we can end up accepting a proposition that 
isn’t true, or failing to properly understand a given 
problem. And we can harm our own interests in all 
the same ways that resisting contrary evidence can do. 
To cite a real-world example: in the years leading up 
to the banking collapse of September 2008, there were 
many people in the banking and investment industries 
who knew that a crisis was coming. Profits from debt 
refinancing, sales of derivatives, sub-prime mortgages, 
and the like, could not rise forever, they said. But those 
people were told to keep their objections quiet because 
the system, at the time, was still profitable. Some of 
these critics were threatened with being fired if they 
persisted with their warnings. But their warnings came 
true, with catastrophic results for the world economy.
Here’s the example that philosophy professors 
almost always use: the proposition that “all swans are 
white”. If you wanted to find out whether this proposi-
tion is true, you could look for white swans. However, 
even if you saw nothing but white swans, you would 
not be able to deductively claim that the proposition is 
true. At the most, you could claim that, “all the swans 
I’ve seen so far are white.” Therefore, you should also 
look for black swans. The more white swans you see, 
the stronger your claim becomes. But one sighting of 
one black swan is all that it you need to deductively 
prove that the proposition is false.
Although it is not, strictly speaking, a part of 
confirmation bias, there is a third way that people 
inadvertently bias their handling of evidence: Prefer-
ring Available Evidence. This means preferring the 
evidence that is easy to find. The evidence might be 
memorable, or very impressive, or simply psychologi-
cally persuasive. It might be the evidence that happens 
to come up on your social media stream, as your 
friends share the website links or the ‘memes’ that 
amuse or interest them. But the easy evidence is not 
necessarily all the evidence! For example: people today 
are inclined to assume that there is more war in the 
world now than ever before, because we hear about 
war in the news almost every day. But actually, there is 
much less war in the world now than ever before. In 
fact, at the time of writing, only 42 countries, out of 
196, are considered war zones. 13 
As a final note about evidence: claims which 
assert something amazing, unlikely, or wild, or even 
just especially unusual, are often called extraordinary 
claims. So here’s another ‘proverb of reason’ for you: 
“extraordinary claims require extraordinary evi-
dence”. And if that extraordinary evidence is lacking, 
it’s best to assume the claim is false. 
5.6  Conspiracy theories
A common kind of extraordinary claim is the con-
spiracy theory. For example, many people believe that 
the moon landings of 1969 to 1972 were filmed in a 
studio, the governments of the United States and other 
powerful countries are controlled by a secret society 
called The Illuminati, and that the attacks of “9/11” 
were an “inside job”. Some of the inoculations given to 
newborn babies just after birth cause those babies to 
develop learning disabilities, and can even stunt their 
brain growth. Some people believe that the vapor trails 
in the sky left behind by jet aircraft contain mind-
altering chemicals which governments use to pacify 
the populations in cities and keep them obedient to 
the laws. Extraordinary claims like these ones are often 
called conspiracy theories. 
The American writer Mark Twain defined a con-
spiracy as “A secret agreement of a number of men for 
the pursuance of policies which they dare not admit 
in public.” For our purposes, let’s define a conspiracy 
theory as a theory that attempts to explain some 
event or situation in the world by saying it is the 
work of a secret group of people who have nefari-
ous aims. Part of why conspiracy theories seem com-
pelling is because there is often at least some evidence 
available which seems to support it. For instance, 
those who believe the moon landings didn’t happen 
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often point to the photos from the lunar surface, in 
which there are no stars in the sky. Those who believe 
in ‘secret government’ type conspiracies point to the 
‘occult’ symbol on the back of the American $1 bill 
(that’s the pyramid with the eye in the top). And those 
who believe in various “9/11” conspiracies note that the 
World Trade Centre towers fell in a way that strongly 
resembles a controlled demolition.
But in most conspiracy theories, there are usually 
other, and far simpler, ways to explain the evidence. 
To continue the examples given above: There are no 
stars in the moon landing videos because their feeble 
light is drowned out by the glare of the moon’s surface, 
dispersing the light of the sun. This is the same reason 
we do not see the stars on earth during the day: the 
glare of the sun, dispersed in the atmosphere, drowns 
them out. The “Illuminati Pyramid” on the back of 
the American $1 bill was placed there as a symbol that 
the American union is both glorious, and unfinished. 
It also has to do with the deistic and humanist ideas 
espoused by the authors of the U.S. constitution. And 
the World Trade Centre towers fell in an apparently 
controlled way because they were designed to do so 
in the event of a fire, just like all modern skyscrapers. 
Remember your Ockham’s Razor! If other explana-
tions are simpler, and require fewer presuppositions, 
then you should prefer those other explanations, until 
or unless extraordinary evidence appears.
Conspiracy theories tend to have these four as-
sumptions in common:
5. They concern groups, large or small, not isolated 
individuals;
6. The group has illegal or sinister aims;
7. The group’s activities are highly organized, not ac-
cidental; and
8. The planning for their activities is carried out in 
secret, not in public. 14
If the explanation for some event involves these 
assumptions, and especially if these assumptions are 
closed to critical questioning (like a value program), 
then you’ve probably got a conspiracy theory. And you 
should invoke your reasonable doubt.
Some of you might have heard the phrase: “Just 
because you’re paranoid, it doesn’t mean they are not 
out to get you!” In the same way, just because some 
extraordinary claim bears these four signs of a con-
spiracy theory, it doesn’t mean the claim is false. But it 
does mean you are almost certainly better off assuming 
the claim is false. In the spirit of open-mindedness, it’s 
fine to remain open to the idea that some day you may 
indeed see some extraordinary evidence in support of 
the extraordinary claim. But until that day arrives, it’s 
best to let the claim go.
5.7  Propaganda and Disinformation
Another place you are likely to encounter extraor-
dinary claims which require extraordinary evidence 
is in political communications.  In normal everyday 
language the word ‘propaganda’ tends to have a bad 
connotation: it refers to a message from a government 
or political party that tries to garner support for a 
political cause by emotionally manipulating people. 
But the word need not always mean something 
negative. Propaganda is a type of communication 
from a political organization, which is spread for 
the purpose of raising support for that organiza-
tion’s causes and policies, whatever those might be, 
and whether the means of persuasion is rational or 
emotional or something else. Governments publish 
propaganda all the time, as do all political parties, 
although some might do so more often than others. 
Corporations, labour unions, military forces, churches, 
charities, and all kinds of other public institutions 
publish propaganda to raise support for their own 
purposes, too. A political scientist with whom I’m 
acquainted defines propaganda as any government 
communication, or any party political communication 
of any kind, including innocuous messages such as 
those which inform the public about when a certain 
office might close for the holidays. But I think that 
definition is probably too broad.
You should examine propaganda claims with the 
same critical and skeptical eye that you use to examine 
advertising, or the news, or just about anything else 
in the mass media. Such claims might be true, or 
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false; but it’s the evidence and the argument which 
determines that, not the source, nor the patriotic 
symbols which might surround it. But one should be 
especially vigilant of disinformation. Disinformation 
is a type of propaganda: it also attempts to raise sup-
port for a political party or cause. But disinformation 
tries to raise that support by deliberately spreading 
falsehoods. It might describe an event which didn’t 
happen, or which happened differently than how it is 
described. It might accuse a person or group of doing 
something they did not do. It might warn of a threat 
from an enemy or a source of danger which does 
not exist, or which in reality is fairly trivial. It might 
discredit or divert attention away from well-evidenced 
facts or well-documented historical realities.
In some ways disinformation is not like ordinary 
lies, although it always includes lies. Disinformation 
is also an attempt to construct a fictitious reality, 
supported by a set of tightly inter-connected lies, half-
truths, and pseudo-facts, and a carefully constructed 
world view. The purpose is not only to raise support 
for a political cause, or to influence people to vote, 
or spend money, or act in a certain way. It also aims 
to influence people to live, speak, and think as if the 
fictitious reality is the truth. Disinformation may point 
to actual events, but describe them in the very worst 
possible light. And it will normally appear to come 
from very trustworthy and reliable sources. These 
features help make it seem credible and persuasive. But 
this also makes it very hard to identify whether or not 
a given piece of propaganda is actually disinformation. 
And it is effective because most people tend to trust 
and believe what they see and hear and read in sources 
that look authoritative. And most people tend to 
trust speakers who seem confident, self-assured, and 
convinced.  Here are some examples from the 20th 
century:
•	 U.S. senator Joseph McCarthy’s ‘communist conspiracy’, 
1950-54.
•	 The Nazi campaign against the Jews, which falsely 
accused them of doing things that are just too horrible 
to reprint here, 1933-1945.
•	 The corporate-funded denial of climate change and 
global warming.
•	 The nonexistent Iraqi ‘weapons of mass destruction’, 
which was the stated causus belli for the Iraq War in 
2003.
Almost all political parties and governments 
spread disinformation once in a while; some more 
than others, and some have done so in the past more 
than they do now. Corporations sometimes spread 
disinformation about the quality or safety of their 
products, or their competitor’s products. They may also 
spread disinformation about the state of the economy, 
or the state of some situation in the world, in order 
to keep their investors confident, or maintain market 
share. Military forces sometimes use it to trick their 
enemies into believing the wrong thing about the 
strength of the force that faces them.
 Disinformation is often extremely difficult 
to identify, at least at first. It often requires a lot of 
research, a lot of courageous questions, and a lot of 
time to pass, before the reality is revealed. As with 
recognizing conspiracy theories, one should remember 
that extraordinary claims require extraordinary 
evidence, but this, too, can be difficult to apply, 
because the disinformation may actually present the 
extraordinary evidence to the public. (The trouble is 
that such ‘evidence’ is often fabricated from nothing, 
or taken out-of-context, or mixed with half- truths and 
lies, or just as extraordinary as the claim it supposedly 
supports.) But there are a few general features of a 
disinformation campaign which, if you spot them, may 
give you reason to doubt it.
Excessive simplicity. The world view and the fram-
ing language of a disinformation campaign tends to 
presuppose a highly simplistic understanding of things. 
Elsewhere in this textbook I have described simplicity 
as a good thinking habit, and as a quality of the prefer-
able explanation for things, and so this statement may 
seem incongruous. Yet the disinformation communique 
tends to simplify things that are by nature complicated, 
such as diplomatic, economic, or scientific matters. It 
also tends to ignore or suppress tricky or subtle details 
which nonetheless remain relevant.
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Absolutist moral assumptions. As part of its 
excessively simple view of things, the disinformation 
campaign often assumes that in any moral matter relat-
ed to its topic there are only ‘good guys’ and ‘bad guys’, 
and almost nothing in between. Within the world view 
of the fictitious reality created by the campaign there is 
normally no room for any discussion of alternatives. In 
this way the world view presupposed by a disinforma-
tion campaign resembles a value program (c.f. world 
views, chapter 1.)
Fear. The ‘bad guys’ in the absolutist moral assumption 
are portrayed as a source of danger. They might be said 
to threaten the economy, or the state, or people’s lives. 
Racist or xenophobic beliefs are frequently included 
here: the campaign might claim that the ‘bad guys’ 
cannot be trusted because they have lower standards of 
hygiene, or they are prone to criminality, less intelligent 
on average, involved in criminal conspiracies, or that 
they do not share the target audience’s cultural and 
religious values. 
Unstated assumptions. The disinformation cam-
paign presents a set of pseudo-facts and then suggests 
implications or hints at possibilities, using framing 
words, rhetorical or leading questions, provocative im-
ages, and the like. The target audience is thus prompted 
to reach certain conclusions on their own. This tech-
nique is often used when the explicit statement of the 
assumption would damage the campaign, for instance if 
the conclusion to be reached is racist or sexist, or if it is 
clearly a logical fallacy.
Time pressure: if the disinformation includes a call 
to action, then it is often claimed that the action must 
be taken quickly. War propaganda often includes an ele-
ment of time pressure.
Mixing Truths and Falsehoods. Disinformation 
campaigns might include a few clear truths among its 
propositions. Mixing truths together with half-truths 
and lies, and expressing such truths with the right kind 
of framing language, can help make the overall picture 
presented by the campaign appear more believable.
Fake, inaccessible, or misquoted authori-
ties . Among the falsehoods which form part of the dis-
information, there might be testimony from scientists, 
policy analysts, or other relevant experts and witnesses. 
Later, it may be revealed that these people cannot be 
reached by the public, or that their actual reports have 
been suppressed or partially censored, or that they 
don’t exist at all. (One should always be suspicious of 
statements like “The experts agree that...” when such 
statements are not coupled with information about 
who those experts are, or what organization they work 
for.) Out-of-context quotations from actual experts, or 
from political rivals, may also be used to make it seem as 
if that person said something very different from what 
was actually intended.
Shifted accusations. The disinformation cam-
paign might accuse rival persons or parties of doing 
things they themselves have done, including conducting 
disinformation campaigns.
Black Propaganda /  False flags. A disinforma-
tion communique might disguise its true source, for 
instance by appearing to have come from one party, 
when in fact it came from another. Or, it might describe 
a real event, with credible witnesses and documentary 
evidence, but which was secretly carried out by persons 
disguised as members of a different party than their 
own. The term ‘false flag’ comes from military and 
spycraft parlance, and refers to ships flying the flag of a 
different country than the one they’re actually registered 
with, or soldiers wearing the uniforms of a different 
army than their own.
Marketing techniques. Disinformation often uses 
some of the same techniques used by advertisers to per-
suade us to spend our money in certain ways. It might 
use celebrity endorsements, weasel words, constant rep-
etition, provocative images, and so on. If it comes from 
a government, it might use patriotic symbols such as na-
tional flags, portraits of respected leaders, references to 
historical events, and so on. If it comes from a religious 
group, it might use religious symbols, or quotations 
from holy books, etc.
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There might be more to disinformation than these 
features, but these are perhaps the most important 
points. A given disinformation campaign might have 
only some of these features, not all of them. But the 
more of these features you think are present in a given 
piece of propaganda, then the more you may want to 
engage your reasonable doubt. 
Another thing you can do is go to a fact-checking 
agency, to see if any professional research has been 
done on the topic. Most such agencies can be reached 
on the Internet, and some publish their findings in 
newspapers and magazines as well as in their own web 
sites. Here is a short list of them:
•	 FactCheck.org  (USA)
•	 PolitiFact.com  (USA)
•	 FullFact.org  (United Kingdom)
•	 Snopes.com  (primarily for memes and urban legends)
5.8  Doubting experts and professionals
 Given that we don’t always have the time or the op-
portunity to figure out things for ourselves, we have to 
rely on experts at least some of the time. This is natural 
and normal, and not a problem. But we must still 
decide when it is rational to trust an expert, and when 
it is rational to not trust one! And in some specialized 
fields, if you are not a professional in that field then 
you are probably not in a very good position to judge 
whether the expert has done a good job. It is also 
sometimes the case that professionals and experts are 
in a position to harm as well as to help their clients. So, 
how do you know who is an expert, and who is not? 
And how do we decide whether a given expert can be 
trusted?
One of the most frequently quoted definitions 
of a ‘profession’ was written in 1914 by United States 
Supreme Court judge Louis Brandeis, who wrote that 
a profession is:
...an occupation for which the necessary preliminary 
training is intellectual in character, involving knowledge 
and to some extent learning, as distinguished from mere 
skill; which is pursued largely for others, and not merely 
for one’s own self; and in which the financial return is 
not the accepted measure of success. 15
We might criticize this definition by saying that 
its emphasis on service to others renders it too narrow. 
There might be lots of experts who practice their 
profession in order to benefit themselves. Yet the point 
that Brandeis was trying to reach was that such service 
to the public is an essential part of what makes a 
professional person trustworthy.
Let’s define an expert here as someone who is 
very knowledgeable in a particular subject area or 
field, more so than most other people are, due to some 
combination of experience and specialized training.  
Experts tend to have:
•	 A lot of formal education and training from college or 
university, or some other reputable institution relevant 
to their field.
•	 A lot of experience. Several years at least; and the more, 
the better.
•	 A decent reputation among other experts in the same 
field, and among clients.
•	 A history of professional accomplishments.
Yet even when it is appropriate to call someone an 
expert, there are still circumstances in which it may be 
prudent to doubt what that person says. Here are some 
examples:
•	 The person is speaking about a topic outside of his or 
her actual training and experience, and yet claims to be 
an expert in that field.
•	 There are decent reasons to believe that the expert is 
inappropriately influenced or biased (for instance, 
by the corporation that funds his or her research), or 
involved in a conflict of interest.
•	 When various experts disagree with each other about 
the matter under consideration.
Regarding the second point: Many academic 
science journals now encourage their contributors to 
put a ‘conflict of interest statement’ in their published 
articles, to help allay concerns about whether corpo-
Chapter Five 5.8  Doubting experts and professionals.
15 Louis Brandeis, Business - a profession (Boston, USA: Hale, Cushman, & Flint, 1933), pg. 2
92
rate or government power influenced their research. 
Here’s an example of such a statement: “The authors 
declare that the research was conducted in the absence 
of any commercial or financial relationships that could 
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.”
The third point deserves a closer look for a 
moment, too. Experts disagree with each other all 
the time, and this is part of the way that experts keep 
their skills sharp and their judgments sound. But 
most of the time, most experts in a given field will 
have a general consensus among each other about the 
most important principles of their field. (It would be 
weird, for instance, if there was a lot of disagreement 
among aeronautical engineers concerning whether 
propeller-driven aircraft need to have wings.) But 
when the experts have a lot of disagreement among 
each other, non-experts should stand back and exercise 
some reasonable doubt. When the experts who agree 
with some claim are the great majority, and when the 
experts who disagree with that claim are a very small 
minority, then we have less reason to doubt it. For 
example, the vast overwhelming majority of qualified 
scientists in relevant fields believe that climate change 
and global warming is real, and is being caused by 
human industrial activity. In late 2012 Dr. James 
Powell, executive director of the National Physical 
Science Consortium, surveyed 13,950 articles published 
in peer-reviewed, professional scientific journals. He 
found that only 24 of them claimed that the theory of 
global warming was false.16 Clearly, then, there is no 
controversy among climate scientists about the causes 
of global warming.
And here are a few more points to consider. It is 
possible to doubt what an expert says without at the 
same time doubting that someone is an expert. It’s 
also not rational to believe something just because an 
expert said it’s true, and for no other reason. (To do so 
is called the fallacy of appeal to authority.) And there 
are some questions which, while we should seek the 
advice of experts for help resolving, we have to resolve 
for ourselves.  Moral, social, religious, or political ques-
tions are among the kinds of questions each person 
should decide, by means of reason, on his or her own.
5.9  Doubting your own eyes and ears.
Most of the time, it’s perfectly rational to believe that 
something is true when you’ve seen or heard it for 
yourself. Yet there are several factors that can alter your 
perceptions of things, and if those factors are in play, it 
can be reasonable to doubt your own senses.
Our expectations, stereotypes, and bad thinking 
habits affect what we see, and how we remember what 
we see. In 1947, psychologists Gordon Allport and 
Joseph Postman conducted an experiment in which 
they showed people a drawing of two men, one black 
and one white, confronting each other on a subway 
car. The white man held a knife in his hand. Later, the 
people were asked to describe the picture. Around 
half of them said the knife was in the black man’s 
hand. Psychologists Boon & Davies replicated the 
experiment in 1987, and the picture they used depicted 
two white men, but one was wearing a business suit 
and the other was wearing workman’s clothes. Again, 
many people recalled later that the knife was in the 
workman’s hands. In these examples, the viewer’s 
stereotypes and prejudices caused them to construct 
certain memories differently in their minds. Those 
who recalled the pictures wrongly genuinely believed 
that the picture was as they described it later. They 
were not deliberately telling lies. But because of their 
unconscious expectations, based on the stereotypes 
that still operated unconsciously in their minds, 
they got the picture wrong. This affects all kinds of 
situations where eyewitness testimony is important: 
criminal investigations, for instance. Because people’s 
perceptions can be distorted in this way, police detec-
tives prefer hard physical evidence over eyewitness 
testimony, when investigating crime scenes and bring-
ing evidence to prosecutors. Eyewitnesses are often too 
unreliable.
Expectation, as a form of observer bias, tends to 
happen when we have a strong enough desire for 
something to be true. We will interpret our personal 
experiences in the way that best fits our desires. One of 
the most common ways in which we do this is when 
we see human faces in objects where no such shapes 
exist. Psychologists call this effect Pareidolia, which 
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we can define as a psychological phenomenom in 
which vague and ambiguous sensory information 
is perceived as meaningful. And this happens 
because the mind is almost always working to organize 
the sensory information it receives, the better to un-
derstand it. The ‘face on Mars’, the hill in the Cydonia 
region of the planet Mars which looked like a human 
face in a 1976 photograph, is a well known example of 
this. Other examples of Pareidolia include astronomer 
Percivel Lowell’s diagrams of “canals” on the surface of 
the planet Mars, first published 1895. The case of the 
piece of toast that had a burn mark resembling the 
face of Christ is another famous example. 17 The people 
involved in these examples strongly wanted to believe 
that what they were seeing is what they thought it was. 
And that strong desire affected their perceptions.
Sometimes, the mere verbal suggestion that things 
might be a certain way is enough to make people 
expect to see them that way. In 2007 I tried this out my-
self. On a visit to a cornfield maze with some children, 
near Halloween, I mentioned that the cornfield was 
the site of a War of 1812 battle, and that the ghosts of 
some of the soldiers had been seen there once or twice 
through the years. Sure enough, half an hour later, 
one of the children ran out of the maze, panting with 
fright, claiming to have seen one. He hadn’t, of course. 
But the darkness, the creepy music fed through hidden 
speakers that the farmer had placed in the maze, 
and my suggestion of what he might have seen, was 
enough to produce in his consciousness the expecta-
tion of a certain experience, which he then imposed 
on his perceptions. Some ‘Reality TV’ shows exploit 
the psychological power of suggestion, to create in the 
minds of the show’s participants the expectation of 
ghosts, or aliens, or whatever the show might be about.
Environments where the sensory information is 
vague or ambiguous can also influence our expecta-
tions, and affect what we think we see and hear. The 
situation might be too dark, too bright, too hazy, too 
foggy, or too noisy. Clouds, smoke, garbled voices, 
multiple sources of loud noise, blurry photos, strange 
smells, etc. might obstruct your senses. Because of 
pareidolia, the mind will often impose an organized 
pattern on the ambiguous sights and sounds. Similarly, 
you may want to consider doubting your own eyes 
and ears when your senses are physically impaired. You 
might be sick, injured, stressed, tired, dizzy, excited, on 
drugs, hypnotized, distracted, disoriented, or drunk. 
Certain illnesses, such as diabetic myopia, can also af-
fect one’s eyesight. Each of these situations constitutes 
a kind of impairment, and can lead you to perceive 
things in the world improperly. It is usually under such 
circumstances that people have paranormal or super-
natural experiences: ghost sightings, UFO sightings, 
etc. Leaving aside the possibility that such things are 
real: if you are seeing such a thing during bad visual 
conditions, and while impaired, it’s probably safe to 
discount your first thoughts about what it is you are 
seeing.
5.10  Scams, Frauds, and Confidence Tricks
An associate of mine once saw a job listing on 
craigslist, in which the employer was looking for a 
mystery shopper (a person who poses as a normal 
customer at some business, and then reports about his 
or her experience back to the employer.) My associate 
was sent a cheque for $3,000 and then asked to wire-
transfer the money to an address in a foreign country, 
and then report about her experience with the money 
transfer service. But when she brought the cheque to 
the bank, she was told that the cheque had the wrong 
signature, and would not be cashed. Had she deposited 
the cheque using an ATM, or a cheque-cashing service, 
then she would have transferred the money to the 
destination, and then the bank would have eventually 
discovered that the cheque was bogus and cancelled it. 
The result would have been that my friend would have 
lost $3,000 of her own money.
All scams and confidence tricks depend on two 
main factors for success: the victim’s self-interest (espe-
cially his or her desire for money, sex, social prestige, a 
job, or even love and attention), and the victim’s gull-
ibility. They are successful when prospective victims 
want something desperately enough, and don’t ask 
too many questions. Scam artists and con men tend to 
be creative, persuasive, and original; they constantly 
change or improve their strategies, so that their 
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scams become harder to detect, and of course more 
successful. Some con artists will research their victim’s 
history, and find out things like what the person wants, 
what their weaknesses are, what events in their past 
cause them shame or anger, and so on. These facts are 
then used to manipulate the victim later. Yet all cons 
depend on a fairly small number of basic strategies. 
Here are a few of them:
Deception. Effective con artists use lies and half-
truths to make themselves, or their situation, appear to 
be other than what it really is. Almost all confidence 
tricks rely on some amount of deception. They might 
dress in some kind of costume or disguise, for instance 
to appear very rich or very poor. They might pretend to 
be a professional in a field they actually know nothing 
about. They might set up a web site to make themselves 
look like a legitimate business.
Distraction. Con artists keep your attention focused 
on something unrelated, while they or an accomplice 
steal from you when you’re not looking. Think of the 
person who steals your purse or your wallet while pre-
tending to accidentally trip and knock you down, and 
then help you to your feet again.
Flattery. Con men often open their game by being 
friendly and amiable, and quickly become admiring and 
deeply respecting. Some con men might pretend to fall 
in love with their intended victim. Since most people 
enjoy being praised and admired, this strategy helps 
make the victim more receptive and agreeable to the 
con man’s claims and requests.
Time pressure. People who have been lead to believe 
that an important decision must be made in a very short 
amount of time tend to make bad decisions. 
Vulnerability. The con artist might present himself 
as someone in pain or in a position of weakness, for 
instance as someone suffering a serious disease, or some-
one persecuted unjustly by the law, etc. This technique 
manipulates the sense of empathy that most people 
have for the suffering of others.
Obedience. Most people still defer, at least partially, 
to lawyers, judges, police officers, professors, priests, rich 
people, and just about anyone who looks like they pos-
sess some kind of social authority or power. This is true 
even in societies that claim to be democratic and equal. 
Con men sometimes present themselves as persons with 
authority, in order exploit people’s willingness to defer 
and to obey.
Conformity. Taking advantage of the fact that most 
people will do what they see lots of other people doing, 
the con artist and accomplices will do something in 
order to make it easier for their victim to do it too. 
Think of people who start crossing a road before the 
lights have changed because two or three others have 
already started crossing ahead of them.
Although all cons involve those basic psychologi-
cal strategies, some specific applications of those strate-
gies have been so successful that they have been given 
names. Here are a few of them:
“Big Store” is named after the Marx Brothers movie, 
and it involves renting out a large building, such as a 
storefront or a warehouse, and filling it with furniture 
and people to make it appear like a well established 
business. 
“Phishing” is when the con artist sends an email that 
looks like it comes from a legitimate business, bank, 
or government agency. The message asks the victim to 
‘verify’ or ‘confirm’ personal details that may have been 
lost or subject to a computer virus attack, such as email 
passwords and bank account numbers.
“Shell game” and “Three Card Monty” is a 
sleight-of-hand trick in which a pebble or other small 
object is placed under one of three cups or shells or sim-
ilar objects. The position of the cups is then mixed up 
at random by sliding them across the table quickly, and 
then the victim is asked to bet some money on which 
cup has the pebble. What the victim does not normally 
see is that the pebble has been moved separately, and is 
hiding elsewhere, such as in the con artist’s palm. 
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“Bait and Switch”. This is a con in which a victim 
is offered a chance to buy something, or must do 
something to get something else in return. They might 
be shown the product or the reward that they have been 
offered. But once the money changes hands or the ser-
vice is performed, the product or reward turns out to be 
something very different, and not what was promised.
“Honey Trap” is a very aggressive kind of scam in 
which a sexually attractive person lures the victim to a 
private location with an expressed or implied promise of 
sexual intimacy. Once the victim has been lured to the 
private place, he or she might be robbed, blackmailed, 
held captive, photographed in a compromising position, 
kidnapped, harmed in other ways, or even killed. 
“Russian Bride” is a less aggressive version of the 
Honey Trap. In this type of scam, the con artists creates 
fake personal ads with dating websites or matchmaking 
services, poses as a single person in a distant country, 
and starts a long-distance relationship with the victim. 
Eventually, the con artist will ask for money to emigrate 
to the victim’s country, and possibly to move household 
furniture and children too. But once the money is sent, 
the con artist disappears.
“Ponzi  Schemes” are types of financial investment 
frauds. A con artist posing as a businessperson will offer 
to prospective victims a chance to invest in some low or 
medium risk enterprise, and offered an excellent return 
of investment rate. But in reality there is no enterprise. 
The con artist uses money from his second investor to 
pay his first investor. Then he uses money from his third 
investor to pay the second one, and so on. (In a variation 
of this scam called the Pyramid Scheme, the con artist 
freely admits that there is no enterprise to invest in, 
and promises to pay earlier investors with new money 
from subsequent investors.) This procedure can be very 
difficult for victims to spot, since at least some investors 
think they are getting their money’s worth. A success-
ful pyramid scheme operator can eventually become 
exceedingly rich, if he’s careful. But the system depends 
on a constant flow of money from new victims to keep 
working. If the flow of new investment should slow 
down or stop, the scheme collapses.
“Psychic Scams” involve a con artist who claims 
to possess magical powers. For instance, he might say 
he can communicate with the dead, or with angels or 
other supernatural beings, or with aliens, or even with 
God. For a price he will convey to the victim messages 
from a recently deceased person (or animal!). Or he 
might claim to be able to detect and remove curses. Or 
he might offer to cast magical spells which will bring 
the victim money, good heath, love, a better job, or some 
other kind of worldly benefit. Leaving aside the ques-
tion of whether ghosts or magic or gods actually exist, 
the fraudulent medium exploits the victim’s belief in 
the paranormal to part him from his money.
“Affinity Scams” are scams in which the con artist 
poses as a member of a tightly integrated small com-
munity of some kind, such as a church, or an ethnic 
enclave in a large city (“Chinatown”, or “Little Italy”, 
etc). The con artist ingratiates himself to the leaders and 
prominent members of the group in order to improve 
his credibility among other members.
“Advance Fee Fraud”. In this type of scam, a person 
is asked to do something and is promised a large sum 
of money as the reward, but must pay the con artist a 
small sum in advance as part of the deal. A common 
version of this is called “Nigerian Money Scam” or “419 
Scam”, named for the section of Nigerian criminal law 
which covers fraud. In this type of scam, the con artist 
sends an email message to hundreds of people, in which 
he poses as someone from a foreign country, and asks 
for your help opening a bank account in your country. 
He’ll say this is needed to transfer a very large sum of 
money as part of an inheritance, or tax-avoidance plan, 
or similar deal. You are also offered a share of that large 
sum of money. But once you open the account, you will 
be asked to make deposits to keep the account ‘active’ 
or ‘viable’ or something like that. And your share of the 
big sum never arrives. Another variation, going back 
to the 19th century, is called the “Spanish Prisoner”. In 
this scam, a person asks for help transferring money to 
an individual who will help break a rich friend out of 
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a jail (in Spain). The con artist asks for some money in 
advance in order to bribe the guards, and then promises 
a share of the money that the rich prisoner will surely 
pay as a reward when he is free. A more recent variation 
is the “Casting Agent” scam, in which the scam artist 
poses as a talent scout for a film studio or modeling 
agency. The con artist asks for large up-front fees for 
professional photo shoots, and promises the victim that 
well-paying jobs will soon follow. The photos for the 
victim’s portfolio might arrive, or they might not. But 
the jobs never do.
5.11  Doubting the Mass Media
It is important to learn to analyze films, websites, video 
games, commercials and other visual media since they 
reflect and shape our cultural values. Critically analyz-
ing media is different than analyzing an argument. 
The rhetoric of media is often about emotional rather 
than logical persuasion and this can make it difficult 
to determine the strength of the argument being pre-
sented. Our familiarity with different media and our 
viewing habits can affect how critical we can be. If you 
are used to watching films passively as entertainment, 
it is important to be aware of the things you ordinarily 
accept as part of the cinematic experience—such as the 
emotional quality of the score, or the use of close-up 
shots in certain scenes.  These can have implicit prem-
ises that serve in both the arguments made by media 
and their rhetoric. 
To begin analyzing media, you want to carefully 
describe what you are seeing. What is the media? Is 
it mostly words, pictures, sound or a combination of 
these? What is the subject of the piece, and how is it 
portrayed? Are the colors dark, is the focus sharp or 
blurry, is the lighting bright or dim? 
Once you have a basic description, ask yourself 
what information the piece conveys and what you 
would need to know in order to understand it more 
fully. If it looks like an old film, you might want to 
know if it is old or if it is just shot to look that way. 
Think about how this would change the message. 
Does it matter who made the piece? Would the mes-
sage seem different if it was created by a man rather 
than a woman, or by someone of a different cultural 
background? 
Using this information, you can begin to interpret 
the media. What do you think it means? What message 
is the author trying to communicate? What other mes-
sages are also being communicated? Think about the 
emotional tone of the piece, and the attitude it takes to 
its subject. What values does it express or omit? If the 
piece presents itself as objective/ scientific/ journalistic 
what elements contribute to or detract from this? If 
it were personal and reflective instead would it be as 
compelling?
Media is meant to be communicative, so think 
about whom the intended audience was and what the 
purpose of the piece was with regards to this audience. 
It can be very interesting to compare commercials 
(for instance) for which you were and were not in the 
intended demographic group. What makes a commer-
cial appeal to you, or not? What makes a film or game 
entertaining to you? How would a different audience 
respond?  Evaluate the success of the piece in achieving 
its purpose. How did it intend to make you feel about 
the subject? How did it make you feel?
Finally, reflect on the cultural impact of the media 
and how it might influence others. Draw on all of your 
other observations to think about this. Does it portray 
the subject in a culturally acceptable way? Does it 
present it in a new light, or in a way that conflicts 
with other values? This can be very subtle. We often 
think that films made for entertainment, because they 
don’t pretend to be objective or scientific, shouldn’t 
be taken seriously. The film Jaws is about a man-eating 
shark and aims to scare viewers with tense music and 
sharp cuts. Jaws was a fictional film, but presenting 
sharks as predators to humans changed people’s 
attitudes to sharks and had a negative impact on shark 
conservation. On the other hand, the BBC Blue Planet 
documentaries show the underwater world of fish and 
marine mammals as a purely foreign place without any 
human presence. While these films are beautiful, the 
way they present the marine environment hides the 
significant impact of humans on the oceans.
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5.12  Doubting the News
There are literally thousands of sources of news 
and information available today: newspapers, radio 
stations, television stations, web sites, and publishing 
companies, large and small. It looks like it’s a lot of 
different sources, but in fact most of them are owned 
and controlled by a relatively small number of 
corporations. Furthermore, not all of this information 
is of high quality, nor is all of this information of the 
same quality. There are several factors that can affect 
the quality of information in the mass media. By far, 
the most important of these factors is money. All news 
outlets, whether in print media, broadcast media, or 
online, and whether they lean left, right, or centre 
in terms of their political perspective, they all need 
money to maintain themselves.
News organizations make only around 20% of 
their income by selling products (newspapers, website 
subscriptions, etc.) Most of their money comes from 
advertising. Since that is the case, news organizations 
are usually very reluctant to report facts, events, opin-
ions, or realities which might offend advertisers. They 
also tend to be very reluctant to report anything that 
might offend the shareholders, many of which are not 
individuals, but other corporations. And finally, they 
tend to be very reluctant to criticize political parties 
whose platforms are consistent with the interests of 
advertisers and shareholding corporations. Here are 
the words of Canadian news media owner Conrad 
Black:
“If newspaper editors disagree with us, they should 
disagree with us when they’re no longer in our employ. 
The buck stops with the ownership, [and] I am respon-
sible for meeting the payroll. Therefore, I will ultimately 
determine what the papers say, and how they’re going to 
be run.”  18
Here are some of the ways in which journalists, 
editors, and executives bias the news to avoid offend-
ing advertisers and shareholders:
Selection of events to report /  not report: 
Obviously, if a news outlet chooses to say little or noth-
ing about a certain event, it has biased its reporting 
of the facts, even if what little it does say is factually 
correct.
Selection of point of view: As a general rule of 
thumb, any newsworthy public event can be examined 
from multiple points of view. Consider, as an example, 
a story about a bomb attack in a foreign country. The 
reporters could take the view of the victims and em-
phasize their suffering. Or they could take the view of 
the attackers, and emphasize whatever grievances they 
have for which they decided to retaliate. Or the report-
ers could draw attention to third parties harmed by, or 
benefitted by, ongoing violence in the region.
Selection of framing language: Nouns, 
metaphors and adjectives used by the journalists will 
often give away their point of view. War reporting is 
where this is most obvious: one side of a conflict might 
be referred to as ‘troops’ or ‘hordes’, while the other side 
might be referred to as ‘soldiers’, or ‘brave women and 
men’, or ‘our boys’.
Preference for Drama: Most journalists know 
that their employers depend on advertising revenue for 
their economic survival, and they also know that adver-
tisers pay more when the news service can deliver a larg-
er audience. One of the most effective ways to draw an 
audience is to report stories involving conflict, tension, 
or controversy. Sometimes journalists will report two 
or more sides of a story even when one of those sides is 
relatively insignificant. This can make a controversy ap-
pear larger than it really is. For instance, very few people 
believe that the works of William Shakespeare were 
written by someone other than Shakespeare. But in the 
interest of ‘balance’ and ‘fairness’ a journalist might give 
equal time to someone who believes Shakespeare’s plays 
were ghost-written by Francis Bacon. This creates the 
impression of a dramatic and vigorous debate, and that’s 
what usually attracts audiences.
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False Emphasis , and Marginalization: This 
is a term that dates back to the days when newspapers 
were laid out by hand, without computers. A story that 
the editors wanted to downplay might be given only a 
small amount of space on the page, near the margins 
(hence, ‘marginalization’), or on the back pages. 
Similarly, an event that the editors want to draw special 
attention to could be given a more front and centre 
position, with tall block-capital letters.
Passive Reporting: This is what happens when 
journalists don’t do their jobs. An agency that calls a 
press conference typically gives journalists a press kit 
along with access to people for interviews, and photo-
ops for their cameras. Passive Reporting happens when 
the journalists simply copy the information from their 
press kits into their reports without doing any of their 
own writing, researching, or follow-up. Reporters do 
this for many reasons: sometimes they are just so busy 
that it’s easier to just copy and paste the text from the 
press kit. But organizations who want their information 
presented in the best possible light sometimes manipu-
late the environment of the press conference to make 
the journalists more comfortable: offering alcoholic 
drinks, for instance, or free entertainment.
Disinformation: It’s an unfortunate reality, but 
some news organizations willingly publish disinforma-
tion on behalf of political parties, businesses, churches, 
or other organizations that they support, or whose 
world views they share.
Given these forces affecting the news, and these 
common ways that the news is slanted or distorted, 
how can an ordinary person become helpfully in-
formed about issues that interest her? The main thing 
to do is to read about the event that interests you in 
several news sources, not just one. Among mainstream 
corporate news services, some will be politically right 
leaning, some left leaning, and some centrist; pick one 
service for each of these three positions and read all 
three of them. Also, look for independent news outlets, 
which rely on volunteer or ‘citizen journalists’ for their 
content, and which make most of their money from 
volunteer donations or reader subscriptions. (With 
less of their revenue stream coming from advertisers, 
independent media tends not to have the same prob-
lem with advertiser-friendly bias that corporate media 
often has.) And if you have access to the Internet, 
you can read about world events in newspapers and 
broadcast media of different countries. Here’s a list of 
news outlets that I read at least two or three times each 
week:
From Canada: 
CBC News (Centre-Left)
The Globe and Mail (Centre-Right)
The National Post (Right-leaning)
From the United Kingdom:
BBC World News (Centre-Left)
The Guardian (Left-leaning)
The Times of London ( Right-leaning)
Elsewhere in the world:
France24 (France; centre-right)
Al Jazeera (Qatar; centre-left)
Der Spiegel (Germany; centre-left)
Deutsche Welle (Germany; centre)
The Economist (USA; right-leaning)
The Washington Post (USA: centre)
The Irish Times (Ireland; centre)
China Daily.com.cn  (China; centre)
Independent media:
ThinkProgress.org (USA; left-leaning)
Truth-Out.org (USA; left-leaning)
Rabble.ca (Canada; left-leaning)
A final note:  Journalists are professionals, and all 
of them entered the profession because they think it is 
important for people to know what’s going on in the 
world. (Well, that’s what one would hope!) Most of the 
time, if any bias appears in their reporting, it is quite 
accidental, and certainly not a reason to distrust the 
profession as a whole. Nonetheless, in the mass media 
there is no such thing as ‘a plain fact’. Information 
in the mass media is always subject to various forces 
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which affect how, when, and in what context, and in 
what light, it gets presented. Professional journalists 
know this. They do their best to be as objective and 
as impartial as possible. But we who read the news 
cannot simply passively accept whatever a favourite 
journalist or magazine might say. We have to read the 
media intelligently, and do our own thinking, in order 
to be fully informed when we need to make decisions 
like how to spend our money, or how to vote, or when 
to take a stand on a pressing public cause.
5.13  Doubting Advertisements and Marketing
All advertising serves just one purpose: to sell some-
thing. In general, all advertising tries to do this in one, 
or both, of these two ways:
•	 Making a favourable claim about the qualities of the 
product;
•	 Creating a favourable feeling in the mind of the viewer, 
for instance by being informative, or inspirational, or 
entertaining.
But all advertising, at its heart, delivers only one 
message: “Your life sucks, and my life is awesome, so 
buy my product or service, so your life can be awesome 
too!” Some ads may present this message in an infor-
mative or entertaining way. Some advertisements even 
have what deserves to be called artistic merit. But the 
job of advertising is not to help people make informed 
and rational choices about how to spend their money. 
It is to influence people to spend their money in very 
specific ways, on very specific products and services. 
Thus we are always justified in approaching claims 
made in advertising campaigns with reasonable doubt.
Here are some of the most common ways that 
advertisers do this:
Identification /  association: Using key words, 
images, sounds, or even provocative shapes, the product 
is presented in close association with something desir-
able. The most common object of association is sex: by 
filling the space with images of beautiful and sexually 
available people, advertisers play upon our deepest and 
most human psychological instincts. (Realistically, how-
ever, you should remember that when you see a sexy 
person in a commercial, you have almost zero chance of 
ever meeting that person face to face, so there’s no point 
paying extra attention.) But advertisers might also asso-
ciate their products with good health, exotic locations, 
celebrities and their accomplishments, or a lifestyle of 
some kind (be it adventurous, or fun-filled, or wealthy, 
or simple, or otherwise enviable).
Slogans and j ingles: Catchy tunes, rhymes, clever 
puns and word play, and so on, can hold our attention 
for years. To this day, whenever I see certain brands of 
breakfast cereal in the grocery store, I hear in my mind 
the song that was played in TV ads for that cereal back 
in the 1980’s. 
Misleading /  Vague comparisons: Sometimes 
advertisers want to compare their products to other 
similar products that you might buy instead. But since 
they also want you to buy their products, they have to 
present the comparison in a slanted way. For instance, 
the text of an ad for a headache pain medicine might 
say, “Now 30% more effective!” Well, more effective than 
what? It doesn’t say. Or, a car commercial might show 
two cars together with their prices, and boast that you 
will “Save $15,000 when you buy a MonsterCar!” But the 
price of the competition’s car includes all the optional 
features like power windows and air bags, whereas the 
price of the MonsterCar doesn’t include those features.
Weasel words: These are words which appear to 
make a definite claim about the product, but actually 
don’t. For example, the marketing text for a lottery 
might say, “You might have just won ten million dol-
lars!” Well, you might have, but the realistic likelihood 
of actually winning that prize is very small. A campaign 
for a department store holiday sale might say “Up to 
60% off everything in the store!” But in fact only one 
product in the store is marked down that much, while 
everything else is marked down between 20 and 30 per-
cent. Words like ‘possibly’, ‘up to’, ‘as much as’, ‘many’, and 
so on, serve as weasel words when they are just vague 
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enough to mislead and manipulate the viewer, without 
telling an outright lie.
Puffery /  exaggerated claims: Puffery is an ex-
aggerated claim which is obviously untrue, but gets your 
attention anyway. I once saw a billboard advertisement 
for women’s cosmetics that made the claim: “We make 
women so beautiful, other women will want to kill you.” 
Taken at face value, this statement is clearly, painfully 
false. But the statement still creates the impression in 
the viewer’s mind that women who use that product 
will become enviable. Similarly, television commercials 
for trucks or fast cars might tilt the camera, to make the 
vehicle look like it can easily drive up a very steep slope. 
The image tells no lies, but most people don’t notice the 
camera tilt, especially if the shot lasts only half a second. 
So the impression left on the viewer is a somewhat 
misleading one.
Push polling: This is a type of advertising technique 
normally used by political campaigns. Large numbers of 
individuals are contacted directly, usually by telephone, 
and invited to participate in a survey. But the caller is 
not actually collecting data. Instead, the caller is trying 
to influence the contacted person’s thinking about an 
issue (and her vote!) use a series of leading questions, 
rhetorical questions, and carefully designed framing 
languages. It might drop vague hints about the bad be-
haviour of a political opponent, or an innuendo about 
the unreliability or untrustworthiness of a party.
5.14  Exercises for Chapter Five
Consider the following situations, and decide whether 
it is reasonable to doubt what is claimed, and why (or 
why not).
Early yesterday morning, just as the sun was rising, 
Jeff spotted what looked like a giant sea serpent rising 
through the mists of the lake. Jeff has never lied before. 
He must have seen the Loch Ness monster.
Shelly has had a terrible month. She was in bed with 
the flu for a week, the pipes in her bathroom burst, 
and she broke up with her boyfriend. After all that bad 
luck, she is surely due for better times.
Two studies reported in the New England Journal of 
Medicine in July 2007 found that the risk of cancer, 
heart disease, and diabetes were reduced when the 
stomach size of obese patients was reduced.
I recently purchased a gold-plated, jewel-encrusted 
scale model of the starship Enterprise. But I keep it in 
a safety deposit box in a bank vault. It’s so precious to 
me that I don’t want anyone to see it.
These statues magically move by themselves, in the 
middle of the night. But only the very virtuous can see 
them do it.
Of course there was a cover-up! And the fact that you 
can’t find out what really happened is evidence that 
the cover-up was very effective!
Everyone who “Shares” this picture on Facebook will 
receive a free Kindle Fire HD.
The MonsterCar Corporation is actually majority-
owned by a conglomerate of foreign investors who use 
their profit to fund radical militant religious groups. 
So if you are driving a MonsterCar, you’re supporting 
terrorism!
Every once in a while, you might notice the Internet 
access on your phone slowing down or stopping for 
no apparent reason. Sometimes it’s ordinary net traffic. 
But sometimes it’s the spyware on your phone, gather-
ing all your phone calls, text messages, emails, web 
sites visited, and camera pictures, and sending them 
to the government. It even tells the government your 
movements, using the map software. 
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In the discussion of Reasonable Doubt, we learned 
how to decide what to believe. In this discussion of 
moral reasoning, we will learn how to decide what to 
do. In this sense, moral reasoning is the most practical 
part of the process. When we reason about morality 
we build arguments, just like when we reason about 
anything else. But arguments involving moral proposi-
tions have to be constructed in a special way. This is 
partly to help us avoid the Naturalistic Fallacy. But it is 
also to help ensure that our arguments about morality 
are consistent.
6.1  Features of Moral Arguments
The main thing that makes an argument about 
morality distinct from other kinds of arguments is that 
moral arguments are made of moral statements, at 
least in part. A moral statement, as you might guess, 
is a statement about morality: it is a statement that 
says something about what’s right or wrong, good 
or evil, just or unjust, virtuous and wicked. Moral state-
ments are not like other propositions: they do not talk 
about what is the case or not the case. Rather, moral 
statements talk about what should be the case, or what 
should not be the case. Look for moral indicator words 
like ‘should’, ‘ought’, ‘must’, ‘is right’, ‘is wrong’, and the 
like. And look for the language of character-qualities, 
like ‘temperance’, ‘prudence’, ‘friendship’, ‘coldness’, 
‘generosity’, ‘miserliness’, and so on. Sometimes, sen-
tences written in the imperative voice (i.e. sentences 
which are commands) are moral statements in which 
some of the moral indicator words have been left out. 
Thus, a sentence like “Share your toys!” could mean, 
“You should share your toys!” But to be fully logical, 
it’s necessary to phrase imperative sentences that way 
in order to fit them into moral arguments, and find 
out whether they are sound. It’s also easy to fall into 
the fallacy of equivocation. Words like ‘good’ can have 
a moral and a non-moral meaning: we don’t use the 
word ‘goodness’ the same way when we speak of good 
snow boots, and good people.
With that in mind, which of the following are 
moral statements, and which are not?
•	 Peter should keep his promise to you.
•	 Peter did keep his promise to you.
•	 Human stem cell research is wrong.
•	 Some people think that human stem cell research is 
wrong.
•	 My mother is a good person.
•	 My mother tries to be a good person.
•	 This pasta dinner is really good.
•	 Finish your dinner!
•	 It’s wrong to cheat on tests.
•	 Information gathered from terror suspects via torture 
can’t be trusted.
•	 Torturing people suspected of terrorism is barbaric and 
criminal.
•	 You’ve always been a good friend to me.
•	 Proper etiquette demands that we treat guests with 
respect.
As mentioned, moral arguments are made of 
moral statements. This means that the conclusion is 
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a moral statement, and at least one of the premises is 
also a moral statement. As we saw in the discussion 
of deductions, nothing can appear in the conclusion 
that was not present somehow in at least one of the 
premises. So, if you have a moral statement for a 
conclusion, you need a moral statement somewhere in 
the argument as well. Without one, the argument is an 
instance of the Naturalistic Fallacy, and it’s unsound. 
Consider these examples:
(P1) It’s wrong to steal candy from babies.
(P2) Little Sonny-Poo-Poo is a baby.
(C) Therefore, it’s wrong to steal candy from Little 
Sonny-Poo-Poo.
In this example, P1 is a general claim about moral 
principles, and P2 is a factual statement. Together, they 
lead us to the conclusion, which passes a moral judg-
ment about the particular case described in P2.
(P1) Jolts of electricity are very painful.
(P2) Some of the prisoners have been interrogated 
using electric jolts.
(C) It is wrong to torture people using electric jolts.
In this example, both P1 and P2 are both factual 
claims. But the conclusion is a moral statement. Since 
there’s no moral statement among the premises, this 
argument is unsound. Now there might be an implied, 
unstated general moral principle which says that it’s 
wrong to inflict pain on people. And some readers 
might unconsciously fill in that premise, and declare 
the argument sound that way. But remember, when 
examining an argument, the only things you can 
examine are what’s actually in front of you. 
6.2  Moral Theories
How do we know that it’s wrong to steal candy from 
babies, and wrong to inflict pain on people? We know 
this because somewhere in our intellectual environ-
ments and our world views, we learned a few general 
moral principles. And there are lots and lots of moral 
theories that might form part of your world view. 
Here’s a kind of ‘family tree’ of the most successful 
theories of ethics which philosophers have developed 
over the centuries.
1: Deontology, or Duty-Ethics: These are 
theories which claim that there are actions and choices 
which are inherently, intrinsically wrong, no matter 
what the consequences are.
 1a. Divine Command
  1a.1 from scriptures [“theology”]
  1a.2 from personal experience 
  [“mysticism”]
 1b. Natural Law theory
 1c.  Kantian Deontology
 1d. Justice 
  1d.1. The Just Society [Plato]
  1d.2. Distributive Justice 
  [ John Rawls, etc.]
  1d.3. Social Contract Theory 
  [Hobbes, Rousseau, Smith]
 1e. Rights
  1e.1. Natural Rights
  1e.2. Human Rights
  1e.3. Civil Rights
2: Consequentialism: These theories claim that 
there’s no such thing as an intrinsically, inherently 
wrong choice or action. The rightness or the wrongness 
of the act or the choice depends on the consequences.
 2a. Utilitarianism
  2a.1. Act Utilitarianism / Hedonistic 
  [Bentham]
  2a.2. Rule Utilitarianism / Lexical [Mill]
  2a.3. Objective List
 2b. (Or not to be.) Ethical Egoism
  2b.1. Classical Libertarianism 
  [Locke, Mill.]
  2b.2. American Libertarianism 
  [Nozik, Rand]
3: Virtue Theory: These theories state that the 
weight of moral concern is on the character and identity 
of the person who acts and chooses, as well as the habits 
he or she develops and discharges through her actions 
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and their consequences. 
 3a. Mythological / Heroic 
 [Celtic, Norse, Greek, Germanic, etc.]
 3b. Teleological [Aristotle]    
 3c. Religious [Aquinas, El-Farabi] 
 3d. Non-Teleological [Hume]
 3e. Will to Power [Nietzsche]
 3f. Modern Virtue 
 [MacIntyre, Hursthouse, Foot, Crisp, Slote]
By the way, I have drawn this family tree with 
three roots in the base, in accord with the observation 
by philosopher Jonathan Glover that ethics is founded 
in three main psychological traits which he called ‘the 
moral resources’. 
Different ethical theories base morality either on self-
interest or else on one of the moral resources. They 
tend to urge the claims of one of these factors to be the 
basis of morality... Sympathy for others is at the heart 
of utilitarianism. Respect for other people, as a form of 
recognition of their moral standing, is the centre of Kan-
tian ethics and of moralities based on rights. Concern 
with one’s own moral identity is one source of ethics 
centred on virtue. 19
In the next sections, we’ll look at four major 
theories of ethics in detail.
6.2.1  Utilitarianism
Main authors: Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), John 
Stewart Mill (1806-1873), Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900), 
Peter Singer (b. 1946), Derek Parfit (b. 1942)
Statement of the theory: The morally right 
action is that which results in the best consequences. 
An action holds no intrinsic value; the value of an 
action depends solely on its consequences.
Discussion: By far the most widespread and 
popular ethical theory today, Utilitarianism is very 
practical, and in most situations it offers a quick and 
straightforward solution to most ordinary moral 
problems. It has turned out to be very historically in-
fluential in the last 200 years or so, especially in major 
public concerns such as women’s suffrage, the reform 
of prison conditions, the abolition of slavery, the wel-
fare of animals and of children. Because of its emphasis 
on calculating benefits, harms, and preferences, it has 
also profoundly influenced modern economics and 
econometrics.
The core of the Utilitarian theory combines three 
main points. First, actions and choices should be 
judged only in virtue of their consequences. Nothing 
else matters. Right actions are, simply, the ones with 
the best consequences. Second, the only consequence 
that needs to be examined is the amount of utility 
that the action produces, for everyone affected by the 
action. Utility is usually interpreted as ‘happiness’ 
but can also mean ‘pleasure’, ‘benefit’, or ‘well-being’. 
Its converse, disutility, usually means something like 
‘unhappiness’, ‘pain’, or ‘suffering’. The right actions are 
the ones that produce the greatest net result of utility 
over disutility. And third, when calculating the utility 
that is gained or lost as a result of one’s choices, no 
one’s utility is more important than anyone else’s. Each 
person’s entitlement to happiness is exactly the same. 
As Jeremy Bentham said, “Each to count for one and 
none to count for more than one.”
Modern Utilitarianism was originally developed 
for use by legislators in the British Parliament. 
Bentham’s idea was that law makers should ask 
themselves what consequences the policy or decision 
under consideration was likely to produce. He listed 
a number of ethical criteria with which to measure 
utility, including duration, intensity, number of people 
affected, and so on. Adding up all of these criteria in 
an almost mathematical way, he believed, would make 
it possible for legislators to come to morally correct 
decisions fairly quickly. When considering any moral 
dilemma, the right choice is the one that produces “the 
greatest benefit for the greatest number of people”, or 
the greatest net benefit over pain for all those who are 
affected.
There are several different types of the theory. 
Act Utilitarianism, which was espoused by Bentham, 
measures the utility in the actual outcomes of one’s 
choices. Rule Utilitarianism, generally attributed 
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to John Stuart Mill, holds that one should follow 
moral rules which have been shown by experience to 
produce the greatest benefit for the greatest number of 
people. This may look like a form of deontology, since 
it is a matter of obeying moral rules. But note that the 
rules gain their authority only from the consequences 
which tend to flow from following them. Thus, we 
have rules like “don’t kill”, “don’t tell lies”, etc., because 
we know that people who follow such rules tend 
to produce utility for themselves and others. Those 
who break such rules tend to produce disutility. If 
there is some situation in which following a rule will 
clearly produce disutility, then the rule should not be 
followed. 
And the core concept of the theory, Utility, also 
comes in different types:
The Pleasure Principle’ : As noted, Utility is nor-
mally defined in terms of pleasure and pain, happiness 
and suffering. And this can mean physical pleasure and 
pain, but the definition can also easily include emo-
tional and intellectual pleasures and pains, such as love, 
or depression. And it can include social conditions that 
harm people such as political repression. In this type 
of utility, all pleasures are equal: thus the pleasure of 
playing a game of conkers can be about as good as the 
pleasures of reading Chaucer. Some pleasures might last 
longer, or be more intense, or affect more people, and 
so fare better in the calculus. But if all other factors are 
equal, so is the utility or disutility that could be gained. 
Satisfaction of Desires: Utility is defined in 
terms of the fulfilment of people’s interests, and people’s 
getting of what they want and avoiding what they don’t 
want. Sharing some features in common with economic 
theories about consumer behaviour, this understanding 
of utility probably has the greatest prestige and appeal. 
Lexicality: an innovation of Mill’s that was intended 
to meet objections to Bentham’s Hedonistic theory, 
this concept asserts that some things are more worth 
desiring than others. The pleasures of Chaucer really can 
trump the pleasures of a game of conkers, since the lat-
ter (well, according to Mill) is a higher-order pleasure.
Objective List: Utility is defined in terms of an 
objective list of ‘goods’ that, as experience has shown, 
tend to improve people’s quality of life. There can be 
multiple lists for different cultures, societies, and times 
in history, which allows the theory some flexibility. 
Criticisms of the theory:  Probably the 
most obvious criticism of Utilitarianism is that its cen-
tral principle, ‘utility’, can sometimes be ambiguous. 
Measuring happiness and pleasure, as some forms of 
Utilitarianism requires, is a bit like measuring a cloud 
with a ruler.  Are sado-masochists experiencing happi-
ness by inflicting pain on each other? The re-defining 
of Utility as ‘satisfaction of preferences’ helps address 
this criticism, but it has problems of its own. Some 
people do not know what their desires are; some find 
that once their wants have been satisfied they are still 
unhappy; some might have wild or impossible desires; 
and some might have a desire to hurt others.
Another criticism is that sometimes the actual 
consequences of one’s actions are hard to identify pre-
cisely. Your choices might affect some people directly, 
others indirectly, and some only remotely. So which 
of them do you include in your utilitarian calculus, 
and which do you exclude? What about unintended 
or unforeseeable consequences? And depending on 
how you measure utility, an action can be conceived 
as having very different moral worth. Do you add up 
the average happiness of all people involved? In that 
case the net utility can be increased by getting rid of 
those who bring down the average for everyone else. 
(Think of political ‘ethnic cleansings’ here). Or do you 
maximise the total happiness? In that case utility could 
be maximised by some enormously large population 
of people all of whom experience very little utility 
individually. 
A third criticism has to do with the way 
Utilitarianism might force certain consequences 
which are unjust. There can be situations in which the 
choice that produces greatest balance of happiness 
over unhappiness also results in a lot of harm or 
suffering for people who don’t deserve it. Think of a 
magistrate forced to imprison or execute an innocent 
man in order to prevent a riot or a war, etc. In classical 
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Utilitarianism, it can be acceptable to do that which 
burdens or harms some, in order to benefit many 
others. As the character Spock from Star Trek once 
said, “The needs of the many outweigh the needs of 
the few, or the one.” Committed Utilitarians regard 
this as a strength of the theory (and rightly so). But 
this can sometimes mean that an unjust act could 
be compensated for by other consequences which 
produce enough benefit to outweigh the harm. Those 
who believe in any of the more rule-oriented moral 
views, such as the Ten Commandments or similar 
religious moral teachings, cannot logically accept that 
claim. On the rule-oriented view, no amount of utility 
could compensate and outweigh the harm caused by 
punishing an innocent person, for instance.
6.2.2 Deontology
Main authors: Immanuel Kant (1724-1778), W.D. 
Ross (1877-1971)
Statement of the theory: The right thing to 
do is that which is in accord with one’s moral duty as 
determined by reason. The rightness of wrongness of 
the action is intrinsic to the action itself. 
Discussion: Duty-based or rule-based state-
ments of ethics has been around for centuries, but the 
philosopher who did the most to lay out the logical 
structure of such statements was Immanuel Kant. As 
he saw it, the right thing to do has nothing to do with 
consequences and outcomes. It is the choice you make, 
the action in itself, which matters. And to be moral, 
the action has to be in accord with moral laws. So to 
figure out whether a choice you are about to make is in 
accord with moral law, he proposed a procedure called 
the Categorical Imperative: “Act on that maxim which 
you can at the same time will that it shall be a univer-
sal law.” Basically, the idea is to ask, what if this course 
of action was a moral law for everyone? Would it still 
be possible to do it? If some course of action became 
self-defeating if everyone did it, then you shouldn’t do 
it. For example, if you were considering telling a lie to 
someone, even an innocent and harmless one, then 
you should consider what would happen if everyone 
told lies, all the time. The result would be that no one 
would ever trust anything anybody says, so when you 
tell your lie your listener would know perfectly well 
that it’s a lie. And that defeats the purpose of telling 
the lie in the first place. As another example, you might 
think it convenient to throw fast-food wrappings out 
your car window. But if everyone did that all the time, 
there would be huge pile-ups of litter on roadsides 
everywhere, as well as traffic hazards from flying 
garbage, and a terrible smell. Civic authorities would 
have to bring in workers and equipment to constantly 
clean it up, thus making the disposal of food waste less 
convenient for everyone. So, it is wrong to do it. Kant’s 
idea is that reason cannot consent to an action which, 
if it were a law for everyone, would make it impossible 
to do the action.  
Kant formulated a second, more pragmatic 
version of his moral principle, called the Practical 
Imperative: “Act in such a way that you always treat 
humanity, whether in yourself or in another, as an end 
in itself, never as a means to an end.” In this second 
formulation of the theory, Kant named an object of 
special concern, ‘humanity’, as a thing which deserves 
the utmost respect at all times. ‘Humanity’, here, means 
that which Kant thought made human beings special: 
our capacity for reason and free will. Kant thought that 
reason and freedom were intertwined with each other, 
and he thought they were so important that anything 
which exploits, reduces, interferes with, or subverts 
them is always wrong. He was not simply saying that 
one should complain or retaliate when someone tries 
to take your freedom away. Rather, it is a matter of 
respecting reason and freedom wherever you find it, 
‘whether in yourself or in another’. A choice is always 
morally wrong if it exploits someone’s else’s freedom, 
or uses another person as a means to an end, presum-
ably a selfish end. For example, you might think that 
buying a pack of chips in a shop uses the shopkeeper 
as a means to an end, but the shopkeeper is (presum-
ably) freely exchanging his merchandise for your 
money. So there’s no moral problem. But exploiting 
the shopkeeper’s generosity to get a pack of chips for 
nothing is using his freedom as a means to an end, and 
thus intrinsically wrong.
The 19th century Scottish philosopher William 
Chapter Six 6.2.2 Deontology
108
David Ross produced a theory of ‘prima facia duties’ 
( i.e. ‘first glance’ duties ), which further clarify Deon-
tological thinking and help make it practical. Ross 
identified seven such basic principles:
Fidelity: to keep one’s promises, speak the truth, be 
loyal to friends, etc.
Reparation: to compensate others for any harms or 
burdens one might have caused them.
Gratitude: to show genuine thankfulness for benefits 
received from others.
Non-maleficence: to refrain from causing harm to 
others.
Justice: to treat people equally; to treat others in ac-
cord with what they deserve, etc.
Beneficence: to do good to others, to show respect 
and kindness to others, etc.
Self- improvement: to seek education, to develop 
one’s natural talents, etc.
Ross believed that in any given situation, one or 
more of these duties may apply. Some duties may carry 
more weight than others, and each person must evalu-
ate this on their own, following something like Kant’s 
imperatives. In cases where two or more of these duties 
conflict with each other, the weightiest of them should 
take precedence.
Kantian Deontology is probably the most 
influential rival to Utilitarianism. Almost all religious 
thinking in ethics is some variety of Deontology, for 
instance. Modern jurisprudence and legal thought 
still stems from Deontological principles. Moreover, 
almost all discussion of human rights is Deontological 
in character. The categorical rejection of slavery, racism, 
sexism, hate crimes, war crimes, cruel and unusual 
punishments, etc., and the protections of basic civil 
liberties like speech, association, privacy, habeus corpus, 
and freedom of conscience and religion, etc., stem 
from Deontological thinking.
Criticisms of the theory: Probably the 
most widely mentioned criticism of deontology is 
that it might be wrong to always ignore the actual 
consequences of our choices. When we do things, our 
intentions do not always coincide with the results. One 
can do a lot of harm even when one means well. And 
there is always a possibility that doing the right thing 
can sometimes bring about harm to people who don’t 
deserve it. 
A second criticism has to do with conflicting 
moral laws. It is conceivable that situations may arise 
in which two or more of one’s moral duties conflict 
with one another. Should you always tell the truth, 
even in a situation where doing so might lead you to 
break a promise, or fail to protect someone in danger?
And finally, Kant’s Categorical Imperative is 
perfectly capable of supporting various trivial or silly 
rules, for instance “Always wear a clown hat when 
visiting the Queen.”
6.2.3 Virtue Theory / Areteology
Main authors:  Aristotle (384-332 BCE); 20th 
century: Rosalind Hursthouse, Phillipa Foot, Alistair 
MacIntyre.
Statement of the theory: An action is right 
if it demonstrates the virtue that is appropriate for the 
situation.
Discussion: Virtue theory is the oldest but 
also the trickiest of the theories. It tends not to ask if 
such-and-such an action is the intrinsically right one, 
or whether it will produce the best consequences. It 
asks, instead, what kind of life is most worthwhile, 
what does it mean to live well, and what must we do 
to flourish as human beings. The usual answer that a 
Virtue theorist supplies to these questions runs like 
this: to live a worthwhile life, we must develop certain 
virtues. So, what is a virtue? It is “a settled disposition 
of habit”, as Aristotle defined it; it is a special quality of 
character, a behavioural or psychological disposition, 
even ‘a way of being in the world’. Each virtue has 
a certain object of interest: for instance, courage is 
concerned with the management of fear, temperance 
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with the management of pleasure, etc. Each virtue also 
has a certain role in one’s pursuit of a worthwhile and 
meaningful life.
Now there might be disagreement among various 
theories of virtue about just what a worthwhile life 
actually is; and there might be some disagreement 
about what virtues are useful and necessary to achieve 
that worthwhile life. Indeed there are different lists of 
virtues, from different cultures and different times in 
history, such as:
The Heroic Virtues (from the mythology of early 
bronze age and iron age Europe): courage, friendship, 
generosity.
The Classical Virtues (from the works of Plato 
and Aristotle): courage, prudence, temperance, justice.
The Seven Grandfathers (from aboriginal An-
ishnabe and Ojibway culture): Wisdom, Truth, Humil-
ity, Bravery, Honesty, Love, and Respect.
Although there are different lists like these, there 
is usually enough general agreement among those 
differing theories for their supporters to get along 
with each other. Some theories of virtue claim that 
the virtues are necessary for the attainment of ethical 
goals like ‘leadership’, or ‘happiness’. Some emphasize 
that the virtues are closely tied to the maintenance 
of a certain kind of community, and the preservation 
of various personal and civic relationships. But all, or 
perhaps nearly all, theories of virtue hold that the hav-
ing and the practicing of a virtue is self-rewarding: by 
acting and living in a certain way, the virtuous person 
gives to herself.  Similarly, all, or nearly all, theories 
of virtue hold that a vice, the opposite of a virtue, is 
self-punishing; the vicious person gives to himself a 
stressful, difficult, and unhappy life. Thus, a quality like 
courage is clearly a virtue, because a person wishing to 
lead a worthwhile life would have to know how to face 
danger and how to swallow fear once in a while. And 
a quality like cowardice is clearly not a virtue, because 
the cowardly person is effectively controlled by his fear.
Aristotle defined Virtue as “an excellence in the 
service of a function or a purpose.” There’s a moral 
and a non-moral meaning implied here: a knife can 
be ‘virtuous’ if it is sharp, for instance, and that’s not 
a moral statement. But Aristotle thought there was a 
purpose to being human: it is to use the ‘faculties’ or 
‘endowments of nature’ which he thought are unique 
to us, and not shared with other animals. Using those 
talents and skills, and developing them to excellence, 
is what makes us happiest in life. The most important 
of these talents, he says, is our power of reason. The 
important task which reason plays among the virtues 
is to show how much of a virtue is too much, and how 
much is not enough. This principle is now called The 
Doctrine of the Mean. A vice, Aristotle would say, 
is manifesting too much or too little of the particular 
quality that a situation calls for. Courage, to continue 
the example, goes between rashness or recklessness 
(which is too much courage), and cowardice (which is 
too little.) The idea is often compared to archery: your 
arrow can fly too high or too low, and in either case 
miss the target. 
And finally, most theories of virtue emphasize that 
developing virtue takes time. Just as “one swallow does 
not make a spring”, as Aristotle said, one good action 
by itself does not make one virtuous. Virtue theory 
requires one to practice a certain form of behaviour 
over the spread of one’s life. One becomes courageous 
by making courageous choices and doing courageous 
things. Eventually, habit takes over and then you don’t 
need to be quite as calculating about your choices. But 
even so, the virtues must be deliberately chosen, in 
each moment that calls upon you for a moral response.
Criticisms of the theory: One of the obvi-
ous problems with virtue is that the theory may not 
appear well suited to solving practical problems. When 
faced with a specific practical question such as is likely 
to arise in a business environment, or a hospital, or an 
arts venue, for instance, virtue theory tends to return 
rather unhelpful answers. It isn’t impossible to apply 
virtue theory to practical ethics problems, but neither 
is it easy. (Imagine a conversation like this one. A client 
says, “We are having a fiscal imbalance. Should I fix this 
problem by cutting worker’s wages or laying some of 
them off?” The philosopher replies, “Only if doing so 
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would be virtuous...”)
Some critics have pointed to deficiencies in the 
definition of a virtue itself. Aristotle’s definition of a 
virtue as ‘a settled disposition of habit’ might not be 
a good enough explanation of what a virtue is. Every 
moral theory faces a criticism like this one, that is, 
a question about the meaning of its core concepts. 
But as it faces virtue theory, the problem lies in the 
conundrum of ‘deliberately choosing’ that which we 
have a ‘settled disposition of habit’ to do.
6.2.4 (Distributive) Justice
Main Author: John Rawls (1921-2002)
Statement of the theory: The just distribu-
tion of social goods is a distribution that is advanta-
geous to everyone.  An unequal distribution can be 
just if it increases the total wealth, and also maximises 
the size of the minimum share.
Discussion: Unlike the three theories of ethics 
discussed above, Justice is not a theory about indi-
vidual choices. It is a theory of social and sometimes 
political choices. 
There are, of course, many theories of justice, but 
the one I will focus un here is perhaps the most widely 
discussed and accepted: the theory by American phi-
losopher John Rawls. Since his flagship text “A Theory 
of Justice” was published in 1971, literally all discussion 
of justice among philosophers has somehow revolved 
around his ideas: promoting them, modifying them, 
criticizing and rejecting them, but nonetheless talking 
about them. 
Whatever else justice may be, and whoever’s the-
ory of justice we are talking about, justice is a principle 
of social organisation, concerning the distribution of 
social goods such as wealth, power, material resources, 
punishments and honours, and the like. The first line 
of Rawls famous theory confirms the ancient orienta-
tion of justice toward the public realm: “Justice is the 
first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems 
of thought”. So when we speak of ‘distributive’ justice, 
we’re speaking of the fairness of how we distribute 
those social goods. Rawls claimed that social goods 
must be distributed in a way that is advantageous to 
everyone. Note that he does not say they have to be 
distributed equally. There could be advantages for 
everyone gained by an unequal distribution. This leads 
to what Rawls calls The Difference Principle: any 
inequalities in the distribution must be acceptable to 
those who receive the smallest share. In his words: “The 
social order is not to establish and secure the more 
attractive prospects of those better off unless doing so 
is to the advantage of those less fortunate.” Thus, Rawls 
claims that some forms of inequalities may still be just: 
they are just if they are to the benefit of the least well 
off. Under such a principle, injustice is not simply in-
equality, but rather injustice inequalities that are not to 
the benefit of everyone, and especially injustices which 
are not to the benefit of the least well-off person.
This is, he says, the system of distribution which 
all rational parties would choose if they were in an 
“original position”, standing “behind a veil of igno-
rance”. That is to say, it is the system of just distribution 
everyone would choose if no one knew what his or 
her social position would be, nor what share he or she 
would receive. In the “original position”, one can know 
the basic structure of society but one can not know 
whether one will end up rich or poor, male or female, 
black or white, well educated or poorly educated, and 
so on. Rawls claims that someone in such a position 
would bet that they might end up as the person with 
the smallest share, and would therefore want that 
smallest share to be as large as it can be.
Criticisms of the theory: Rawls presup-
poses that in the “original position”, people are still 
self-interested, and they want to maximize the size of 
their own share; and this Rawls identifies as rational 
behaviour. Some of Rawls’ critics have questioned 
this assumption about rationality. There may be 
other models of rationality that do not presuppose 
self-maximization: for instance it may be rational to be 
charitable, sympathetic, and caring.
Some critics have also pointed out that not every-
one gets to sit at the bargaining table where the social 
goods get distributed. Children, people with certain 
kinds of disabilities, people from foreign societies, 
even animals and the environment, have a stake in the 
shape of the distribution arrangement. But they might 
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not be able to speak on their own behalf, and so their 
interests in how the social goods get divided up may 
go unrepresented, and they may thus end up unjustly 
deprived of a fair share.
Finally, Rawls’ toughest critics have noted that 
Rawls’ theory concerns the distribution of goods, 
and says nothing about what is owed to people, and 
nothing about what qualities or attributes a person 
might possess which entitles him or her to a share of 
the society’s goods. Therefore, it may be argued, Rawls’ 
theory is not a theory of justice at all, but rather a 
disguised form of Utilitarianism.
6.3 Summary remarks: Why can’t we all just get 
along?
Why is there so much violence, conflict, fear, and hate 
in the world? Why can’t people just get over it and be 
friends? These are, of course, among of the oldest and 
most difficult of moral questions. There are hundreds 
of answers, and none of those answers were easily 
discovered. It might be that there are just not enough 
of the good things in life for everyone to have as much 
as they want. So as people discover this they end up 
distrusting each other, and they compete with each 
other to get as much of those things as they can. Or so 
Thomas Hobbes argued. It might be that most people 
cannot stand the presence of others whose thinking 
and reasoning is radically different from their own, 
as David Hume once claimed. Perhaps it is as Plato 
said, that as people grow accustomed to pleasures and 
luxury goods, so they eventually become unable to re-
strain their appetites for those things. Therefore, like “a 
city with a fever”, they turn to their neighbours, to take 
by stealth, or even steal by force, what they think they 
need to satisfy their feverish demands. Or, it might be 
that some people are just naturally, inexplicably evil. 
“Some men just want to watch the world burn,” as 
Alfred said to Bruce Wayne in The Dark Knight (2008), 
although that answer always seemed to me too super-
ficial, too quick, and too easy. People have reasons for 
doing things - reasons that are irrational, faulty, silly, 
or perhaps demonstrably insane - but they have their 
reasons, nonetheless. In the ten worst public shooting 
incidents in the United States, 170 people were killed, 
not including the shooters themselves (five of whom 
took their own lives).20 The shooter’s reasons ranged 
from the calculated, such as the desire to terrorize 
people who held differing political beliefs, to the 
absurd, such as the desire to be seen on the media.
Let’s re-phrase the question a little bit. What must 
people do to have at least a chance, even if only a small 
one, to get along with each other? That I think I can 
answer: we have to talk to each other. We have to be 
willing to speak truly and listen attentively to each 
other. There is a logical disjunction between speaking 
and hating; there’s a gulf as wide as the ocean between 
dialogue and murder. You might want to ‘send a mes-
sage’ to someone (as the euphemism goes) by beating 
him up, or depriving him of his rights or his dignity, 
or even by killing him. But the recipient of that kind 
of message is never in a position to hear it: the very 
means of delivery itself logically excludes meaningful 
communication. Think of old Lucretius here, who 
taught us to have no fear of death because “While one 
lives one does not die; when one dies there is no one 
there for death to claim; thus death never reaches you.” 
In the same way, a message whose means of delivery 
kills the recipient finds no one at the point of delivery 
able to receive the message at all. It’s very similar for a 
message delivered by shouting, threatening, bullying, 
stealing, hating, or any other oppressive or dehuman-
izing act short of killing. The message whose means 
of delivery oppresses or dehumanizes the recipient 
quickly finds that the recipient’s ability to hear the 
message is stripped away.
But if we talk to each other, without threats, with-
out violence, and without oppression, we acknowledge 
each other’s humanity. This is because to speak to 
someone is to assume that the other person can hear 
and understand what you are saying, and to assume 
that the other person is capable of responding to you. 
The ability to understand and to respond, so it seems 
to me, is an important part of what it is to be human. 
Even to criticize and to disagree with someone is still 
to treat that person as a human being with a mind of 
her own, because criticism and disagreement hopes to 
persuade the other person to change her mind. (Thus 
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to criticize and disagree with someone is not the same 
as to take away that person’s right to speak. But I di-
gress.)  Similarly, to listen to someone is to assume that 
the other person has a mind of her own, and that she 
has something to say, and deserves a hearing. Listening 
is not just the opposite of silencing, marginalizing, 
ignoring, or fighting the other person; listening is also 
a way of showing respect. While we are speaking to 
each other, we might also be confronting, competing, 
distrusting, manipulating, dominating, or even lying 
to each other. But we are not killing each other. And 
that, it seems to me, is no small thing. It introduces a 
moral dimension into the very structure of logic itself. 
While we are manipulating, dominating, or lying to 
each other, and so on, that moral dimension remains 
tiny and fragile, almost too small to notice. But it is 
not nothing. And it can grow. It appears on a scale of 
intensity: the less fear and hate there is in our dialogue 
with each other, the more humanity there is. 
There may be reasons to reject this rosy picture 
I’ve painted. Jean-Jacques Rousseau observed, correctly 
I think, that rationality has power enough to separate 
people as much as to unite them, and that one can use 
reason to care less about people rather than to care 
more. 
It is reason which turns man’s mind back upon itself, 
and divides him from everything that could disturb or 
afflict him. It is philosophy that isolates him, and bids 
him say, at the sight of the misfortune of others, ‘Perish 
if you will; I am secure’... A murder may with impunity 
be committed under his window; he has only to put 
his hands to his ears and argue a little with himself, 
to prevent nature, which is shocked within him, from 
identifying itself with the unfortunate sufferer. 21
But surely the problem here is not in rationality 
itself, but in a kind of reductionism that identifies 
reason with self-interest. For rationality is more than 
that. Reason can, indeed, find ways to reject the moral 
claims of others and secure itself in its own world, 
as Rousseau claims. But reason can also show us the 
moral worth of our neighbours, and create new ways 
for people to be friends. Rousseau correctly grasps the 
former but not the latter, and thus his understanding 
is too narrow. Moreover, Rousseau portrays reasoning 
as an activity that takes place entirely within one’s 
own mind, and nowhere else; but this is not always 
true. Reasoning, especially in matters of ethics, is also 
a social event. It enters into dialogue with others; it 
speaks to people and it hears what they have to say; 
and it tests its arguments against the criticisms of 
others. And if talking to each other does not guarantee 
that we will get along with each other, at least it opens 
the possibility. And that is something that violence and 
the threat of violence cannot do.
This textbook was written during the volunteer 
hours of its contributors, and financially supported by 
volunteering donors. I hope that all of them believe, as 
I do, that a world in which people can think and speak 
rationally is a better world. I’ve made this textbook 
available to the world for free, in the hope that it 
will help people understand each other, solve their 
problems, and get along with each other.
 
6.4  Exercises for Moral Reasoning
Examine the argument in the summary remarks given 
above. What are the moral propositions? What are the 
factual propositions? What patterns of argumentation 
(from chapter 3) are used here? Does the author 
commit any major logical fallacies (from chapter 
4)? Which of the four main theories of ethics does it 
appear to presuppose? What does this essay say about 
the author’s world view? And finally, is the argument 
sound or unsound?  (Notice that even if you decide 
that it is unsound, we will be speaking to each other, 
and not killing each other...)
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